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It does seem certain that a touch of the motley rests upon the ways of price
making.
-Walton Hamilton et al., Price and Price Policies 530 (1938).

INTRODUCTION
Prices are the lifeblood of markets. They provide vital information about supply and demand, signaling to consumers and producers alike and allowing individual preferences and decisions to come
together in market transactions. As every student of economics learns,
the price for a particular good or service in a competitive market is
determined by the interaction of supply and demand.1 Prices thus provide a powerful means for coordinating economic activity in a manner
that maximizes allocative efficiency.2 By allowing the decentralized,
tacit knowledge of producers and consumers to coalesce and constitute new forms of economic order, the “wisdom of prices,” to use an
explicitly Hayekian frame, has long been promoted as superior to
planning and regulation as a means of governing economic activity.3
To be sure, most economists long ago abandoned the simple notion of price formation that populates introductory economics textbooks. Price theory, to the extent that it represents a defined subfield
within economics, has been refined and adjusted over the years to accommodate all manner of concerns with the functioning of imperfectly competitive markets, the influence of industry structure, the
1. See, e.g., GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 176 (3d ed. 1966) (“Everyone
knows that prices are set by supply and demand.”).
2. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 10–11 (1962) (“The problem solved
by a price system is an extremely complicated one, involving the coordination of the
activities of tens and hundreds of millions of people all over the globe and their prompt
adjustment to ever-changing conditions. The price system is an extremely subtle and
complex device for solving this problem.”).
3. Hayek was quite critical of the neoclassical model of perfect competition, emphasizing instead the role of competition and the price system as tools for discovery
and knowledge aggregation. See, e.g., F.A. Hayek, Competition as a Discovery Procedure,
5 Q.J. AUSTRIAN ECON. 9, 13 (2002) (Marcellus S. Snow trans., 1968) (remarking upon
“the absurdity of the conventional approach proceeding from a state in which all essential conditions are assumed to be known”); F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 526–27 (1945) (“We must look at the price system as such
a mechanism for communicating information if we want to understand its real function. . . . The most significant fact about this system is the economy of knowledge with
which it operates, or how little the individual participants need to know in order to be
able to take the right action.”); see also Richard Bronk, Hayek on the Wisdom of Prices:
A Reassessment, 6 ERASMUS J. PHIL. & ECON. 82, 90 (2013) (“Thanks to the information
conveyed by prices, individual agents can act with the benefit of a type of wisdom that
is digestible and yet more comprehensive than they alone could otherwise acquire or
even understand.”).
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role of money, credit, and interest, different short- and long-term effects, and the stickiness of certain prices (among others).4 But prices
in most competitive markets are often still assumed, at least over the
long run, to reflect the fundamentals of supply and demand.5 As such,
they are also generally presumed to be fair—a presumption that has
long informed and supported various forms of economic regulation.6
When market distortions or manipulation cause prices to depart from
their competitive levels, regulation is sometimes called upon to restore competition and thus allow prices to return to their “natural”
state.7
This overly stylized story ignores for the most part the complex
ways in which prices are actually made in many markets. It asserts
rather than investigates the functioning of particular price mechanisms in particular markets. Like any powerful metaphor, the idea
that prices emerge from the interaction of supply and demand
4. See, e.g., JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST
292 (1936) (“So long as economists are concerned with what is called the
Theory of Value, they have been accustomed to teach that prices are governed by the
conditions of supply and demand . . . . But when they pass in volume II, or more often
in a separate treatise, to the Theory of Money and Prices, we hear no more of these
homely but intelligible concepts and move into a world where prices are governed by
the quantity of money, by its income-velocity, by the velocity of circulation relatively
to the volume of transactions, by hoarding, by forced saving, by inflation and deflation . . . .”); Frank H. Knight, Cost of Production and Price over Long and Short Periods,
29 J. POL. ECON. 304, 304 (1921) (“Great difficulties are met with in stating a clear and
straightforward exposition of price theory because of the fact that the given conditions
or data of the problem are so different according to the length of the time period which
the explanation takes into account.”). For a recent statement on price theory that canvasses some of the history discussed here, see E. Glen Weyl, Price Theory, 57 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 329 (2019).
5. See Philip Mirowski, Twelve Theses Concerning the History of Neoclassical Price
Theory, 38 HIST. POL. ECON. (ANN. SUPP.) 343, 371 (2006) (“For the bulk of its history,
the neoclassical program equated ‘science’ with uncovering the generic abstract operation of phenomenologically diverse markets and distilling those insights into a small
number of ‘laws of supply and demand.’”).
6. See, e.g., William Boyd, Just Price, Public Utility, and the Long History of Economic Regulation in America, 35 YALE J. ON REGUL. 721 (2018) (discussing historical
conceptions of just price and the idea that competitive markets operating under “normal” conditions generate just or fair prices).
7. The idea of a “natural” competitive price comes from Smith. See ADAM SMITH,
AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 83 (1796) (“The
price of monopoly is upon every occasion the highest which can be got. The natural
price, or the price of free competition, on the contrary, is the lowest which can be
taken. . . . The one is upon every occasion the highest which can be squeezed out of the
buyers, or which it is supposed they will consent to give: The other is the lowest which
the sellers can commonly afford to take, and at the same time continue their business.”).
AND MONEY
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(whether represented in the familiar graphs from economic textbooks
or conceived as the workings of Adam Smith’s invisible hand) has both
illuminated and obscured the ways that markets work in the real
world.
This Article takes a different approach. It starts with the practice
of price making—what Walton Hamilton once referred to as the “ways
of price making”—in particular markets.8 It focuses on the instrumentalities of price formation; that is, on the mechanisms and practices
that generate prices in specific markets. By investigating these concrete ways of price making, the Article seeks to advance our thinking
about how law, technology, and economics come together to fashion
markets and some of the concomitant challenges for regulation.
The Article draws on recent work across several disciplines that
takes the building and maintenance of markets—and the tools, techniques, and knowledge practices that make this possible—as key objects of inquiry.9 It also reaches back to earlier work by legal realists
and institutional economists and, in particular, to the work of Walton
Hamilton. More than any of his fellow travelers in economics and law,
Hamilton, who operated in both worlds, focused on the actual practices of price making in specific industries, and was outspoken in his
admonishments of economists and others for their hasty embrace of
abstract theory at the expense of the concrete.10
8. See WALTON HAMILTON, MARK ADAMS, ALBERT ABRAHAMSON, HELEN EVERETT MEIKLEJOHN, IRENE TILL & GEORGE MARSHALL, PRICE AND PRICE POLICIES 530 (1938).
9. See, e.g., DONALD MACKENZIE, AN ENGINE, NOT A CAMERA: HOW FINANCIAL MODELS
SHAPE MARKETS 13 (2006) (emphasizing the importance of understanding the “infrastructures of markets: the social, cultural, and technical conditions that make them
possible”); Fabian Muniesa, Yuval Millo & Michel Callon, An Introduction to Market Devices, in MARKET DEVICES 2 (Michel Callon et al. eds., 2007) (describing the roles played
by a wide array of market devices in constructing markets such as analytical techniques, pricing models, aggregate indicators, and trading protocols); Trevor Pinch &
Richard Swedberg, Introduction to LIVING IN A MATERIAL WORLD: ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY
MEETS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES (Trevor Pinch & Richard Swedberg eds., 2008)
(“The market . . . is not just some abstract structure of social relations or an institution
consisting of rules and regulations; it also involves material objects, be it in the form
of balances, coins, tickers, telephones, or computers.”); Fabian Muniesa, Market Technologies and the Pragmatics of Prices, 36 ECON. & SOC’Y 377 (2007) (discussing the techniques used to construct closing prices for the Paris Stock Exchange); Marion Fourcade, Price and Prejudice: On Economics and the Enchantment (and Disenchantment) of
Nature, in THE WORTH OF GOODS 45 (Jens Beckert & Patrik Aspers eds., 2011) (“Many
pricing technologies, then, are tools (complex, highly sophisticated economic tools)
that bring markets into existence. That is, they are technologies whose purpose is to
construct a space of ‘tradability.’”).
10. See HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 8, at 543 (“A vogue among persons who will
neither get down to the concrete nor probe beneath the surface is to say that price is
made by supply and demand, to dub a truism as a natural law, and to let it go at that.”);
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Rather than assuming the existence of a price mechanism as the
core of any well-functioning market, therefore, this Article asks how
these mechanisms are constructed and maintained. Answering that
question requires close attention to the techniques and practices that
generate prices and allow markets to function.11 Such a perspective, it
is argued, provides an important complement to more traditional understandings of markets in law and economics as well as more recent
critical work traveling under the rubric of law and political economy.
By investigating the micro-level details of how prices are actually
formed, we can begin to see how seemingly technical questions of
market design are fundamental to broader questions about power,
distribution, and the political economy of markets.
In keeping with such a perspective, this Article argues that prices,
and the ways of price making that stand behind them, are never
simply facts or things that emerge out of markets, but instead, are ongoing objects of struggle.12 To that end, one of the key objectives of
this Article is to show how the struggle over prices has moved upstream to become a struggle over the ways of price making in particular markets—highlighting the need for a more robust political economy of market design. For it is in this “hidden abode” of price making
that some of the most intense forms of rent seeking and conflict between market participants now occur.13 Although this requires getting
see also MALCOLM RUTHERFORD, THE INSTITUTIONALIST MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN ECONOMICS,
1918-1947: SCIENCE AND SOCIAL CONTROL 81–84 (2011) (discussing Hamilton’s study of
price and price policies and his broader role in New Deal debates about price control);
William J. Novak, Institutional Economics and the Progressive Movement for the Social
Control of American Business, 93 BUS. HIST. REV. 665, 685–86 (2019) (characterizing
Hamilton’s institutionalist conception of prices as “a revolutionary approach . . . [that]
paved the way for the mass of empirical and sociohistorical investigations of pricing in
particular industrial and institutional settings that dotted early twentieth century economic writing”).
11. See, e.g., DONALD MACKENZIE, MATERIAL MARKETS: HOW ECONOMIC AGENTS ARE
CONSTRUCTED 182 (2009) (“[T]reating ‘the market’ as a singular entity is mistaken . . . .
Of the many markets that are possible, which markets we have matters, and that is a
question not simply of their overall characteristics but of the details of their design, the
technological infrastructures that support them, and the way economic agents in them
are constructed . . . .”).
12. Max Weber, among others, specifically emphasized this view of price as an
object of struggle. See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 201 (Keith Tribe ed. & trans.,
2019) (“Money prices are the product of contest and compromise, and hence are outcomes of power constellations.”); see also id. (describing the “price system” as a “struggle of man against man” and prices as “expressions of the struggle”).
13. With apologies to Karl Marx who used this phrase to refer to the sphere of
production, where profits are made. See 1 KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
CAPITALIST PRODUCTION 154–55 (Frederick Engels ed., Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling
trans., 1902) (“Accompanied by Mr. Moneybags and by the possessor of labor-power,
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into the technical details of these markets at times, it is precisely on
this more technical terrain where so much of the politics of economic
regulation now takes place.14
The Article develops these arguments through an investigation of
two particular markets in the United States: natural gas and electricity. Both of these markets emerged out of actions by Congress and the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or the Commission) to
restructure previously regulated industries by unbundling certain
components and subjecting them to competition.15 In the process, distinctive ways of price making have taken shape in these markets;
namely, price indices in natural gas markets and market-clearing
we therefore take leave for a time of this noisy sphere, where everything takes place
on the surface and in view of all men, and follow them both into the hidden abode of
production, on whose threshold there stares us in the face ‘No admittance except on
business.’ Here we shall see, not only how capital produces, but how capital is produced. We shall at last force the secret of profit making.”); see also WALTER MATTLI,
DARKNESS BY DESIGN: THE HIDDEN POWER IN GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS 4 (2019) (“Markets
are more than simple coordination systems or ‘disembodied’ meeting places of demand and supply. They are organizations governed by their own rules and regulation.
Moreover, markets are deeply political organizations or governance systems where
contending groups of members or stakeholders are frequently embroiled in intense
battles to shape market rules and structure according to their own narrow preferences.”).
14. Cf. ANNELISE RILES, COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE: LEGAL REASONING IN THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 223 (2011) (arguing that the “technicalities” of financial regulation
are at the very core of financial governance and, as such, are “profoundly political practices”); MACKENZIE, supra note 11, at 33 (“That the design of markets—for example, the
formal and informal rules that govern them—is a political matter is true more widely.
Apparently minor matters—‘technicalities,’ often technicalities little understood by
non-participants—can have big effects, . . . giving advantages to some actors and some
strategies and disadvantaging others. . . . An effective politics of markets—whether
‘left-wing or ‘right-wing’ in inspiration—needs to engage with such apparent ‘technicalities,’ not just with the overall virtues and demerits of markets.”); Marc K. Landy &
Martin A. Levin, Creating Competitive Markets: The Politics of Market Design, in CREATING COMPETITIVE MARKETS: THE POLITICS OF REGULATORY REFORM 9–12 (Marc K. Landy et
al. eds., 2007) (noting the intense politics and rent seeking directed at various market
design processes).
15. See Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations Governing SelfImplementing Transportation; And Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial
Wellhead Decontrol, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,267, 13,270 (Apr. 16, 1992) FED. ENERGY REGUL.
COMM’N, Order No. 636 (Apr. 8, 1992) [hereinafter Order 636] (unbundling natural gas
pipeline business and imposing open access regime for interstate transportation of
natural gas); Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,541–43 FED.
ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, Order No. 888 (May 10, 1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35)
[hereinafter Order 888] (summarizing final rules requiring unbundling and open access nondiscriminatory transmission services in order to promote competitive wholesale markets).

2020]

PRICE MAKING

745

algorithms in wholesale electricity markets.16 In both cases, the Article seeks to open the black box of price making to understand how
they function and the challenges facing regulators charged with market oversight and regulation.
These cases are important in their own right. Price formation in
both natural gas and electricity has become a major preoccupation at
FERC since the early 2000s, when market manipulation and gaming
conspired with bad market design to create severe disruptions in natural gas and electricity markets across California and the western
United States, ultimately costing the California economy as much as
forty-five billion dollars.17 As this Article shows, FERC has struggled
ever since the California crisis to engage in sufficient oversight and
surveillance of market conditions, to fashion workable rules for these
markets, and to enforce against manipulation and gaming. To be sure,
FERC has been aggressive in using the new investigation and enforcement authority that Congress gave it in 2005.18 But the importance of
price formation in these markets goes well beyond the issue of manipulation, posing hard questions about markets, jurisdiction, and the
structure of federalism that animates much of U.S. energy law. Indeed,
each of the three major Supreme Court cases on energy since 2015 has
focused on jurisdictional questions stemming from the ways of price
making in natural gas and electricity markets.19 And ongoing
16. See infra Parts II.C, III.C.
17. See generally FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, FINAL REPORT ON PRICE MANIPULATION
IN WESTERN MARKETS: FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION OF POTENTIAL MANIPULATION OF ELECTRIC AND NATURAL GAS PRICES, Docket No. PA02-2-000, at ES-1 to -2 (2003) [hereinafter
FINAL REPORT] (concluding that dysfunction in natural gas and electricity markets fed
off each other during the crisis and resulted in part from manipulation of natural gas
price indices and California wholesale electricity prices); CHRISTOPHER WEARE, THE CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY CRISIS: CAUSES AND POLICY OPTIONS 3–4 (2003) (estimating $40 billion in added energy costs and $40–45 billion in total costs, which at the time was
around 3.5% of the state’s total annual economic output).
18. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005) gave FERC new civil penalty authority of up to $1 million per day per violation. See 16 U.S.C. § 825o-1. Total Civil Penalties assessed for all years 2007 to present: $784,194,020. . . . Total Disgorgement ordered for all years 2007 to present: $518,070,718. For compiled figures, see All Civil
Penalty Actions–2020, FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, https://www.ferc.gov/enforcement
-legal/enforcement/civil-penalties/all-civil-penalty-actions-2020 [https://perma.cc/
T86U-WT59]. See also FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, STAFF WHITE PAPER ON ANTI-MARKET
MANIPULATION ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS TEN YEARS AFTER EPACT 2005 (2016) [hereinafter
STAFF WHITE PAPER] (reviewing ten years of experience under the Commission’s antimanipulation rules).
19. Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373 (2015) (addressing jurisdictional issues emerging out of the manipulation of natural gas price indices); Fed. Energy Regul.
Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016) (addressing compensation
for demand response in the wholesale energy markets); Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg.,
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controversies regarding how to value various generation attributes
and how to handle state subsidies for certain resources within the
pricing structures in the organized electricity markets have only
grown in intensity since those cases were decided.20
By focusing specifically on the ways of price making in natural gas
and electricity—how they evolved in the context of restructuring, how
they work (and sometimes fail to work), how they have been manipulated and gamed, and how they have come to be viewed as key objects
in a broader competitive struggle—this Article develops a novel way
of thinking about U.S. energy law and the challenges confronting FERC
in its effort to ensure that the prices formed in these markets are just
and reasonable. Such a perspective reveals that the fundamental challenge confronting FERC is more of a conceptual challenge than a legal
one. As we will see, FERC’s tentative and uneven efforts to engage in
more oversight and regulation of price indices in natural gas and market-clearing algorithms in wholesale electricity markets result in part
from (and, at the same time, serve to reinforce) a view of markets and
competition that derives in large part from neoclassical price theory.
Although the Commission clearly recognizes the importance of price
formation in these markets and has opened multiple dockets, convened technical conferences, and launched investigations,21 it has
tended to treat price making in largely neutral terms, viewing it as a
function of underlying market forces rather than as a constitutive
technology that has become an object of struggle among market participants. This has translated into a focus on market structure and the
conduct of market participants rather than on the infrastructure and
instrumentalities of price formation, which have been left largely in
the hands of third parties. As this Article argues, FERC needs to complement its ongoing focus on market structure and conduct with more

L.L.C., 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016) (addressing state payments to certain generation resources and their implications for capacity markets). There has been a large amount
of commentary on what these cases mean for the Federal Power Act’s (FPA’s) jurisdictional “bright line” between state and federal authority. Compare Matthew R. Christiansen & Joshua C. Macey, Long Live the Federal Power Act’s Bright Line, 134 HARV. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2021) (arguing that the FPA’s jurisdictional bright line is alive and
well and developing a framework that integrates the trio of recent Supreme Court
cases in a defense of the bright line), with Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy
Federalism, 95 TEX. L. REV. 399, 403 (2016) (arguing that these cases blur the line beyond recognition and usher in a new era of concurrent jurisdiction).
20. See Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,940 (proposed Oct. 10, 2017);
FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, 162 FERC ¶ 61,012, GRID RELIABILITY AND RESILIENCY PRICING (2018); see also discussion infra Part III.C.
21. See discussion infra Parts II.B–C, III.B–C.
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direct oversight and regulation of these ways of price making, something it has ample legal authority to do.
In addition to the importance of these cases on their own terms,
they also speak to more general concerns about markets, politics, and
regulation—concerns that are especially relevant in a world where
markets of all sorts are increasingly the product of active design.22 To
that end, the Article makes three larger claims. First, it argues that
while prices play an important epistemic role in coordinating economic activity (Hayek’s key insight),23 such a view misses the fundamental ways in which prices (and the price system) are political.
While this matters more in some markets, and with some prices, than
in others, once we recognize that prices are not simply economic signals, we can begin to see a broader set of possibilities regarding the
use of markets to achieve various ends and we can recognize (yet
again) that there is no pre-political set of criteria for deciding how to
harness the power of competition and direct it toward public ends.
Second, the Article argues that the modalities of price making are
where much of the politics of markets now occur. Understanding the
micro-level details of how markets and the price mechanisms that
power them are designed and maintained is crucial to understanding
larger questions of power, distribution, and political economy. Third,
the Article underscores that when it comes to systems of provisioning
for certain economic necessities (long the traditional domain of public
utilities), we must always remember that the instrumentalities of
price making that determine the terms of access to these necessities
are themselves critical pieces of shared infrastructure.24 As such,
there is a strong public interest in ensuring that they have integrity
and are able to perform their functions. In a broad sense, they might
even be considered as public utilities in their own right.25
22. See, e.g., Matthew Kassel, Beware Algorithms that Could Collude on Prices,
WALL ST. J., (Apr. 1, 2019) (“Companies are increasingly using algorithms to help them
set prices for air travel, ride sharing, gasoline and a range of other goods.”); see also
MATTLI, supra note 13, at 49 (describing the dramatic transformation of capital markets over the past two decades as a product of “power politics” involving a “small number of insiders” who “began to quietly push for a different structure that offered a better alignment with their changing commercial interests”).
23. See Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, supra note 3, at 526–27.
24. See, e.g., K. Sabeel Rahman, Infrastructural Regulation and the New Utilities, 35
YALE J. ON REGUL. 911, 913 (2018) (framing the question of infrastructural regulation
as “how to regulate and govern foundational infrastructure—those goods and services
that are essential, upon which much of our economic and social life are built”).
25. Id. at 914; see also William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61
UCLA L. REV. 1614, 1619–20 (2014) (arguing for a broad normative conception of public utility that is not tied to any particular business model or type of entity).
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The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides background for
the rest of the Article and elaborates on the analytical approach that
frames the inquiry. Parts II and III, which comprise the empirical core
of the Article, investigate the ways of price making in restructured natural gas and electricity markets respectively, focusing specifically on
the price indices and market clearing algorithms at the center of these
markets. The central claim here is that FERC’s tendency to view these
markets in overly abstract terms, its reliance on what it has often referred to as the “forces of competition” to discipline prices, and its decision to leave regulation of the actual mechanisms of price making to
third parties26 have created significant conceptual and regulatory
challenges for the Commission, raising important questions about its
ability to carry out its responsibilities as these markets grow in size
and complexity. As these Parts show, however, FERC has ample legal
authority to engage in more direct oversight of these mechanisms of
price formation. Among other things, regulation of price indices and
market clearing algorithms would seem to fit easily within FERC’s authority under both the Natural Gas Act and the Federal Power Act to
regulate “practices” that directly affect rates.27 Each of these Parts
thus concludes with a discussion of possible reforms. Finally, Part IV
draws out some of the more general lessons from these case studies
and engages with broader debates about how to understand and investigate ways of price making and the problem of markets in U.S. energy law and beyond.
I. FROM PRICES TO PRICE MAKING
Writing in 1958, Joan Robinson chided her fellow economists for
their misguided quest to develop a general theory of prices. “Ever
since Adam Smith,” she wrote, “economists have been looking for a
simple general theory of prices to fit all cases.”28 Such an undertaking,
she continued, was “a will o’ the wisp. Prices are a social phenomenon
26. See discussion infra Parts II.C, III.C.
27. Natural Gas Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a); Federal Power Act § 206(a), 16
U.S.C. § 824e(a). Two recent Supreme Court cases, EPSA and Oneok, both address the
scope of practices affecting rates. See, e.g., Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n v. Elec. Power
Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 764 (2016) (approving lower court decision that limits
FERC’s “affecting” jurisdiction to rules or practices that directly affect the wholesale
rate); Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373, 378–79 (2015) (discussing FERC’s jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act over practices affecting rates); see also Joel B. Eisen,
FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1783,
1817–34 (2016) (tracing history of “practices affecting rates” jurisprudence).
28. Joan Robinson, Some Reflections on the Philosophy of Prices, 26 MANCHESTER
SCH. ECON. & SOC. STUD. 116, 135 (1958).
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and the pricing system in any economy is geared to its social and political system.”29
In addition to her own considerable accomplishments as an economist (among other things she played a key role in developing the theory of imperfect competition), Robinson, of course, was one of the
great interlocutors of Keynes and, unlike most of her peers, had engaged deeply with Marx.30 This breadth of learning, combined with a
maverick sensibility, likely fed her more social and relational views of
price and her limited patience for mainstream economic theory. For
Robinson, “the market, by its very nature, is . . . a scene of conflicting
interests” and prices were as much a “moral and political problem” as
an economic problem.31
But Robinson was clearly swimming against the mainstream. Her
ideas regarding the social aspects of markets and prices failed to get
traction in the wider discipline of economics that was in the midst of
a “formalist revolution” during the middle decades of the twentieth
century.32 Indeed, at almost precisely the time she was writing, formal
mathematical modeling was emerging as the dominant tool in economics.33 Most pertinent to this Article, a second generation of Chicago School economists, notably George Stigler and Milton Friedman,
were refining their own version of neoclassical price theory and preparing the ground for their critique of economic regulation.34
29. Id.
30. Key works include: JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION
(1933); JOAN ROBINSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT (1939); JOAN
ROBINSON, AN ESSAY ON MARXIAN ECONOMICS (1947).
31. 5 JOAN ROBINSON, Markets, in COLLECTED ECONOMIC PAPERS 164 (1979) (“The
doctrines of laissez faire were very attractive, not only to those who gained most directly from the market system. If the economy is a self-regulating mechanism and economics a system of scientific laws, moral and political problems are excluded from it.
Questions of social justice do not arise, all the operations of public administration are
to be strictly neutral between interested parties. Ethics can be discussed on Sunday. It
is considered unsound, soft-headed and unpatriotic to bring it in to week-day business.
As soon as we recognize that the market, by its very nature, is necessarily a scene of
conflicting interests, every element in it . . . becomes a moral and political problem.
This is tormenting because there are no longer any ‘principles of economics’ to provide
safe and simple rules for finding the correct solutions.”).
32. See, e.g., Mark Blaug, The Formalist Revolution of the 1950s, 25 J. HIST. ECON.
THOUGHT 145, 145 (2003) (observing that the “metamorphosis of economics in the late
1940s and 1950s is aptly called a ‘formalist revolution’ because it was marked, not just
by a preference, but by an absolute preference for the form of an economic argument
over its content”).
33. Id.
34. See J. Daniel Hammond, The Development of Post-War Chicago Price Theory, in
THE ELGAR COMPANION TO THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS (Ross B. Emmett ed., 2010)
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Needless to say, this growing formalization of economics had
widespread implications for the field and marked an end to an earlier
era of pluralism.35 Prior understandings of markets as concrete places
of exchange were thoroughly subsumed by abstract models of the
market as a price-making mechanism,36 with prices increasingly
viewed as signals or bits of information that emerged out of markets.37
Within the confines of the neoclassical model, very little attention was
given to the question of price adjustment in competitive markets.38

(discussing post-war development of Chicago price theory through the work of Milton
Friedman and George Stigler). Hammond describes “Chicago law and economics” as
“Chicago price theory applied to problems of the law.” Id. at 11; see also Steven G.
Medema, Chicago Price Theory and Chicago Law and Economics: A Tale of Two Transitions, in BUILDING CHICAGO ECONOMICS: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE HISTORY OF AMERICA’S
MOST POWERFUL ECONOMICS PROGRAM 151, 162–63 (Robert Van Horn, Philip Mirowski &
Thomas A. Stapleford eds., 2011) (discussing heterogeneity in Chicago price theory).
35. See, e.g., Mary S. Morgan & Malcolm Rutherford, American Economics: The
Character of the Transformation, in FROM INTERWAR PLURALISM TO POSTWAR NEOCLASSICISM 1, 4–17 (Mary S. Morgan & Malcolm Rutherford eds., 1998) (describing transition
from the pluralism of the interwar years to a “tool-kit” version of economics marked
by formal, mathematical methods during the postwar period).
36. See Richard Swedberg, Markets in Society, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 233, 240 (Neil J. Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds., 2d ed. 2005) (tracing this
shift to the marginalist revolution during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
37. See SANFORD J. GROSSMAN, THE INFORMATIONAL ROLE OF PRICES 1 (1989) (“It is a
common theme of most discussions of the competitive price system that prices convey
information.”). On the rise of an explicit economics of information, see PHILIP MIROWSKI
& EDWARD NIK-KHAH, THE KNOWLEDGE WE HAVE LOST IN INFORMATION: THE HISTORY OF INFORMATION IN MODERN ECONOMICS (2017).
38. See, e.g., Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Markets, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO SOCIAL ECONOMICS 277, 278 (John B. Davis & Wilfred Dolfsma eds., 2015) (“For much of the twentieth century there has been little discussion of how specific markets are structured to
select and authenticate information. Economists refer to the ‘forces’ of supply and demand, and locate market equilibria at the intersection of their curves in price-commodity space, but until recently they have offered little discussion of the mechanisms
through which these forces operate.”); 2 CHARLES R. PLOTT, MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND
PRICE DISCOVERY: COLLECTED PAPERS ON THE EXPERIMENTAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMICS
AND POLITICAL SCIENCE, at xxiv (2001) (discussing “the mysterious process through
which markets find price”); John Roberts, Perfectly and Imperfectly Competitive Markets, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 10,196, 10,197 (Garett Jones et al.
eds., 2018) (observing that perfect competition “is a theory of price competition that
contains no coherent explanation of price formation”); Kenneth J. Arrow, Toward a
Theory of Price Adjustment, in THE ALLOCATION OF ECONOMIC RESOURCES 41 (Moses
Abramovitz ed., 1959) (discussing the “logical gap” regarding price adjustment in the
neoclassical model).
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Even less attention was directed at the question of how prices actually
formed in existing markets.39
But if we look back to an earlier generation of institutional economists, legal scholars, and social theorists, we find alternative understandings of prices that emphasize, along with Robinson, their social
and political dimensions while also pointing to the importance of understanding the different ways of price making operating in different
markets. Max Weber, for example, viewed prices as objects of struggle
that could only be understood in the context of “power constellations”
and the ways in which various actors sought to influence what he
called “the market situation.”40 Weber was very aware, in this respect,
of the different ways that markets could be organized and the implications this had for prices. His early comparative studies of stock and
commodity exchanges in Germany, France, England, and the United
States, for example, demonstrated how the rules, institutions, and
even the mechanisms used to communicate prices varied across different market formats and how they too became part of the general
price struggle.41
39. See Marc R. Tool, Contributions to an Institutional Theory of Price Determination, in RETHINKING ECONOMICS: MARKETS, TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC EVOLUTION 19, 20
(Geoffrey M. Hodgson & Ernesto Screpanti eds., 1991) (“The neoclassical ‘price system’
is alleged to be concurrently a pervasive characterization of how prices tend to be determined in most markets and a stipulation of how prices ought to be determined in
virtually all markets. Departures from price-competitive market determinations are
examined as pathology. The abstract ideal defines the proper price system. The normative use of this competitive model remains endemic in orthodox neoclassical theory
generally. But within the sometimes contentious house of orthodoxy there is widespread recognition that the postulated theory of automatic, mechanistic price determination in free competitive markets is not necessarily descriptively adequate.” (citation omitted)).
40. See WEBER, supra note 12, at 202 (referring to the “market situation” and the
“competitive struggle”).
41. See Max Weber, Stock and Commodity Exchanges (1894), reprinted in 29 THEORY & SOC’Y 305, 326 (Steven Lestition trans., 2000) (discussing importance of exchanges to national economy and observing “how tremendously important it is that
the creating and determining of prices (of ‘rates’) take place in a secure and correct
manner”). Weber goes on to discuss the different institutions and mechanisms used to
govern these exchanges in Germany, England, and America. Id. And he clearly recognized the need to understand the specific rules and norms governing these different
markets. See id. at 335 (“One must be clear about one thing: a general, overall supervision of the exchanges remains an empty word. It is [really] a question of which specific
procedures one can and will control—or, regulate through legislative intervention—
and, for example, which sorts of business, or which business between which people,
one wants to prevent and can actually prevent.”). Both Walras and Marshall, writing at
roughly the same time as Weber, took stock exchanges—the Paris Bourse and the London Exchange in their respective cases—as the closest living examples of perfectly
competitive markets and, accordingly, as models for their respective theories of price
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Legal realists and institutional economists such as Robert Lee
Hale and John Commons likewise viewed prices and price relationships in the context of a broader economy of mutual coercion structured by a shifting set of background entitlements.42 As Hale put it,
“prices and price relationships are decisive factors in modern economic life.”43 They “account directly for the economic inequalities
which we observe between different classes in modern society.”44 At
a more granular level, Gardiner Means, Walton Hamilton, and others
rejected the simple neoclassical model of markets and prices and
pointed instead to the ways in which large firms, often in concentrated
industries, developed their own specific approach to setting prices
(what Means referred to as “administered prices”).45
formation. See J.A. Kregel, Neoclassical Price Theory, Institutions, and the Evolution of
Securities Market Organization, 105 ECON. J. 459, 459 (1995). Coase, among others, criticized this view, taking a position that was much closer to Weber’s. See Ronald H. Coase,
Nobel Prize Lecture: The Institutional Structure of Production (Dec. 9, 1991),
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1991/coase/lecture
[https://perma.cc/XQC9-KHH3] (“Stock and produce exchanges are often used by
economists as examples of perfect or near-perfect competition. But these exchanges
regulate in great detail the activities of traders (and this quite apart from any public
regulation there may be). What can be traded, when it can be traded, the terms of settlement and so on are all laid down by the authorities of the exchange. There is, in effect, a private law. Without such rules and regulations, the speedy conclusion of trades
would not be possible.”). More recently, Bernard Harcourt has used the Chicago Board
of Trade to make a similar point, albeit with more attention to the distributional effects
of these market rules and regulations. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE
MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER 180 (2011) (“The Chicago
Board of Trade is viewed as a free market; but it is, in truth, a disciplinary mechanism
that keeps a market relatively ordered.”); id. at 185 (“The rhetoric may be about the
‘free market,’ but the reality is layers upon layers of complex regulations and intricate
rules . . . all of which distribute wealth.”).
42. See, e.g., ROBERT L. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF PRIVATE
GOVERNING POWER 131 (1952) (arguing that market prices “result from and register the
mutual pressures exerted by buyers and sellers. The amount of pressure which each
can exert is very unevenly distributed, with the result that some are economically
strong, others economically weak.”); 1 JOHN R. COMMONS, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: ITS
PLACE IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 260 (1934) (defining real value as the price that obtains in
the absence of coercion).
43. Robert L. Hale, The Constitution and the Price System: Some Reflections on
Nebbia v. New York, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 401, 401 (1934). On Hale and his understanding
of markets as “a network of mutual coercion,” see BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE
ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT
49–59 (1998).
44. Hale, supra note 43, at 402.
45. See GARDINER C. MEANS, INDUSTRIAL PRICES AND THEIR RELATIVE INFLEXIBILITY, S.
DOC. NO. 74-13, at 1 (1935) (“An administered price is . . . a price which is set by administrative action and held constant for a period of time. . . . Many wholesale and most
retail prices are administered rather than market prices.”); GARDINER C. MEANS, PRICING
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What united these various approaches was the recognition that
politics and institutions determine the ways in which markets take
shape and prices emerge. As articulated by Hamilton, the goal of this
self-described field of “institutional economics” was to develop an understanding of “the economic order” that would explain “why some of
us are better off than others.”46 “Such an explanation,” he continued,
cannot properly be answered in formulas explaining the processes through
which prices emerge in a market. Its quest must go beyond sale and purchase
to the peculiarities of the economic system which allow these things to take
place upon particular terms and not upon others. It cannot stop short of a
study of the conventions, customs, habits of thinking, and modes of doing
which make up the scheme of arrangements which we call “the economic order.”47

In his price studies, Hamilton was most interested in investigating
“what lies back of a price—to make it high or low—to restrict or enlarge supply—to bring it within the reach of the few or the many.”48
“A price,” he noted,
is a monetary summary of all the conditions which give value to a ware; a
system of prices is a pecuniary shorthand for an economy at work. As a result
the phenomena of prices are as broad and varied as the industries whose
structures, arrangements, and activities they reflect. The mark of accident, of
custom, of conscious policy is upon every price.49

To be clear, Hamilton was hardly an enemy of markets. He recognized the important role of competition in disciplining prices—keeping them close to costs and ensuring that buyers and sellers alike
would be protected from the exaction of unfair gains.50 But he also
POWER AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: A STUDY BASED ON STEEL 11–14 (1962) (discussing theory of administered prices); HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 8, at 25 (“[T]he phenomena of
prices are as broad and varied as the industries whose structures, arrangements, and
activities they reflect.”); see also Robinson, supra note 31, at 156 (“Once it is recognized
that competition is never pure or perfect in reality, it becomes obvious that there is
great scope for individual variations in the price policy of firms.”).
46. Walton H. Hamilton, The Institutional Approach to Economic Theory, 9 AM.
ECON. REV. 309, 311 (1919).
47. Id.
48. See Malcolm Rutherford, Walton H. Hamilton and the Public Control of Business, 37 HIST. POL. ECON. 234, 255 (2005) (quoting Walton H. Hamilton, Why the Price
Studies?, 1 CONSUMER 7 (1936)).
49. HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 8, at 25; see also Walton H. Hamilton, Cost as a
Standard for Price, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 321, 332 (1937) (illustrating how modern
cost accounting as a basis for price varies across firms and sectors).
50. See Walton H. Hamilton, Affectation With Public Interest, 39 YALE L.J. 1089,
1107 (1930) (“Where free enterprise prevails, price-control is indirect; the state enforces competition and trusts to an open industry and a free market to establish rightful prices. . . . Because of rivalry in their ranks sellers cannot charge too much; and because of a like rivalry among buyers, they are allowed to charge enough. The result is
that prices will have a basis in costs, unfair charges cannot continue to prevail, and in

754

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[105:739

recognized, along with Hale, Commons, Means, and others, that competitive markets did not always function as intended and that some
industries required more active regulation.51 The traditional public
utilities were the most obvious example given their “natural monopoly” characteristics.52 In other sectors, when changing economic conditions allowed for the possibility of coercion, government intervention might be needed to ensure that “rightful prices” resulted from
market exchange.53
In sum, Hamilton believed that the abstract model of the market
economy embraced by neoclassical economic theory had limited relevance for understanding real-world conditions in the American economy during the middle decades of the twentieth century.54 His detailed investigations of the ways of price making in various industries
were intended to reveal the manner in which pricing practices departed significantly from the standard economic model.55

the long run only reasonable gains can be taken. It is not assumed that under free enterprise price is beyond public concern; rather it is presumed that the market gives
adequate protection.”).
51. See id. (“Where an industry is closed, price-control is direct; the state undertakes to say what prices are fair to the parties concerned.”).
52. See id. at 1108 (“Certain ‘natural monopolies’ and businesses which operate
by exclusive franchise must be recognized as a class apart; the province of monopolistic industry is to be narrowly limited. Here buyers or sellers are not protected by competition between those with whom they must deal, and the state must accord the protection which in the usual case the market is supposed to afford. Accordingly, the state
may resort directly to price-fixing.”); see also HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 8, at 19 (“But
the supply of water, of gas, and of electricity has been recognized as monopolistic in
character. One by one such industries have been detached from the domain of competition, garnered into the category of public utilities, and entrusted to the regulatory
oversight of public bodies.”).
53. Hamilton, supra note 50, at 1107.
54. Cf. Robert L. Heilbroner, The Problem of Value in the Constitution of Economic
Thought, 50 SOC. RSCH. 253, 274 (1983) (arguing that the “utility approach to price . . .
recommends itself because it avoids troublesome considerations of class conflict and
cooperation as the fundamental problem of social order, and puts in their place a view
of social order as the outcome of individuals contending for pleasure or avoiding pain
in an environment of scarcity. Whatever violence this may do to history—and I believe
it is a fictive account at the level of Locke’s social contract—it is much in tune with the
conservative ideology of our time, and indeed helps to create and support that ideology.”).
55. As the director of research for President Roosevelt’s Cabinet Committee on
Price Policy, Hamilton supervised a multi-year investigation into the pricing practices
of numerous industries. The results of this work were reported in his PRICE AND PRICE
POLICIES from 1938, which compiled detailed studies of pricing in the automobile, tire,
cottonseed, dress, whiskey, and milk industries. See HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 8, at
vii.
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Ironically, elements of this perspective seem to have infiltrated
(albeit in a very partial way) mainstream economics since the 1980s,
as evidenced by the growing enthusiasm for mechanism design and
experimental economics.56 One of the key lessons of this work, according to several pioneers in the field, is that institutions and rules matter
far more than the economic rationality or knowledge of individual
agents in determining market outcomes.57 Designing markets thus entails a form of institutional engineering that seeks to channel behavior
in ways that comport with ideas of economically rational behavior rather than allowing that rationality to emerge and flourish unimpeded
by specific rules and structures.58 By taking markets and the rules and
institutions that make them work as objects of conscious design and
construction, mechanism design opened up a whole new world of direct intervention in the economy.59
56. See, e.g., Roger B. Myerson, Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic
Theory, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 586, 602 (2008) (“Mechanism design and other areas of game
theory have contributed to a fundamental change in the scope of economics.”); Alvin
E. Roth, The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation
as Tools for Design Economics, 70 ECONOMETRICA 1341, 1341 (2002) (“[I]n the 1990s,
economists, particularly game theorists, started to take a very substantial role in design, especially in the design of markets.”).
57. See, e.g., Vernon L. Smith, Economics in the Laboratory, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 113,
116–18 (1994) (observing that one of the most important lessons from experimental
economics and mechanism design is that institutions matter); Charles R. Plott, Experimental Methods in Political Economy: A Tool for Regulatory Research, in ATTACKING REGULATORY PROBLEMS 117, 134 (Allen R. Ferguson ed., 1981) (“The task is to find a system
of institutions—the rules for individual expression, information transmittal, and social
choice—a ‘process’ that mirrors the behavioral features of the mechanism. . . . This is a
pure form of institutional engineering.”).
58. See Francesco Guala, How to Do Things with Experimental Economics, in DO
ECONOMISTS MAKE MARKETS? ON THE PERFORMATIVITY OF ECONOMICS 128, 145 (Donald
MacKenzie et al. eds., 2007) (“The main idea behind mechanism design theory . . . is to
treat institutions as variables that affect the allocation of economic goods. Normative
(welfare) economics plays a role at the level of defining a set of criteria used to assess
market allocations . . . . Then game theory enters the scene: the market institution is
represented as a game that rational agents are trying to solve. The ‘best’ institution is
the one that leads the agents to satisfy the welfare criteria ‘as if guided by an invisible
hand,’ by setting the right incentives and by giving them enough information to solve
the problem they are facing.” (citation omitted)); id. at 147 (“Economic rationality is
not like Newton’s laws, which are supposed to be at work everywhere in the universe.
It is a fragile property that must be carefully preserved by creating a hospitable environment. It is a capacity or a potentiality, and the goal of experimental market design
is to create the ‘right’ circumstances for it to be actualized.”).
59. See MIROWSKI & NIK-KHAH, supra note 37, at 148 (“[S]ince roughly 1980, the
[economics] profession converged upon a more ‘constructivist’ approach to markets
in the sense that it has become possible, for the first time, to acknowledge that market
formats do indeed differ in significant ways; furthermore, it might be possible for economists to intervene in the setup and maintenance of these diverse structures. Where
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The critical role of rules, devices, and techniques in constituting
markets as well as the applied work of economists in building markets
have not gone unnoticed by a new generation of social scientists focused on the institutional and technical infrastructures of price making in particular markets.60 Rather than viewing prices as facts that
emerge out of the interaction of supply and demand, these scholars
seek to investigate the specific rules, techniques, and practices that
make prices and in turn shape and format the ways in which supply
and demand are allowed to interact.61 By shaping the “space of tradability,” they argue, different market designs, employing different pricing technologies, allow for different interactions between buyers and
sellers.62 Competition, in this view, is not some underlying force waiting to be unleashed, much less an end-state reflected in market structure, but a process that can be shaped and channeled in specific ways
by different market formats and different ways of price making. Put
another way, prices are not simply things that emerge from markets;
rather, it is the specific ways of price making that allow different markets to emerge.
economists once placidly contemplated markets from without, situated in a space detached from their subject matter, so to speak, now they are much less disciplined about
their doctrines concerning the nature of economic agency, and much more inclined to
be found down in the trenches with other participants, engaged in making markets.”);
Guala, supra note 58, at 130 (“[E]xperimental economics can be (and has been) used
effectively to intervene, to change the institutions that regulate and coordinate economic behavior. . . . With experimental economics, . . . you can do things to the economy.
You can manipulate and intervene in the microeconomies you have built in your laboratory, and this activity in turn is instrumental to intervening in real-world, full-size
markets.”).
60. See, e.g., MACKENZIE, supra note 9, at 13 (emphasizing the different infrastructures that support markets); Fabian Muniesa, Yuval Millo & Michael Callon, An Introduction to Market Devices, in MARKET DEVICES 1, 2 (Michel Callon et al. eds., 2007) (describing market devices as “the material and discursive assemblages that intervene in
the construction of markets”).
61. See, e.g., Jens Beckert, The Social Order of Markets, 38 THEORY & SOC’Y 245, 264
(2009) (“Although changes in prices emerge from changes in supply and demand,
these changes themselves are the result of the social, institutional and cognitive structures of markets.”); Koray Caliskan, The Meaning of Price in World Markets, 2 J. CULTURAL ECON. 239, 240 (2009) (“Price realization does not occur as a natural process,
but depends on a set of technical devices and artificial equipment, which is almost
never described in economic theory.”); Fourcade, supra note 9, at 44 (discussing shift
in economic sociology from “the meaning (social, symbolic, cultural) of prices to the
technologies which sustain the price system”).
62. Fourcade, supra note 9, at 45; see also Michel Callon & Fabian Muniesa, Economic Markets as Calculative Collective Devices, 26 ORG. STUD. 1229, 1240 (2005) (noting “the existence of a multiplicity of practical forms of confrontation between supply
and demand” across different markets).
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Seen from this perspective, the problem of price formation cannot be reduced to a problem of ensuring that the structure of any particular market is sufficiently competitive or that the conduct of market
participants stays within the bounds of acceptable behavior. It is also
a problem that requires close attention to the infrastructure and instrumentalities of price making and the various rules and institutions
that determine how they work. In all such cases, moreover, it is a problem that cannot be divorced from politics. The technical aspects of
price making, in fact, are where much of the politics of markets now
reside.
Taken together, these insights add up to a powerful analytical
framework for investigating the ways of price making in actually existing markets. Although the general approach can be applied to markets across the economy, this Article focuses specifically on price making in restructured natural gas and electricity markets. Aside from
their foundational importance to the broader economy, there are two
main reasons for focusing on natural gas and electricity. First, these
markets were both products of government directed restructuring efforts that sought to replace one form of price making, cost-of-service
regulation, with another, competition. Second, in both cases, the statutory frameworks governing these markets are very similar, and in
both cases, FERC has an ongoing responsibility to ensure that prices
are just and reasonable, which brings to the fore the question of when
market prices can be viewed as fair prices.
As we will see, FERC’s efforts to restructure these markets were
based on the core conviction that the new markets could be kept relatively pure, thereby allowing competition to ensure that prices would
meet the statutory just and reasonable standard.63 As long as competition was robust, FERC could get by with a more minimalist, “lighthanded” approach to regulation.64 Competitive markets, in this view,
would solve many of the problems that had plagued the cost-of-

63. See, e.g., Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373, 380 (2015) (describing
FERC’s efforts to restructure the natural gas industry “as an approach that relied on
the competitive marketplace, rather than classical regulatory rate-setting, as the main
mechanism for keeping wholesale natural-gas rates at a reasonable level”); Coal. for
Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 906 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 2018) (“FERC has determined
that just and reasonable rates for wholesale electricity should be set by competitive
auctions.”).
64. See United Distrib. Cos. v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 88 F.3d 1105, 1122
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (observing that with its natural gas restructuring effort FERC “has
gradually withdrawn from direct regulation of certain industry sectors in favor of a
policy of ‘light-handed regulation’ when market forces make that possible”).
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service ratemaking of the past.65 Simply put, the discipline of competition could do a better job at setting “just and reasonable” prices than
the discipline of regulation.66
From the outset, however, FERC failed to grasp the significance
of the specific ways of price making operating at the heart of these
markets—a conceptual blindspot that became painfully apparent during and after the California energy crisis of 2000–01, which greatly
disrupted both natural gas and electricity markets throughout the
western United States.67 Among other things, the crisis illustrated how
fragile these new markets were, how dependent they were on key
technologies of price making, and how relatively easy they were to
manipulate.
Although FERC recognized after the crisis that it had been naïve
in its assumption that market forces should be allowed to run their
course, it has struggled to develop a consistent and coherent approach
to the techniques of price making that power these markets.68 In
65. See Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 768
(2016) (“In this new world [of competitive wholesale power markets], FERC often forgoes the cost-based rate-setting traditionally used to prevent monopolistic pricing.
The Commission instead undertakes to ensure ‘just and reasonable’ wholesale rates by
enhancing competition—attempting, as we recently explained, ‘to break down regulatory and economic barriers that hinder a free market in wholesale electricity.’” (quoting Morgan Stanley Cap. Grp. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty., 554 U.S. 527,
536 (2008)).
66. See, e.g., Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 811 (Jan. 6,
2000) FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, Order No. 2000 (Dec. 6, 1999) [hereinafter Regional
Transmission Organizations] (“Competition in wholesale electricity markets is the
best way to protect the public interest and ensure that electricity consumers pay the
lowest price possible for reliable service.”).
67. There is voluminous literature on the California electricity crisis. See, e.g.,
WEARE, supra note 17, at 1–2 (2003) (describing the severe malfunctioning of the California electricity market); Paul L. Joskow, California’s Electricity Crisis, 17 OXFORD REV.
ECON. POL’Y 365, 377–78 (2001) (discussing increases in wholesale electricity prices in
California); David B. Spence, The Politics of Electricity Restructuring: Theory Vs. Practice, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 417, 417 (2005) (discussing California’s “disastrous experience with restructured electricity markets”).
68. See, e.g., STAFF WHITE PAPER, supra note 18, at 2 (“During the Western Energy
Crisis, the Commission’s enforcement tools lagged behind these market developments,
and the [manipulation] schemes exposed a major weakness in the Commission’s ability
to fulfill its core mission of ensuring just and reasonable rates and protect energy market participants and consumers. . . . [N]either the statutes administered by the Commission nor its rules, regulations, or orders contained any explicit prohibition or definition of market manipulation.”). Not surprisingly, FERC was widely criticized for its
handling of the California energy crisis. See, e.g., GARY TAYLOR, SHAUN LEDGERWOOD,
ROMKAEW BROEHM & PETER FOX-PENNER, MARKET POWER AND MARKET MANIPULATION IN
ENERGY MARKETS: FROM THE CALIFORNIA CRISIS TO THE PRESENT 251 (2015) (“FERC was
poorly prepared for the California Crisis. Its approach to constraining market power
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essence, FERC has tended to view prices and the technologies that
produce them as facts about the market rather than as explicit objects
of struggle among market participants. As we will see, this has led to
a persistent set of conceptual and regulatory challenges confronting
the Commission as it has sought to establish a workable framework
for market governance.
II. PRICE MAKING IN NATURAL GAS MARKETS
FERC launched its first major restructuring effort in the mid1980s, focusing on the natural gas industry. Taking its cues from Congress, the Commission sought to unbundle the natural gas pipeline
business, separating gas sales from gas transportation and establishing an open-access transportation regime that would provide the
foundation for competitive natural gas markets.69 In contrast to the
cost-of-service model of the past, competition and market forces
would ensure that prices for jurisdictional sales of natural gas comported with the statutory just and reasonable standard.70 FERC would
withdraw from direct regulation in favor of a posture of “light-handed
regulation” when it judged that market forces were sufficiently robust
to allow competition—rather than regulation—to set prices.71
It would take the better part of a decade to complete the effort
and, by virtually all accounts, restructuring has been successful in creating robust markets and lowering prices.72 Today, natural gas is
traded throughout the country at dozens of active trading hubs, and
since the early 1990s a deep and liquid market for futures contracts
was woefully antiquated, and it had failed to collect the data necessary to understand
what was going on in the markets. The concept of fraud-based manipulation had not
even entered the Commission’s thinking. It had no workable model of manipulative
behavior, no analytic approach for diagnosing it, and no remedial tools to deter it or
compensate consumers for any consequential damage.”); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., ENERGY
MARKETS: CONCERTED ACTIONS NEEDED BY FERC TO CONFRONT CHALLENGES THAT IMPEDE EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT 84–86 (2002) (noting that FERC Commissioners recognized the
Commission’s shortcomings in responding to the crisis).
69. See Order 636, supra note 15 (unbundling natural gas pipeline business and
imposing open access regime for interstate transportation of natural gas). The key features of Order 636 were upheld by the D.C. Circuit in 1996. See United Distrib. Cos. v.
Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 88 F.3d 1105, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“In its broad contours
and in most of its specifics, we uphold Order No. 636.”).
70. See Order 636, supra note 15, at 13,297 (determining that prices for jurisdictional sales of natural gas “will be limited by a just and reasonable ceiling which is set
by a competitive national gas market”).
71. See id.
72. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Evolution of Natural Gas Regulatory Policy,
10 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 53 (1995).
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and other financial derivatives has emerged.73 Price discovery in a
market of such complexity and scope is quite challenging. There is no
single prevailing price of natural gas in the United States, and no one
really knows the total value of the U.S. natural gas market—a problem
that FERC and others have pointed to repeatedly in their efforts to enhance market transparency.74
Because of the complexity of the market and the challenges of
price discovery, much of the natural gas sold in the United States is
tied in one way or another to one of a handful of price indices.75 These
price indices are published by private price reporting agencies such
as Platts, a division of publishing giant McGraw-Hill, and Natural Gas
Intelligence, a private family-owned company.76 In the United States
today, there are ten or so index publishers, which publish dozens of
indices for the different trading hubs and market centers across the
country.77
These indices emerged during the 1980s, as new wholesale markets for natural gas took shape in the wake of efforts by Congress and
73. Although natural gas is extracted throughout North America from both onshore and off-shore fields, the Henry Hub in Erath, Louisiana, serves as the primary
cash market trading and distribution center for U.S. natural gas. The Henry Hub serves
as a juncture for thirteen different pipelines that bring in natural gas from Gulf Coast
fields and ship it to U.S. East Coast and Midwest consumption centers. The Henry Hub
is also the delivery point and pricing basis for the New York Mercantile Exchange’s
natural gas futures contract, which is the most important pricing reference for U.S. natural gas. See Barbara Nelson Gray, The Use of Risk-Management Products in the Natural
Gas Industry: Overview, 10 NAT. GAS CONT. NEWSL. 1 (1994) (noting that the New York
Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) began trading in natural gas futures contracts in April
1990).
74. See, e.g., Transparency Provisions of Section 23 of the Natural Gas Act, 73 Fed.
Reg. 1014, 1014 (Jan. 4, 2008) FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, Order No. 704 [hereinafter
Order 704] (“Currently, because of the way transactions take place in the natural gas
industry, there is no way to estimate even in the broadest terms the overall size of the
natural gas market or its breakdown by types of contract provision, including pricing
and term (e.g., spot or for delivery farther in the future).”).
75. These indices reflect particular time periods (such as daily or monthly) and
are tied to particular locations or hubs. The United States pioneered the “hub-based”
approach to natural gas pricing, in which prices change from one location to another.
The alternative approach to pricing, used in Europe and parts of Asia, is “oil indexing,”
in which the price of natural gas is indexed to the price of oil. See Dayong Zhang,
Tiantian Wang, Xunpeng Shi & Jia Liu, Is Hub-Based Pricing a Better Choice Than Oil
Indexation for Natural Gas? Evidence from a Multiple Bubble Test, 76 ENERGY ECON. 495,
496–97 (2018) (discussing different approaches to natural gas pricing).
76. Platts has been publishing industry and price information for oil and natural
gas since the early twentieth century. See OWAIN JOHNSON, THE PRICE REPORTERS: A GUIDE
TO PRAS AND COMMODITY BENCHMARKS 43–44 (2018).
77. See id.
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FERC to restructure the industry.78 During this time, FERC paid almost
no attention to these price indices, assuming that they were natural
features of an emerging market. Price indices, in other words, were
viewed as reflections of the market (facts about the market) rather
than as constitutive technologies that played a fundamental role in
making these markets. With the California crisis of 2000–01, which
involved, among other things, extensive manipulation of natural gas
price indices, FERC began to recognize the critical role of these ways
of price making.
But FERC has struggled since the California crisis to come up with
a coherent approach to price indices and has persisted in leaving their
oversight and regulation largely in the hands of third parties.79 As this
Part demonstrates, this reflects a conceptual blind spot in how FERC
(and Congress) have tended to see these markets and their corresponding views of what constitutes a proper approach to market governance.
A. INDICES AND BENCHMARKS
A price index, as the name suggests, is a composite number meant
to reflect the average value of a set of individual prices.80 Simple price
indices have been used for centuries, but the modern theory of index
numbers and the widespread use of price indices in commerce, economics, and statistics are products of the twentieth century.81 For the
most part, these efforts focused on the construction of broad indices,
such as the Consumer Price Index or the Dow Jones Industrial Average, meant to track changes in prices of a basket of different

78. See Craig R. Carver, Natural Gas Price Indices: Do They Provide a Sound Basis
for Sales and Royalty Payments?, 42 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 10, § 10.02 (1996) (tracing
early history of natural gas price indices); John A. Harpole, Natural Gas Price Indexes:
Fact, Fiction, or Failure?, 49 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 14, § 14.05 (2003) (same).
79. See infra Parts II.B–C.
80. Here is how Irving Fisher described an index number: “If we look at prices as
starting at any time from the same point, they seem to scatter or disperse like the fragments of a busting shell. But, just as there is a definite center of gravity of the shell
fragments, as they move, so is there a definite average movement of the scattering
prices. This average is the ‘index number’.” See IRVING FISHER, THE MAKING OF INDEX NUMBERS 2–3 (1922).
81. See, e.g., id. at 458–60 (“Index numbers are a very recent contrivance . . . their
current use did not begin till 1869 at the earliest, and not in a general way till after
1900.”); see also WESLEY C. MITCHELL, THE MAKING AND USING OF INDEX NUMBERS 7–10
(1938) (discussing history of index numbers).
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commodities or equities for the purpose of evaluating economic conditions and trends.82
Price indices are also used extensively in particular industries,
such as natural resources, agricultural commodities, energy, and finance, as instruments for price discovery and as benchmarks for
transactions.83 The history of these kinds of indices is less well known,
in part because these indices have typically grown out of efforts by
market participants, the trade press, and industry analysts to solve
practical problems of pricing posed by certain types of markets.84
These price indices, moreover, have often been taken for granted,
viewed as a natural part of the market landscape.85 For a long time,
they were all but invisible.
But in the wake of various high-profile manipulation cases, price
indices and benchmarks have become more visible. The most famous
recent example of such manipulation involved LIBOR—the London Interbank Offered Rate—that provides a benchmark rate for short-term
loans between many of the world’s largest banks.86 LIBOR, which is
actually a set of numbers tied to particular currencies for particular
periods of time, affects more than $350 trillion of securities and loans
globally.87 It has been called the most important number in the

82. See generally H. Spencer Banzaf, The Form and Function of Price Indexes: A Historical Accounting, 36 HIST. POL. ECON. 589 (2004) (discussing history of price indices).
83. See Gabriel Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Index Theory: The Law, Promise
and Failure of Financial Indices, 30 YALE J. ON REGUL. 1, 6 (2013) (explaining basic uses
of index prices in various sectors and noting that “there are now over $1.6 trillion in
assets invested in vehicles that track indices, and hundreds of trillions of dollars contractually based on an index referent” (footnote omitted)); JOHNSON, supra note 76, at
1 (discussing extensive use of price indices in commodities and energy markets).
84. See Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 83, at 5 (“Academics and regulators
have largely ignored the indispensable role indices play in markets, failing to articulate
why financial indices have grown so quickly in importance, how they function, and the
risks they face.”).
85. See id. (“Indices are the indispensable and invisible infrastructure of modem
finance . . . .”).
86. See, e.g., id. at 16–17 (describing how LIBOR is constructed); MACKENZIE, supra
note 11, at 80–83 (discussing how LIBOR is constructed).
87. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Reforming LIBOR: Wheatley Versus the Alternatives, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 789, 792 (2013) (“An estimated $350 trillion in financial products are based on the LIBOR rate.”).
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world.88 And it was the target of an extensive manipulation scheme
during and after the financial crisis of 2008.89
Needless to say, price indices perform vital services. They allow
for price discovery, imposing order and coherence on a mass of individual transactions and making markets visible.90 They also reduce
the costs associated with contracting by providing a simple benchmark that can serve as a price term.91 In effect, they operate as key
technologies for making prices—part of the basic infrastructure supporting markets, and, by extension, the global economy. Given their
importance, it is remarkable how little we know about them—how
they are made, how they are used, and how they can be manipulated.92
Various types of price indices and benchmarks have been used in
the oil and gas industry since the early twentieth century. The oil
88. See Donald J. MacKenzie, What’s in a Number?, 30 LONDON REV. BOOKS 11, 11
(2008) (“Judged by the amount of money directly dependent on it, the British Bankers’
Association’s London Interbank Offered Rate matters more than any other set of numbers in the world. Libor anchors contracts amounting to some $300 trillion, the equivalent of $45,000 for every human being on the planet. It’s a critical part of the infrastructure of financial markets but, like plumbing, doesn’t usually get noticed.”).
89. See, e.g., Philip Ashton & Brett Christopher, On Arbitration, Arbitrage and Arbitrariness in Financial Markets and Their Governance: Unpacking LIBOR and the LIBOR
Scandal, 44 ECON. & SOC’Y 188, 197–204 (2015) (recounting LIBOR manipulation). Several popular newspaper and book-length accounts have also covered the LIBOR manipulation scheme. See, e.g., LIAM VAUGHN & GAVIN FINCH, THE FIX: HOW BANKERS LIED,
CHEATED, AND COLLUDED TO RIG THE WORLD’S MOST IMPORTANT NUMBER (2017).
90. See Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 83, at 13 (explaining the role of price
indices in improving markets).
91. See id. at 10 (“Financial indices provide an entirely new way to draft a lessthan-fully-specified contract: the contracting parties agree to let the index provider
decide the price.”).
92. A handful of legal academics have investigated the role of price indices and
other benchmarks in the financial markets. See, e.g., Adriana Z. Robertson, Passive in
Name Only: Delegated Management and “Index” Investing, 36 YALE J. ON REGUL. 795, 797
(2019) (“With a few exceptions, most scholars and even market participants do not
think too hard about where the indices actually come from. As a result, they have become something of a black box in financial markets.”); Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Benchmark
Regulation, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1929, 1930–31 (2017) (describing index prices and other
benchmarks and their growing importance in financial markets); Andrew Verstein,
Benchmark Manipulation, 56 B.C. L. REV. 215, 218 (2015) (“[M]arket manipulation is
increasingly synonymous with benchmark manipulation.”). Commentary on LIBOR
has also led inevitably to broader discussions of the need for reform and regulation of
various benchmarks. E.g., Bainbridge, supra note 87, at 843, 846–49 (discussing various alternatives for reforming LIBOR and arguing that the Wheatley Review proposes
a stronger ex post governance regime are politically viable and likely to enhance LIBOR’s credibility); Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 83, at 57–61 (arguing for
stronger intellectual property rights in financial benchmarks such as LIBOR); Fletcher,
supra, at 1969–70 (proposing an ex ante regulatory framework for financial benchmarks).
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markets, in particular, grew up on the basis of a system of posted
prices for crude oil at particular locations and, more recently, have
come to depend upon a handful of global benchmarks for various
grades of crude oil (e.g., West Texas Intermediate, Brent, DubaiOman).93 In natural gas, use of price indices was less widespread in
the early twentieth century in part because the markets were much
less mature than those for oil and because of a more extensive regulatory scheme. In the 1940s, for example, the Federal Power Commission actually prohibited the use of price indices in natural gas contracts, and from the mid-1950s to the early 1980s, price indices were
non-existent due to direct regulation of wellhead sales of natural
gas.94 Beginning in the 1980s, however, as wellhead sales were
93. See BASSAM FATTOUH, AN ANATOMY OF THE CRUDE OIL PRICING SYSTEM 30–35
(2011) (discussing role of price reporting agencies and price indices in oil markets).
94. See Carver, supra note 78, § 10.02 (describing early history of natural gas
price indices). Direct regulation of wellhead sales of natural gas was the result of the
disastrous 1954 Supreme Court decision, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, holding
that wellhead sales did not fall under state-regulated “production and gathering” activities but were instead “sales for resale” under the Natural Gas Act and that the Federal Power Commission was therefore required to establish rates for such sales in interstate commerce. 347 U.S. 672 (1954). Three Justices dissented (Douglas, Clark, and
Burton), and Justice Jackson did not take part in the decision. Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 677, 681 (1954). As various commentators have observed, the
decision created huge distortions in the natural gas industry and placed an impossible
administrative burden on the Federal Power Commission to engage in cost-of-service
ratemaking for thousands of natural gas producers across the United States. See, e.g.,
STEPHEN G. BREYER & PAUL W. MACAVOY, ENERGY REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION 68 (1974) (“In 1954 there were more than 5,000 [natural gas] producers, and
by 1960 more than 2,900 applications for increased rates were awaiting FPC action.
The individual case approach to regulation required findings on costs, including joint
costs attributable to gas, and on the allowable rate of return and rate base for the hundreds of companies involved in the 2,900 suspended applications. This would have
taken an intolerable amount of time. The decision in the first producer case—the Phillips case—took 82 hearing days, and 235 exhibits and 10,626 pages of testimony went
into the record. . . . By 1960 the Federal Power Commission had completed only 10 of
these cases.”). Phillips was a straightforward statutory interpretation case and one
that, in the era of Chevron deference, would almost certainly have come out the other
way. See 347 U.S. at 690 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The fastening of rate regulation on
this independent producer brings ‘the production or gathering of natural gas’ under
effective federal control, in spite of the fact that Congress has made that phase of the
natural gas business exempt from regulation. The effect is certain to be profound.”
(emphasis omitted)); see also Edmund W. Kitch, Regulation of the Field Market for Natural Gas by the Federal Power Commission, 11 J.L. & ECON. 243, 255 (1968) (“Reaching
a result required neither by the legislative history nor the language of the statute, the
Court gave no reason for the regulation.”); BREYER & MACAVOY, supra, at 94 (“The court
did not examine, more than superficially, the economic purposes that producer regulation might serve. Without such an examination, the court could not tell whether producer regulation was a consistent application of economic policy, in the sense of being
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deregulated, price indices emerged as important features of natural
gas markets.95
Since that time, price indices have become central to U.S. natural
gas markets. The objective of these indices is to provide an accurate
representation of fixed-price transactions at particular geographic locations.96 Today, price indices are published for more than one hundred locations around the country,97 and typically distinguish
consistent with regulation of ‘monopoly’ distribution companies in the gas industry. If
producer regulation did not further economic policy, then to assume a congressional
intent to regulate in the face of ambiguous statutory language and un uncertain legislative history was not warranted.”).
95. Congress began the process of de-regulating wellhead sales of natural gas
with the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA). Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L.
95-621, 92 Stat. 3351 (1978); see also Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial
Wellhead Decontrol, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,408, 42,411 (Oct. 18, 1985) FED. ENERGY REGUL.
COMM’N, Order No. 436 (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 2, 157, 250, 284, 375, 381) [hereinafter Order 436] (“In essence, sections 601 and 121 of the [Natural Gas Policy Act]
effected a phased partial reversal of the Supreme Court’s 1954 decision in the Phillips
case. . . . These statutory changes reflect a Congressional determination that producers
of natural gas do not have ‘natural’ monopoly power. In other words, the statute reflects the workably competitive nature of the production industry.” (footnotes omitted)). According to some observers, the NGPA may have made things worse, but it did
signal a Congressional willingness to get the federal government out of the business of
regulating wellhead sales. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Natural Gas Regulation, Deregulation, and Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 63, 63 (1982) (arguing that the NGPA’s “slow, multiphase deregulation process has the potential to create significant problems in the natural gas market through its interaction with the provisions of long-term gas supply
contracts”). And markets for natural gas did develop, quite robustly in some cases, in
the wake of the NGPA. As one indicator of this, the first price index for natural gas was
published in 1983 in the Natural Gas Market Newsletter. See Harpole, supra note 78,
§ 14.05 (“The first index price table for the competitive market was published in 1983
in the Natural Gas Market Newsletter.”). As FERC then began to impose open access
requirements on natural gas pipelines, Congress finished the job of deregulating wellhead sales in 1989 with the Wellhead Decontrol Act, which removed price regulation
for most wholesale sales of natural gas. See Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of
1989, Pub L. 101-60, 103 Stat. 157 (1989). Going forward, FERC’s jurisdiction over
wholesale sales of natural gas was limited to sales of domestic gas by pipelines, local
distribution companies, or their affiliates. Id.
96. See generally S&P GLOBAL PLATTS, METHODOLOGY AND SPECIFICATIONS GUIDE US
AND CANADA NATURAL GAS 2 (2020), https://www.spglobal.com/platts/plattscontent/_
assets/_files/en/our-methodology/methodology-specifications/us_canada_natural_
gas.pdf [https://perma.cc/VRE9-3BY6].
97. See S&P Global Platts & Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) to Improve Natural
Gas Price Transparency and Bolster North America Benchmarks: Anonymized ICE Data
to Further Underpin Platts Natural Gas Indices, S&P GLOB. PLATTS (Nov. 21, 2016),
https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/about-platts/media-center/press-releases/
2016/112116-amp-intercontinental-exchange-ice-to-improve-natural-gas-price
-transparency-and-bolster-north-america-benchmarks [https://perma.cc/Y4UQ
-MTWM]; Who We Are, NAT. GAS INTEL., http://www.naturalgasintel.com/about
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between daily, weekly, and monthly delivery terms.98 Although as
many as ten different entities publish natural gas price indices of one
sort or another, two index publishers—Platts and Natural Gas Intelligence (NGI)—are by far the most important.99
While the details involved in calculating price indices vary by
publisher (and are not fully known), Platts’ publicly available information on its methodology offers a reasonable framework for understanding the basic approach.100 Index publishers operate on the basis
of long-standing relationships with market participants who voluntarily report their transactions to the publishers.101 Platts’ daily indices,
for example are based on reports of fixed-price physical deals completed before 1 p.m. Central Time for next-day delivery to pipelines in
North America.102 Its monthly index is based on fixed-price physical
deals negotiated on any of the last five business days for each month—
what is known as “bidweek”—and negotiated for next-month delivery.103
After collecting the transaction data, the publisher sorts it and
performs various tests to analyze its quality.104 Anomalous trades are
identified and overall liquidity is evaluated at each trading location
before constructing and publishing an index.105 Throughout the process, there is ample room for the exercise of discretion and judgment
on the part of those responsible for constructing the indices—a point
that has been made with respect to other indices as well and one that
argues strongly against the view that these are merely technical

[https://perma.cc/LET9-9TNG] (noting that Natural Gas Intelligence provides price
indices for more than 170 locations). Platts publishes natural gas price indices for 109
daily locations and 90 monthly locations. S&P GLOBAL PLATTS, supra note 96.
98. S&P GLOBAL PLATTS, supra note 96.
99. Platts has been used as a pricing reference for energy contracts since 1928
and launched its first U.S. gas spot price index in 1988. A Historical Perspective, S&P
GLOB. PLATTS, https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/about-platts/our-history
[https://perma.cc/2GGC-TJ54]. NGI has published daily and weekly natural gas price
indices since 1988 and 1993, respectively. Other index developers include: Argus Media, Inc.; Bloomberg L.P.; Btu/Data Transmission Network; Dow Jones and Company;
Energy Intelligence Group; Intelligence Press, Inc. (NGI); Intercontinental Exchange,
Inc. (ICE); IO Energy LLC; and Powerdex, Inc.
100. S&P GLOBAL PLATTS, supra note 96.
101. Id. at 2–3.
102. Id. at 5.
103. Id. at 4.
104. Id. at 5.
105. Id. at 5–6.
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exercises.106 From their relationships with market participants to
their evaluation and weighting of individual transactions to their decision whether to go forward and publish an index on the basis of limited data, the people in charge of constructing these indices hold enormous power in their hands.107 They can literally move markets.
Price Reporting Agencies
(Platts, NGI, etc.)

Fixed-price
physical deals

Natural Gas
Traders

Price Indexes
(daily, weekly, monthly)

Book value of future
reserves
Royalty payments for
mineral rights
E&P investment
decisions

Financial Derivatives
Basis swaps
Futures/options

Forward contracts for
physical gas:
Wholesale sales to LDCs
Retail sales to various
end users (commercial,
industrial, power)

Figure 1: Price Making in Natural Gas Markets
This diagram illustrates price making in U.S. natural gas markets. Traders
voluntarily report details of their fixed-price physical natural gas deals to the
Price Reporting Agencies who then use that information to construct price
indices for specific locations and durations. Specific price indices are in turn
used as price terms or for valuation purposes in various related transactions
and investments, including some in which the natural gas traders also participate.

It would be difficult to overstate the importance of these indices
to natural gas markets. They serve as benchmarks for a whole range
of transactions and investment decisions across the industry (see Figure 1).108 On the transactional side, FERC reports that 82% of the volume of physical natural gas sales that are required to be reported to
the Commission are now priced at index.109 This includes virtually all
forward purchases of physical gas by local distribution companies and
106. See JOHNSON, supra note 76, at 104–21 (discussing methodologies used to establish commodity benchmarks).
107. S&P GLOBAL PLATTS, supra note 96, at 5.
108. See Verstein, supra note 92, at 217 (discussing how benchmarks of various
types are “hardwired” into legal relationships).
109. CORNERSTONE RSCH., CHARACTERISTICS OF U.S. NATURAL GAS TRANSACTIONS: INSIGHTS FROM FERC FORM 551 SUBMISSIONS AS OF JULY 3, 2020, at 14 (2020).
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other end users such as industrial facilities, power plants, and large
commercial operations.110 Financial basis contracts and other derivatives are also often settled against an identified price index.111 Natural
gas producers utilize price indices to book the value of future reserves.112 Royalty payments to mineral rights holders and others are
typically tied to price indices.113 And investment decisions regarding
exploration and development are often made on the basis of price indices.114 In short, natural gas price indices play a huge role in the industry, affecting many billions of dollars in transactions and capital
investment decisions.115 Maintaining confidence in the integrity of
these indices, therefore, is critical to ensuring that natural gas markets
continue to function smoothly.
B. INDEX MANIPULATION
Index manipulation is relatively easy to understand but difficult
to detect.116 In its most basic form, a market participant reports false
information to the index publisher, thus skewing the index in a
110. See FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, NO. PL03-3-004 (2004) (“Natural gas producers, local distribution companies (LDCs), and others tend to buy at index-linked prices
in lieu of negotiating fixed prices. LDCs have found index pricing to be a straightforward means of meeting prudence reviews by state regulators through comparisons to
index benchmarks.”).
111. See Thomas N. Russo, Using Natural Gas Price Indices, 34 NAT. GAS & ELEC. 1, 5
(2017).
112. See Harpole, supra note 78, § 14.05.4 (“Natural gas producers also utilize index prices to book the value of future reserves. Additionally, index prices are used to
pay royalty and overriding royalty owners, as well as to make exploration and developmental drilling decisions.”).
113. See id.; see also Natural Gas Indices: Responding to a “Crisis of Confidence,” 20
NO. 1 NAT. GAS. CONT. NEWSL. 1, 17 (2004) (noting that natural gas price indices are used
for the calculation of natural gas royalty payments and severance taxes); see also Craig
Carver, Natural Gas Price Indices: Do They Provide a Sound Basis for Sales and Royalty
Payments?, 42 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 10, § 10.01 (1996) (discussing widespread use
of natural gas price indices as a basis for royalty payments).
114. See supra note 112.
115. As one close observer of the industry noted in the wake of the crisis, “[n]atural
gas price indexes are the ‘Achilles Heel’ of a multi-billion-dollar-a-week industry.” See
Harpole, supra note 78, § 14.01.
116. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 92, at 1962 (“[B]enchmark manipulation (1) is
difficult to detect in the absence of monitoring; (2) stems from the innately conflicted
structure of the benchmark production process; and (3) can have serious consequences for market stability . . . .”); Verstein, supra note 92, at 218 (“By their nature,
benchmarks describe a market based on some small slice of it. Careful manipulators
can bias that slice. It is daunting to corner the world currency market, but it is less
daunting to corner the two percent of the market whose price is considered by the
leading benchmark.”).
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manner that will benefit the market participant’s position in a connected transaction or market.117 But indices can also be manipulated
through means other than false reporting: trading strategies and selective reporting of information, for example, can move an index even
though neither involves misrepresentation. Depending on the volume
of transactions tied to any particular index, small changes in a price
index can result in large impacts.118 The LIBOR manipulation scandal
that first came to light in 2012, for example, affected trillions of dollars
in consumer loans, currency exchanges, and a whole host of other
transactions tied to the index.119 Likewise, even a very small change in
the wholesale natural gas price as a result of an index manipulation
scheme would ripple through the markets affecting billions of dollars
in natural gas transactions and investment decisions. These index
prices are quintessential examples of what two scholars have referred
to as “systemically significant” prices.120
Market participants and others have long been aware of the possibility of index manipulation. One close observer of the use of price
indices in the petroleum industry during the 1950s, for example, described the obvious incentives for manipulation:
It would appear on the surface at least that there might be some opportunities in a price mechanism such as this [Platt’s Oilgram] for price rigging by
those interested in keeping prices low. Assuming that contract prices are
based on the low of the Oilgram, the Journal, or any other price-reporting medium, there is no question but that net buyers might gain from a decrease in
the low quotation. If the net buyer were to unload an occasional cargo at a
price below the low, he would, by so doing, establish a new low and if he were
then to offset that sale by buying something in excess of the amount sold, he
would enjoy a net gain on the combination of transactions.121

The author goes on to note, however, that “[w]hile this is possible in
the abstract it would be difficult to effect, even assuming a company
might be interested in attempting it.”122 This was because “[a]ny such
117. See Darrell Duffie & Jeremy Stein, Reforming LIBOR and Other Financial Benchmarks, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 191, 194 (2015) (“Clearly, if one of the counterparties to a
trade also plays a role in the fixing method that determines the announced benchmark
price, the incentive to manipulate is especially severe.”).
118. See id. at 200 (explaining that small distortions can still be lucrative to the
manipulating party).
119. See Fletcher, supra note 92, at 1931 (explaining that the 2012 LIBOR scandal
affected the price indices, which deals with an “estimated outstanding notional value
of $220 trillion”).
120. See Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, Systemically Significant Prices, 2 J.
FIN. REGUL. 1 (2016).
121. RALPH CASSADY, JR., PRICE MAKING AND PRICE BEHAVIOR IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 149 (1954).
122. Id.
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attempt would be perfectly apparent to the price-reporting experts”
and other market participants would no longer trade with the wouldbe manipulator.123
During the 1980s and 1990s, as it worked to restructure the natural gas industry, FERC seemed unaware of the possibility of price index manipulation. Although FERC’s major restructuring order—Order
636—discussed the importance of promoting market centers and
pooling areas, it said nothing about price indices.124 Throughout its
restructuring effort, in fact, FERC never focused on price indices in any
serious way. In its first major restructuring order, Order 436 issued in
1985, the Commission emphasized the importance of “[a]ccurate, responsive price signals” in allowing markets to develop.125 The Commission also pointed to the “explosive growth” of the spot market over
“a few short years” and identified the role of trade publications in “following prices and market developments” as evidence of healthy and
maturing market.126 But neither Order 436 nor any of FERC’s other
restructuring orders identified price indices as objects of inquiry or
concern.127 And there was almost no commentary at the time on potential problems with these indices.128
In effect, FERC seemed to assume that price indices, like market
centers and pooling areas, were natural features of the emerging
123. Id. at 149–50. Price index manipulation has been the subject of antitrust litigation for decades. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221
(1940) (“Any combination which tampers with price structures is engaged in unlawful
activity.”); Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373, 384 (2015) (holding that state antitrust action stemming from natural gas price index manipulation was not preempted
by Natural Gas Act).
124. See Order 636, supra note 15 (discussing market centers and pooling areas).
125. See Order 436, supra note 95, at 42,414. FERC went on to note that such price
signals are “not a matter for mere academic concern but a matter of commercial life
and death for the production industry.” Id.
126. Id. at 42,420; see also id. at 42,412 (observing that the natural gas industry in
the United States was marked by a “highly competitive and rapidly growing spot market, with a thriving infrastructure of brokers and marketers, electronic information
exchange services, and trade publications tracking price and market movements”). Between 1982 and 1987, for example, the Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimated that spot market volumes traded in the United States grew from 0.22 trillion
cubic feet to 7.22 trillion cubic feet. Michael J. Doane & Daniel F. Spulber, Open Access
and the Evolution of the U.S. Spot Market for Natural Gas, 37 J.L. & ECON. 477, 485 (1994)
(citing EIA figures).
127. E.g., Order 436, supra note 95, at 42,408.
128. A survey of legal periodicals has found only one detailed treatment on natural
gas price indices prior to the California Energy Crisis of 2000–01: a 1996 article by a
practicing oil and gas lawyer from Denver, Colorado, that addressed the use of natural
gas price indices as a basis for sales and royalty payments. See Carver, supra note 78.
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landscape of natural gas markets. Price indices, in other words, were
viewed as evidence of the continuing maturity and health of these
markets rather than as potential targets of manipulation. This largely
passive view of such a critical instrument of price making would prove
to be naïve, a product of an overly simplistic, naturalized understanding of markets compounded by a lack of critical information about
market conditions and the behavior of key market participants.
All of this changed with the California energy crisis of 2000–01,
which involved severe disruption of natural gas and electricity markets across California and the western United States as a result of manipulation, poor market design, and limited oversight.129 Subsequent
investigations by FERC and others revealed that false reporting to natural gas price indices during the crisis was, in FERC’s words, “epidemic.”130 In addition, some traders engaged in extensive “churning”
(i.e., rapid buying and selling of natural gas at a particular location) to
create the illusion of market activity and drive indices higher.131 Together, these activities resulted in significant increases in spot gas
prices, in published price indices, and in electricity prices—all of
which translated into several billion dollars in excessive payments by
California consumers of natural gas and electricity.132
During the investigation, five companies admitted that their employees provided false data to price index publishers.133 But FERC
staff also found that index manipulation was common throughout the

129. See generally FINAL REPORT, supra note 17 (reporting on results of FERC investigation into the California energy crisis).
130. See id. at ES-6 (“Market participants provided false reports of natural gas
prices and trade volumes to industry publications. These publications used the reports
to compile price indices, and false reporting became epidemic. . . . The false reporting
included fabricating trades, inflating the volume of trades, omitting trades, and adjusting the price of trades. . . . Many traders acknowledged that false reporting was done
openly in the industry.”).
131. Id. at II-59 (“Reliant’s churning had the effect of moving the entire market
price [of natural gas] by an average of some $8.54/MMBtu for December 2000 and by
an average of $1.91/MMBtu over the 8-month period that it churned.”); see also id. at
II-30 to -31 (describing how Reliant’s churning raised index prices).
132. Id. at II-59 to -60 (estimating that as a result of Reliant’s churning activities,
SoCalGas’s customers “paid excessive gas costs in the neighborhood of $650 million
for December 2000 and about $1.15 billion for the 8-month period” that Reliant
churned and that these excessive gas prices in turn inflated electric clearing prices by
about $1.6 billion); see also WEARE, supra note 17, at 3–4 (estimating $40 billion in excess energy costs and $40–45 billion in total costs as a result of the California energy
crisis).
133. Id. at III-4 (listing Dynegy, AEP, Williams, CMS, and El Paso as the five companies).
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industry, extending far beyond these five companies.134 And the behavior went on for years.135 According to FERC, it was common
knowledge in the industry that most market participants engaged in
false reporting to price indices: “because everyone knew that everyone else was manipulating the indices by reporting false prices and
volumes, it was somehow acceptable and even necessary for this to
take place.”136 Incredibly, one argument advanced in defense of the
price indices maintained that because the manipulations went in both
directions, they would be “offsetting” and the resulting indices could
therefore be considered accurate.137 Needless to say, FERC staff were
not persuaded.138
Part of the problem stemmed from the fact that most of the major
natural gas trading companies “had no formal process for reporting
trade data to the publishers of the price indices; the process was left
to the trading desks and to the traders themselves.”139 In effect, nobody was paying attention.140 Quality control systems did not exist.141
And conflicts of interest were endemic.142 Some of this, not surprisingly, was easy to fix, and natural gas trading companies responded
quickly by adopting improved practices, internal controls and audits,
and better oversight.143
But some of it was not so easy to fix. For starters, FERC had no
regulations expressly prohibiting any of these activities. Indeed, as
FERC concluded in its final report on the western energy crisis, none
of these activities violated the Commission’s regulations because
those regulations did not contain “explicit guidelines or prohibitions
for trading gas” or reporting to indices.144 Moreover, the Commission
134. Id. at III-29 (“[T]he industry lacked systematic reporting procedures and internal verification processes. . . . [T]he price manipulation goes beyond the five companies that have admitted to such behavior.”).
135. Id. at III-37 (“[S]ystematic attempts to manipulate the published price indices
by various significant market participants occurred for at least 4 years.”).
136. Id. at III-15.
137. Id. at III-16.
138. As the report concluded: “Staff does not find this argument to be persuasive.”
Id.
139. Id. at III-29.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. Id. at VII-15.
143. Id. at III-38 to -43 (discussing efforts by natural gas trading companies to reform their price reporting activities).
144. See id. at II-61 (“Reliant’s churning did not violate Section 284.402 of the Commission’s regulations because those regulations contain no explicit guidelines or prohibitions for trading gas.”).
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had limited ability to force market participants and/or price index
publishers to disclose specific information.145 Nor did it really seem to
understand how these indices were constructed and the roles they
played in the markets.
In sum, the California crisis revealed that price indices were
hardly the simple reflections of the market that FERC and others had
assumed they were (to the extent that they even thought about them)
before the crisis. In fact, they were key instruments of price making
and, as a result, ideal targets for manipulation. Since the California crisis, the Commission has been much more proactive in its efforts to police against natural gas price index manipulation, litigating or securing
settlements in multiple cases.146 But there are limits to such an approach, given the opacity of the indices themselves and the fact that
index manipulation does not always involve overt fraudulent activity
such as misreporting.147 In short, FERC’s recognition of the constitutive role that these indices play in making prices and, by extension,
their potential for manipulation was only a first step. Determining
how, if at all, to regulate these price indices continues to prove quite
challenging.
C. PRICE FORMATION AND FERC’S TRANSPARENCY PROBLEM
Much of the post-crisis analysis and calls for reform at FERC have
focused on improving transparency in price indices and ensuring that
market participants adhere to basic standards in their reporting.148
Over the last decade, as FERC has come to recognize the importance
of price formation and the fundamental role that the price indices play
in the natural gas markets, it has pursued multiple efforts to safeguard
the credibility of these indices and to generate a more complete picture of the natural gas markets.149 To date, however, none of these
145. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 68, at 7 (explaining FERC’s limited authority “to levy civil penalties”).
146. See FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, supra note 68, at 21–23 (describing five separate cases involving natural gas price index manipulation since 2005).
147. There are also jurisdictional issues here that preclude FERC from enforcing
against certain cross-market manipulation schemes that originate in the financial markets. See Hunter v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 711 F.3d 155, 156 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (finding that CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction over manipulation schemes involving natural
gas futures contracts).
148. See, e.g., Enhanced Natural Gas Market Transparency, Notice of Inquiry, 141
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,124 (Nov. 15, 2012) FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N No. RM13-1-000 (reviewing FERC’s efforts after the California energy crisis to improve transparency in natural
gas pricing).
149. See, e.g., Order 704, supra note 74.
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efforts have resulted in any significant change in FERC’s general posture of leaving the oversight and regulation of the indices to thirdparty index publishers.
Although the index publishers themselves have reformed their
internal practices and have endeavored to be more transparent on
some aspects of their methodologies, they have never acknowledged
even the possibility of FERC jurisdiction and have been unwilling to
allow the data underlying their price indices to be audited and verified.150 The observation of FERC staff in their initial 2002 report on
the western energy crisis still holds true today:
At this point in time, no independent entity, such as this Commission, can
verify the published price data. This is due, in part, to the reporting firms’
status as non-jurisdictional entities as well as their legitimate desire to protect the confidentiality of their sources. Without knowing the source of the
raw data, there cannot be any independent verification of the price data published by any reporting firm.151

In fact, Platts and other price reporting agencies have long maintained
a position of confidentiality with respect to their sources, making it
very difficult for FERC or other regulators to police the integrity of the
published indices.152
The basic conclusion offered by FERC staff in the wake of the California crisis—that the price reporting “process is fundamentally
flawed because the Trade Press data are still not subject to

150. See, e.g., Platts, Comment Letter on Notice of Inquiry Regarding Enhanced Natural Gas Market Transparency, FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N No. RM13-1-000 at 6–9
(Feb. 12, 2013) (arguing against FERC’s proposal to require additional information
from price reporting agencies as well as mandatory reporting by market participants);
see also id. at 10 (“Platts firmly believes in voluntary participation in the price formation process. . . . Platts consistently has cautioned that mandatory reporting regimes could induce market participants to opt out of price discovery.”).
151. FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, NO. PA02-2-000, INITIAL REPORT ON COMPANY-SPECIFIC SEPARATE PROCEEDINGS AND GENERIC REEVALUATIONS; PUBLISHED NATURAL GAS PRICE
DATA; AND ENRON TRADING STRATEGIES 4 (2002).
152. In the mid-1990s, for example, in response to an inquiry into the methodology
used to establish price indices, price reporting agencies such as NGI opposed any effort
to review the underlying data and methods used to construct the price indices. “The
key to NGI’s price survey of the natural gas market is our pledge of confidentiality
which is printed as part of our pricing methodology. . . . Since confidentiality is the basis on which the survey operates, it would be impossible to keep verifiable records of
our price quotes and still remain in business. Therefore, no true audit of our activities
can be made.” Carver, supra note 78, § 10.04[3]. And here is a comment by McGrawHill: “We would oppose any attempt . . . to review the raw data that we use to compile
our prices. In principle, that data is no different from a reporter’s notes used to write
a story, which clearly we would not turn over voluntarily to any outside party.” Id.
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independent verification”153—is just as accurate today as it was then.
Indeed, “as long as the companies publishing the indices continue to
refuse to disclose the actual calculations of the published price indices,” FERC staff maintained, “the information chain cannot be audited
and the Commission cannot verify the accuracy of the published price
indices.”154 Their recommendation to the FERC Commissioners was
unequivocal: “only price indices calculated from actual trades that can
be verified by the Commission should be used as the basis for any
Commission-approved sales of natural gas or electricity.”155 But the
Commission balked, and it has never revisited the issue with the conviction needed to reform the ways of price making in natural gas markets.
To be sure, FERC has taken steps to improve transparency and
promote confidence in natural gas price indices. Among other things,
the Commission has convened a series of technical conferences addressing price formation,156 issued policy statements recommending
standards for index publishers and market participants,157 and promulgated new regulations establishing mandatory codes of conduct for
those making jurisdictional sales of natural gas.158 According to FERC,
these codes of conduct are intended to police against “behavior undertaken without an appropriate commercial underpinning for the purposes of distorting prices that would otherwise occur in the competitive market.”159 Somewhat surprisingly, these regulations did not
require jurisdictional sellers to report their transactions to price indices.160 But any jurisdictional seller that does report is required to
“provide accurate and factual information, and not knowingly submit
153. FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, at III-48; see also id. (“In order for the published
indices to be reliable, there must be a way to audit the entire information chain.”).
154. Id. at III-49.
155. Id.
156. See sources cited infra notes 171, 180. FERC also encouraged the industry to
articulate a set of “best practices” for price indices that resulted in a 2003 white paper
by the Committee of Chief Risk Officers on Best Practices for Energy Price Indices. See
FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, Order Further Clarifying Policy Statement on Natural Gas
and Electric Price Indices, 112 FERC ¶ 61,040 (July 6, 2005) para. 8–16 (discussing
Committee of Chief Risk Officers white paper).
157. See FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, NO. PL03-3-000, PRICE DISCOVERY IN NATURAL
GAS AND ELECTRIC MARKETS, POLICY STATEMENT ON NATURAL GAS AND ELECTRIC PRICE INDICES 9–12 (2003) (detailing “minimum standards” for index publishers and for market
participants reporting to the indices).
158. Amendments to Blanket Sales Certificates, Order No. 644, 68 Fed. Reg. 66,323
(Nov. 26, 2003) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 284).
159. Id. at 66,328.
160. Id. at 66,332 (“At this time, we are not mandating reporting.”).
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false or misleading information or omit material information to any
[index] publisher.”161 In response to concerns that this would chill reporting, FERC has established safe harbor protections for inadvertent
mistakes in reporting.162
Congress also added new provisions to the Natural Gas Act in
2005 that specifically addressed market manipulation, transparency,
and price indices. New section 4A of the Natural Gas Act, for example,
imported the basic securities fraud framework to prohibit market manipulation in natural gas markets.163 New section 23 directed the
Commission “to facilitate price transparency in markets for the sale or
transportation of physical natural gas in interstate commerce” and
provided that the Commission may obtain “information about the
availability and prices of natural gas sold at wholesale and in interstate commerce” from “any market participant.”164 In carrying out its
new responsibilities under this provision, FERC is required to “consider the degree of price transparency provided by existing price [index] publishers” and to “rely on such publishers to the maximum extent possible.”165 But if the Commission determines that the existing
indices “are not adequately providing price discovery or market transparency,” it can establish its own electronic information system.166
Pursuant to this new authority, FERC issued a pair of regulations
in 2008 intended to provide more visibility into the workings of the
natural gas market.167 In essence, these new regulations required
market participants to file annual reports on their wholesale transactions of physical natural gas and required intra-state pipelines to

161. Id. at 66,336.
162. Id. at 66,631.
163. Natural Gas Act § 4A, 15 U.S.C. § 717c-1. FERC adopted regulations on market
manipulation in 2006. See Prohibition on Energy Market Manipulation, Order No. 670,
71 Fed. Reg. 4244 (Jan. 26, 2006) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 1c). But see David B.
Spence & Robert Prentice, The Transformation of American Energy Markets and the
Problem of Market Power, 53 B.C. L. REV. 131, 133 (2012) (“[B]y focusing on fraud and
deceit, the securities regulation model misses ways in which sellers of energy in physical markets can exercise market power at the expense of buyers, even in the absence
of fraudulent or deceptive conduct.”).
164. Natural Gas Act § 23, 15 U.S.C. § 717t-2 (2005).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See Order 704, supra note 74 (requiring certain market participants to deliver
annual reports to FERC); Pipeline Posting Requirements Under Section 23 of the Natural
Gas Act, Order No. 720, 73 Fed. Reg. 73,494 (Nov. 20, 2008) (requiring “major noninterstate gas pipelines” to make daily postings for daily scheduled volume for certain
points).
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submit information about the volume of gas shipped on their systems.168 According to the Commission, the new rules would instill confidence in the markets by making price formation more transparent.
“Without confidence in the basic processes of price formation,” the
Commission noted, “market participants cannot have faith in the value
of their transactions, the public cannot believe that the prices they see
are fair, and it is more difficult for the Commission to ensure that jurisdictional prices are ‘just and reasonable.’”169
But FERC lost the ability to use these rules to their full effect when
the Fifth Circuit rejected the intrastate pipeline regulations.170 Moreover, the annual trading reports have proved to be far too general to
assess market conditions in a timely manner.171 FERC thus issued yet
another proposal in 2012 to require more detailed and frequent reporting on natural gas transactions by jurisdictional sellers.172 According to the Commission, better reporting would “facilitate price
transparency in the natural gas market by enabling buyers and sellers
of natural gas to better understand the trading and prices that contribute to the daily and monthly indices.”173 This would in turn help to
ensure that prices in the natural gas markets are the “result of fundamental supply and demand forces and not the result of manipulation
or other abusive market conduct.”174
The responses to FERC’s new proposal were almost uniformly
negative. Because of jurisdictional limits, commenters argued, the
new information would not be representative of the market as a
whole.175 In addition, public dissemination of detailed information on
168. See sources cited supra note 167.
169. Transparency Provisions of Section 23 of the Natural Gas Act; Transparency
Provisions of the Energy Policy Act, 72 Fed. Reg. 20,791, 20,792 (Apr. 19, 2007) (to be
codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 260, 264).
170. See Tex. Pipeline Ass’n v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 661 F.3d 258, 263 (5th
Cir. 2011) (“[T]he NGA unambiguously precludes FERC from issuing the Posting Rule
so as to require wholly intrastate pipelines to disclose and disseminate capacity and
scheduling information.”).
171. See Enhanced Natural Gas Market Transparency, Notice of Inquiry, 141
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,124 (Nov. 15, 2012) FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N No. RM13-1-000 at 9
(“[T]he information that is currently available does not provide full market visibility
or price transparency. Much of the data that is currently available is aggregated and
does not provide transaction-specific details.”).
172. See id.
173. Id. at 11.
174. Id. at 11–12.
175. See, e.g., American Forest & Paper Association, Inc., et al., Comment Letter on
Notice of Inquiry Regarding Enhanced Natural Gas Transparency, 77 Fed. Reg. 69,781
(Nov. 15, 2012) FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N No. RM13-1-000 at 8–9 (Feb. 12, 2013).
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specific transactions might have anticompetitive effects.176 For its
part, Platts argued that the information FERC was seeking from market participants and price reporting agencies was akin to the information that would be provided by the “electronic information system”
identified in Section 23 of the Natural Gas Act.177 As a result, Platts
continued, FERC would have to make a threshold determination that
the existing price publishers were not “adequately providing price
discovery or market transparency” before requiring this additional reporting.178
But this argument simply begs the question of how FERC is supposed to evaluate the markets in order to make such a determination
of adequacy if it cannot see what is actually going on in the markets.
And because Platts and other price index publishers have continued
to assert First Amendment protections over the data they use to construct their price indices, FERC has been unable to see what is actually
going on in the markets. Nonetheless, FERC terminated this new proceeding in 2015, leaving it to rely upon the limited annual reporting
required under existing regulations.179 Although the Commission convened another technical conference on the health of natural gas price
indices in June 2017, there is no indication that FERC is planning to
change its current approach.180 In retrospect and notwithstanding a
substantial effort stretching over more than a decade, FERC has made
little progress in improving the overall transparency of the natural gas
markets and getting a better handle on the crucial role that price indices play in those markets.
And there is some urgency here. Based on the information that
FERC does collect as well as reports in the trade press, the volume of
transactions being reported to the index publishers is declining, while
the volume of gas that is tied to the indices is increasing.181 As of 2019,
176. See U.S. Department of Justice, Comment Letter on Notice of Inquiry Regarding Enhanced Natural Gas Market Transparency, 141 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,124 (Feb. 1, 2013)
FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N No. RM13-1-000 at 1–2 (Nov. 15, 2012).
177. See Platts, Comment Letter on Notice of Inquiry Regarding Enhanced Natural
Gas Market Transparency, FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N No. RM13-1-000 at 6–9 (Feb. 12,
2013).
178. Id.
179. Enhanced Natural Gas Market Transparency, Order Terminating Proceeding,
153 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,174 (Nov. 17, 2015) FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N No. RM13-1.000.
180. See FERC, Technical Conference on Developments in Natural Gas Index Liquidity
and Transparency, Docket No. AD17-12-000, June 29, 2017.
181. See, e.g., CORNERSTONE RSCH., supra note 109, at 14–16 (reporting that in 2019
the volume of transactions reported to the indices continued to decline while the volume of transactions dependent upon the indices continued to increase); see also Alexander Osipovich, U.S. Gas Reporting Drop Raises Questions About Indices, ENERGY RISK
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the ratio of natural gas priced at index to fixed-priced deals used to
form the indices was more than 12-to-1, a substantial increase from
2008 when the ratio was 3.6-to-1.182 While it is hard to know the precise reasons for this, some have pointed to a perception of increased
regulatory risk for misreporting, despite FERC’s efforts to create safe
harbors and clear guidelines.183 Others have suggested that because
of lower price volatility as a result of the massive expansion of shale
gas production since 2008, many market participants find it easier to
rely upon the price indices rather than negotiate fixed-price deals.184
Whatever the reason, ongoing decline in the volume of transactions
used to support the indices threatens to further undermine confidence in the indices themselves and, in turn, could hamper the functioning of natural gas markets.185 Declining liquidity could also exacerbate the potential for manipulation by giving those entities that
continue to report more influence over the index. While this may not
seem to matter much in the current environment of low natural gas
prices, no one wants to see a return to the market disruptions of the
past.186 And, of course, index manipulation is problematic (and illegal)
in any price environment.
Although FERC surely recognizes this, the Commission has so far
been unwilling to impose more oversight on the indices to ensure that
(Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.risk.net/commodities/energy/2421133/us-gas-price
-reporting-drop-raises-questions-about-indexes (noting that price reporting agencies
“are constructing their indices based on a shrinking proportion of reported trades, yet
the share of deals linked to their price assessments is growing”).
182. CORNERSTONE RSCH., supra note 109, at 16.
183. See, e.g., J. Robinson, Data Shows Increasing Reliance on Natural Gas Price Indexes, PLATTS ENERGY TRADER, July 5, 2018 (reporting view of industry professionals
that the decline in reporting to price indices “indicates a perception of regulatory risk
among market participants and potential price reporters”).
184. See, e.g, Maya Weber, FERC Conference Debates Indices’ Health, Fixes, PLATTS
GAS DAILY, June 30, 2017 (observing that the shale revolution has created preference
for index deals); Joe Fisher, NatGas Price Index Reporting Sees Uptick, NAT. GAS INTEL.
(Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.naturalgasintel.com/natgas-price-index-reporting-sees
-uptick [https://perma.cc/4PHL-LEUZ] (“Lower price volatility in recent years—
thanks largely to shale gas abundance—has made fixed price deals less attractive compared with the alternative of just doing index deals.”).
185. See Dan DeFrancesco, Turning Up the Heat: Energy Firms Are Urging the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to Prop Up Illiquid Natural Gas Indices, as a Drop in
Price Reporting Is Eroding Confidence, 30 RISK 71 (2017).
186. See Thomas N. Russo, Using Natural Gas Price Indices, 34 NAT. GAS & ELEC. 1, 4
(2017) (“Despite the popularity of natural gas [price] indices, many energy analysts
take a dim view of them. They argue that sellers and buyers should be analyzing the
fundamentals of supply and demand at specific hubs to determine a fair price and not
following the crowd. . . . In the low-price environment we are now in, most sellers and
buyers are not concerned . . . .”).
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they have integrity and enjoy the full confidence of market participants. For its part, Platts has taken steps to shore up some of the indices, entering into a deal (effective in October 2017) with the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) to incorporate data from transactions
executed on ICE’s physical gas trading platform,187 something NGI has
been doing since 2008.188 While this may mitigate some of the liquidity problems facing the indices, it still leaves FERC with the question
of how, if at all, to regulate them. The exclusive use of ICE data by the
two leading index publishers has also raised concerns among some
natural gas consumers and other market participants that this gives
these two price reporting agencies too much power over critical pricing information in the markets.189
As noted in the introduction to this Article, FERC has ample legal
authority to regulate these price indices given that the index publishers are quite clearly engaged in “practices” that directly affect jurisdictional rates.190 Even if the First Amendment protections claimed by
the index publishers inhibit FERC from getting direct access to their
underlying data and calculations (a question that has yet to be tested
fully in court),191 FERC could require independent audit and verification of such indices. It could also use its section 23 authority to require
all market participants in wholesale natural gas markets (not simply
187. See, e.g, Alexander Osipovich, ICE, Platts Shore Up Shaky Natural Gas Indices,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ice-platts-shore-up-shaky
-natural-gas-indexes-1479733201 [https://perma.cc/3QJF-B5J3]; see also Nat. Gas Intel., No. AD17-12-000, Statement Before FERC: Developments in Natural Gas Index Liquidity and Transparency 2 (July 31, 2017) (discussing NGI arrangement with ICE to
use ICE transaction data in developing price indices).
188. Natural Gas Price Index Data, NAT. GAS INTEL., https://www.naturalgasintel
.com/product/ngi-price-index-data [https://perma.cc/496K-TTAA].
189. See Developments in Natural Gas Index Liquidity and Transparency, PostTechnical Conference Comments of Process Gas Consumers Group and American Forest & Paper Association (June 31, 2017) FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N AD17-12-000 at 7
(“With the agreement between Platts North America and Intercontinental Exchange,
Platts will be in the position to exercise an unacceptable level of market power over
consumers with respect to the price of subscriptions for their publication of natural
gas price index information, which end-users rely upon for their pricing information.”).
190. See, e.g., Natural Gas Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a).
191. In several cases involving investigations by FERC and CFTC of natural gas
price index manipulation, courts have rejected assertions of the reporter’s privilege by
index publishers. See, e.g., CFTC v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 507 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(holding that need for trading data reported to price index publisher by company under investigation overrode reporter’s privilege); In re Nat. Gas Commodities Litig., 235
F.R.D. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that qualified reporter’s privilege did not immunize
trade data found in publications related to the natural gas industry from disclosure).
The question of whether courts would find similarly in the absence of a specific investigation has not been litigated.
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jurisdictional sellers) to disclose specific transactional data to FERC,
including the identity of the indices to which such transactions are reported, as a basis for supporting such audits.192 Finally, FERC could
take the more aggressive step of creating its own electronic information system for price reporting (a public price index) to support
these markets if it determined that the existing indices were inadequate—a determination that could, in theory, be based on the general
lack of transparency regarding the price indices and the ongoing decline in reported transactions.193 And even if FERC does not want to
go that far, the Commission could limit its findings of inadequacy to
specific price indices at certain illiquid trading hubs, which could provide the basis for creating a single or small number of public indices
for these problematic hubs. Taking such action would allow FERC to
experiment with managing a public index on a limited scale without
disrupting the larger natural gas markets, thus providing a valuable
opportunity for learning and, perhaps, some useful “yardstick” competition for the existing private indices.194
With the exception of establishing a public index, each of these
approaches would be relatively easy to implement. For the moment,
however, most market participants seem to be content with the status
quo, with few clamoring for reform in the way that some did during
the mid-2000s when prices were much higher.195 But the current situation seems untenable over the longer term, and it is clear that FERC
needs a fresh approach to the indices. While the views of market participants are clearly important (and FERC deserves substantial credit
for creating multiple opportunities for them to make their views
known), those views can also be narrow and self-serving, detracting
from FERC’s overarching duty to protect the broader public interest

192. BP recently argued that FERC should consider mandatory reporting, at least
for some hubs that are currently facing liquidity problems. See Natural Gas Price Formation, Comments of BP Energy Company, BP Canada Energy Marketing Corp., and IGI
Resources, Inc. (June 29, 2017) FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N No. AD17-12-000.
193. As part of its energy reform, Mexico has developed a public price index for
natural gas. See, e.g., Kristen Tsai, Mexico Published First Monthly Natural Gas Price Index After Moving to Competitive Market, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 30, 2017),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=32712 [https://perma.cc/B6JR
-WJR9].
194. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, Government Regulation of Public Utilities, 30 PROC.
AM. ACAD. POL. SCI. 44, 51 (1971) (discussing function of government operated municipal utilities as “yardstick” competition for investor-owned utilities).
195. See, e.g., Russo, supra note 111, at 1 (contrasting current situation with 2006
when various trade associations and market participants were “very upset with high
natural gas price indices and wanted FERC to do something about it”).
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by ensuring that natural gas prices are just and reasonable.196 Simply
put, allowing private parties to control pricing information in a market as vital as natural gas raises the question whether FERC is meeting
its statutory obligations under the Natural Gas Act to ensure that
prices are just and reasonable. With eighty-two percent of physical
natural gas sales now tied to price indices that are in turn based on a
limited and shrinking number of fixed-price deals involving a small
number of large players,197 there is a premium on making sure that
the indices have integrity. Yet, because the indices are controlled entirely by private entities that refuse to make their underlying data
available for inspection and audit, there is no real basis for making
such a determination. At a minimum, in order to conclude that natural
gas prices are just and reasonable, FERC needs to understand how
these prices are made.
III. PRICE MAKING IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS
Following its successful effort to restructure the natural gas industry, FERC embarked on the far more ambitious task of restructuring the electricity sector in the 1990s. With some modest help from
Congress, the Commission used its authority under the Federal Power
Act in new and creative ways to unbundle the industry and create an
open access regime for transmission that would in turn provide the
foundation for competitive wholesale power markets.198 Today, organized wholesale power markets operate across much of the country,
including the mid-Atlantic, Northeast, Midwest, California, and Texas
(which is regulated wholly by the state of Texas).199 This Part focuses
on these organized electricity markets—those that are run by independent system operators (ISOs) and regional transmission organizations (RTOs). In doing so, it looks specifically at the algorithms and
auction structures at the center of these markets and the challenges
that these ways of price making pose to FERC’s ability to ensure that
the resulting prices are just and reasonable.
196. Like the Federal Power Act, the Natural Gas Act is founded upon a commitment to the public interest. See Natural Gas Act, § 1(a), 15 U.S.C. § 717(a); see also Fed.
Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 627 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“Of course the statute is not concerned with abstract theories of ratemaking. But
its very foundation is the ‘public interest’. . . .”).
197. See CORNERSTONE RSCH., supra note 109, at 14–16.
198. See Order 888, supra note 15.
199. See Electric Power Markets, FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N (June 8, 2020),
https://cms.ferc.gov/industries-data/market-assessments/overview/electric-power
-markets [https://perma.cc/55W2-PK9K] (information about wholesale powers markets in the United States, including a map).
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As with natural gas price indices, FERC did not pay much attention to these ways of price making until after the California electricity
crisis. Since that time, FERC has focused extensively on the problems
of market manipulation and gaming, using new powers provided by
Congress in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. But the problems of price
formation in electricity markets do not stem solely from manipulation
and gaming. Ongoing controversies in these markets about how to
value the attributes of certain resources, how to handle subsidies and
other “out-of-market” payments resulting from state and federal policies, and what to do about the increasing supply of zero-marginal cost
resources such as wind and solar have dominated recent discussions
about market reform in the RTOs and ISOs as well as at FERC. As this
Part will show, these challenges raise fundamental questions about
the nature and long-term viability of these markets, and point (again)
to the ways in which price making technologies themselves have become objects of intense struggle among market participants.
A. AUCTIONS AND ALGORITHMS
The organized wholesale electricity markets in the United States
are structured around a series of auctions, which are themselves embedded in a set of algorithms that match the results of the auctions to
the physical constraints of the grid.200 In effect, these markets are a
complex mix of software and hardware that combine specific auction
designs, subject to various market rules, with algorithms dedicated to
optimizing power flow on the grid.201 The overall goal is to ensure economic or least-cost dispatch of electric generating units subject to grid
constraints (what is sometimes known as security constrained economic dispatch) based on the results of a sequence of day-ahead and
real-time auctions.202 The algorithms at the center of these markets

200. See generally Peter Cramton, Electricity Market Design, 33 OXFORD REV. ECON.
POL’Y 589, 593–99 (2017) (describing the basic design of wholesale power markets);
Udi Helman, Benjamin F. Hobbs & Richard P. O’Neill, The Design of US Wholesale Energy
and Ancillary Service Auction Markets: Theory and Practice, in COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS: DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION, PERFORMANCE 190–91 (Fereidoon P. Sioshansi
ed., 2008) (discussing sequencing of electricity market auctions as constrained by the
physical nature of the power system).
201. See Helman et al., supra note 200, at 197, 213–14 (discussing integration of
day-ahead and real-time auctions in various optimization algorithms).
202. Dispatch is the process of coordinating and bringing on-line generation to
meet customers’ load requirements in real-time. See Paul L. Joskow, Challenges for
Wholesale Electricity Markets with Intermittent Renewable Generation at Scale: The US
Experience, 35 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 291, 300 (2019).
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ultimately determine the resulting prices, influencing hundreds of
millions of dollars in financial transactions every day.203
At the most basic level, the systems operation requirements in
these markets are the same as those confronting traditional vertically
integrated utilities. In both cases, systems operators will commit and
dispatch generation units on the basis of cost subject to the physical
requirements of the grid and the need to balance generation and load
in real time. Thus, the process of committing power plants (scheduling
them to be on and ready to generate power for certain hours of the
next day), and the process for dispatching them (bringing them online
to generate power in real time), are both based on least-cost principles (that is, lower cost units are committed and dispatched before
higher cost units).204 But all of this is ultimately subject to the physical
constraints of the grid.205 Both unit commitment and economic dispatch are thus “security constrained.” The key point here is that the
same principles apply to “security constrained unit commitment” and
“security constrained economic dispatch” in both market and nonmarket (vertically integrated) systems.206
The main difference between the two models is that inputs into
the unit commitment and dispatch algorithms in the markets are submitted by independent generators and load serving entities and are
ultimately matched or cleared through a specific auction structure.207
Systems operators in wholesale electricity markets, in other words,
have much less control over generation (given that they do not own
203. See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G, & MED., ANALYTIC RESEARCH FOUNDATIONS FOR THE
NEXT-GENERATION ELECTRIC GRID 62 (2016) (“Because these algorithms sit at the center
of wholesale electricity markets, they influence financial transactions of hundreds of
millions of dollars daily.”).
204. See ALEXANDRA VON MEIER, ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS: A CONCEPTUAL INTRODUCTION 260–67 (2006) (discussing electric power systems’ operation tasks of scheduling
and dispatch of generation).
205. Joskow, supra note 202, at 298.
206. See, e.g., id. at 299 (noting that “the conceptual basis for the design of organized electricity markets in the U.S.” can be traced directly back to optimal dispatch
and optimal investment frameworks developed during the middle of the twentieth
century for vertically integrated electric utilities).
207. Id. at 300 (“The initial design of organized wholesale markets in the US implicitly assumed that instead of ‘central economic dispatch’ by the vertically integrated
system operator with a geographic monopoly based on the reported costs of each generator, competitive wholesale markets could be developed which replaced the vertically integrated central planner with competitive bidding by competing generators via
appropriately designed auctions to define a least-cost dispatch curve (from lowest to
highest marginal price bid to just meet demand at each point in time) for energy supply
and ancillary network support services at each point in time (day-ahead and intraday
hourly auctions).”).
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the generating facilities) and thus face a more complex set of challenges in coordinating and managing the system than their counterparts in vertically integrated utilities. They also typically manage systems that are much larger in scope than those managed by individual
utilities.
In the early days of electricity, the systems control challenge was
modest, with small, local power plants serving a limited number of
end users.208 During the 1920s and 1930s, as regional power networks expanded in scale and scope, the need for more formal control
systems became apparent, and systems operators developed specialized slide rules, analog computers, and network analyzers to manage
these networks.209 Starting in the 1950s, early digital computers were
used to analyze regional power networks.210 And by the early 1960s,
engineers formalized for the first time the problem of optimal power
flow for regional electricity systems.211
Efforts to solve the optimal flow problem have proceeded apace,
drawing upon increasingly powerful optimization tools made available by advances in linear and non-linear programming during the
post-WWII period.212 Since the 1960s, utility system operators have
208. See THOMAS P. HUGHES, NETWORKS OF POWER: ELECTRIFICATION IN WESTERN SOCI1880-1930, at 366 (1983) (discussing early direct-current and small local systems).
209. See id. at 372–75 (discussing early approaches to systems operation and control in U.S. regional power networks during the 1920s and 1930s); see also MARY B.
CAIN, RICHARD P. O’NEIL & ANYA CASTILLO, HISTORY OF OPTIMAL POWER FLOW AND FORMULATIONS 7, 11–12 (2013), https://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05/acopf-1
-history-formulation-testing.pdf [https://perma.cc/8H8Z-ZVPL] (discussing early efforts to “solve” the optimal power flow problem using engineering judgment, rules of
thumb, specially-developed slide rules, and analog network analyzers).
210. See, e.g., Rodney J. Brown & William F. Tinney, Digital Solutions for Large
Power Networks, 76 TRANSACTIONS AM. INST. ELEC. ENG’G 347 (1957) (discussing early
use of digital computers to solving power network problems).
211. See CAIN ET AL., supra note 209, at 7 (“The optimal power flow problem was
first formulated in the 1960s, but has proven to be a very difficult problem to solve.”
(citation omitted)); see also J. Carpentier, Optimal Power Flows, 1 ELEC. POWER & ENERGY
SYS. 3, 3 (1979) (“An optimal power flow may thus be defined as the determination of
the complete state of a power system corresponding to the best operation within security constraints. Best operation usually means least fuel cost: security may range
from the generation feasibility up to very sophisticated constraints, so that the optimization problem may become huge.”).
212. See CAIN ET AL., supra note 209. Much of this work derived from the seminal
contributions of George Dantzig to the field of linear programming starting in the late
1940s. In particular, Dantzig’s development of the simplex algorithm at RAND in the
late 1940s would prove to be enormously influential and important in solving optimization problems, including optimal power flow in electric power networks. See Robert
E. Bixby, A Brief History of Linear and Mixed-Integer Programming Computation,
ETY,
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made use of various commercial algorithms and digital computers to
manage their systems in accordance with the requirements of optimal
power flow.213 During this time, refinements of the algorithms, better
software, and increases in computational capacity have translated
into massive improvements in overall performance.214 From the late
1980s to the early 2000s, for example, the speed of IBM’s CPLEX algorithm (a commercial optimization algorithm used by several electricity markets) increased by some six orders of magnitude (a millionfold) as a result of the combined effects of algorithmic and machine
improvements.215
This truly astonishing increase in performance over a period of
less than twenty years provided much of the necessary technical foundation for the development of wholesale electricity markets during
the 1990s and 2000s. Indeed, it is fair to say that these markets were
not really feasible prior to this time—that is, they could not be developed until software and computational capacity had achieved a sufficient state of development. All of these markets, moreover, are still
“software constrained,” and small increases in the efficiency of these
algorithms translate into billions of dollars in annual savings.216
Better algorithms and improved software for systems operation,
however, were only a necessary first step in creating these markets.
The markets themselves also had to be designed, which entailed all
manner of choices regarding bidding, pricing, and settlement rules;
the sequence of different markets for capacity, energy, and ancillary
services; the locational effects of congestion; the value of physical
DOCUMENTA MATHEMATICA 107, 107 (2007); see also George B. Dantzig, Origins of the
Simplex Method, in A HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC COMPUTING 141 (Stephen Nash ed., 1990).
213. See M. Hunneault & F.D. Galiana, A Survey of the Optimal Power Flow Literature, 6 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYS. 762, 762 (1991); CAIN ET AL., supra note 209.
214. See CAIN ET AL., supra note 209, at 11–13.
215. Bixby, supra note 212, at 113–14 (reporting total improvement factor of
5,280,000 for IBM CPLEX linear programming code between 1988 and 2002). The
CPLEX algorithm is itself based on the simplex algorithm developed by George Dantzig
in the late 1940s. Id. at 107, 113.
216. See CAIN ET AL., supra note 209, at 4 (“Small increases in efficiency of dispatch
are measured in billions of dollars per year.”); see also id. (“The heart of economically
efficient and reliable Independent System Operator (ISO) power markets is the alternating current optimal power flow (ACOPF) problem. The problem is complex economically, electrically and computationally. . . . Even 50 years after the problem was
first formulated, we still lack a fast and robust solution technique for the full ACOPF. . . .
While superior to their predecessors, today’s approximation techniques may unnecessarily cost tens of billions of dollars per year. They may also result in environmental
harm from unnecessary emissions and wasted energy.”); Helman et al., supra note 200,
at 236 (noting that “software has been a limiting factor in the development of efficient
market designs”).
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attributes such as flexibility and so-called fast-ramping capacity; and,
more recently, the integration of intermittent renewable resources
and various demand-side and distributed resources. Needless to say,
such an exercise represented far more than a simple withdrawal of
regulation to allow markets to emerge.
Indeed, the task of designing and building these new electricity
markets, like other market design efforts that were underway during
the 1990s, reflected and drew upon the growing enthusiasm for mechanism design and experimental economics.217 Economists working in
these applied fields operated more as architects or engineers than as
social scientists.218 Along with the Federal Communications
217. See Philip Mirowski & Edward Nik-Khah, Command Performance: Exploring
What STS Thinks It Takes to Build a Market, in LIVING IN A MATERIAL WORLD 90, 90–94
(Trevor Pinch & Richard Swedberg eds., 2008) (discussing rise of mechanism design
within economics); see also sources cited supra note 56. Early conceptual work regarding the introduction of markets into various segments of the electric power industry is
generally traced to PAUL L. JOSKOW & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER: AN
ANALYSIS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY DEREGULATION (1983). In 1984, the Arizona Corporation
Commission contracted with Vernon Smith’s experimental economics group to investigate alternatives to cost-of-service regulation. Based on a series of laboratory experiments, Smith and his group produced a two-volume report for the Arizona Commission that failed to get traction. But Smith and his team used the experience to secure
various consultancies with early pioneers in electricity deregulation such as New Zealand and Australia. Smith, together with leaders in mechanism design such as Robert
Wilson, also played a critical role in articulating some of the basic design principles
that informed U.S. efforts to restructure the power sector in the 1990s. See, e.g., Vernon
L. Smith, Discovery Processes, Science, and ‘Knowledge-How:’ Competition as a Discovery
Procedure in the Laboratory, 28 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 237, 240 (2015) (discussing early
work for the Arizona Corporation Commission, New Zealand, and Australia on electricity markets); Stephen J. Rassenti, Vernon L. Smith & Bart J. Wilson, Using Experiments
to Inform the Privatization/Deregulation Movement in Electricity, 21 CATO J. 515, 517–
38 (2002) (discussing involvement of the University of Arizona’s experimental economics group in the design of various markets for electricity around the world); Robert Wilson, Design Principles, in DESIGNING COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS 159, 160–
61 (Hung-po Chao & Hillard G. Huntington eds., 1998) (discussing different options for
market architecture and procedural rules in designing electricity markets); see also
Carine Staropoli & Celine Jullien, Using Laboratory Experiments to Design Efficient Market Institutions: The Case of Wholesale Electricity Markets, 77 ANNALS PUB. COOP. ECON.
555, 561 (2006) (discussing the use of experimental economics in designing markets
for electricity). To be sure, there was also a great deal of market design work going on
“down in the trenches” by regulators, consultants, and engineers who likely had very
little idea about the central precepts of mechanism design.
218. See Roth, supra note 56; Eric S. Maskin, Friedrich Von Hayek and Mechanism
Design, 28 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 247, 247 (2015) (“Mechanism design is the engineering
part of economic theory. Usually, in economics, we take economic institutions as given
and try to predict the economic or social outcomes that these institutions generate. But
in mechanism design, we reverse the direction. We begin by identifying the outcomes
that we want. Then we try to figure out whether some mechanism—some institution—
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Commission auctions for radio spectrum, electricity markets provided
an early test case for the new practitioners of mechanism design.219
Unlike spectrum and other auctions, however, the task of designing
new electricity markets was far more complicated.220 Because of the
relative freedom that the RTOs and ISOs have had to experiment with
different designs (a result of FERC’s open-architecture approach to
RTO governance), moreover, these markets have all evolved somewhat differently and each has its own distinctive design.221 But they
do share several common features.
First, all of these markets use a uniform clearing-price design for
their auctions.222 Under this design, generators submit offers to sell
specific quantities of electricity at specific prices.223 These offers are
then stacked from lowest to highest price.224 On the buyer side, load
serving entities (those who sell electricity to retail customers) likewise submit their bids to buy specific quantities of electricity at specific prices, which are then arranged from highest to lowest price.225
The price at which supply and demand meet is the clearing price.226
All generators with offers below that clearing price receive the clearing price regardless of the price of their submitted offers.227 The
can be constructed to deliver those outcomes.”); see also Robert Wilson, Architecture of
Power Markets, 70 ECONOMETRICA 1299, 1299–1300 (2002) (discussing role of “economics as an engineering discipline capable of providing guidance on details of market
design” in context of electricity markets and more generally).
219. See, e.g., Francesco Guala, Building Economic Machines: The FCC Auctions, 32
STUD. HIST. & PHIL. SCI. 453, 456 (2001) (describing design of FCC auctions).
220. See, e.g., Paul Milgrom, Auction Market Design: Recent Innovations, 11 ANN.
REV. ECON. 383, 394 (2019) (“[E]nergy auctions are trickier than financial auctions because nonconvexities in power generation are important. There can be large fixed
costs in turning on and ramping up a generator to supply power in the mid-afternoon
and ramping it down when service is no longer needed. Standard price theory analyses
do not dig deeply into these sorts of details, and auctions that are designed to operate
independently in setting separate prices for different products may fail to coordinate
producer activities well.” (citation omitted)).
221. See Regional Transmission Organizations, supra note 66, at 811–12 (“We also
establish an ‘open architecture’ policy regarding RTOs, whereby all RTO proposals
must allow the RTO and its members the flexibility to improve their organizations in
the future in terms of structure, operations, market support and geographic scope to
meet market needs. In turn, the Commission will provide the regulatory flexibility to
accommodate such improvement.”).
222. See JEREMY LIN & FERNANDO H. MAGNAGO, ELECTRICITY MARKETS: THEORIES AND
APPLICATIONS 224 (2017).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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ranking of the generators that clear the market then determines the
so-called merit order for commitment and dispatch.228 Those generators that do not clear the market will not get committed or dispatched.229 All load serving entities that submitted bids to buy at
prices above the clearing price pay the clearing price regardless of the
price of their submitted bid.230 The basic theory behind this design is
that it provides incentives for generators to offer their generation at
their short-run marginal cost in order to ensure that they will clear
the market and be dispatched.231
The goal of the uniform clearing-price auction, then, is to create a
structure that will generate market outcomes as close to the neoclassical ideal of competitive markets as possible, where price equals marginal cost.232 But, of course, as more than a few have pointed out, firms
that only recover their short-run marginal costs will not stay in business for long—a point that is particularly germane for electricity generators who typically have high fixed costs.233 The uniform clearing-

228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See id. at 224–25 (discussing general features of uniform clearing-price design); see also id. at 225 (“In such a pricing scheme, generators are more truthful in
revealing their true marginal costs by bidding as close as possible or equal to their
marginal costs.”). The alternative design, known as “pay-as-bid” or discriminatory
pricing, stacks submitted bids and offers in the same manner as the uniform clearingprice design, but generators that clear the market receive the price at which they offered to sell their power rather than the clearing price. Id. Likewise, load serving entities with bids that cleared the market will pay the price at which they bid rather than
the clearing price. Id. As various observers have argued, this creates incentives for generators to “guess the clearing price” rather than submit offers at their marginal costs.
See id. (observing that “pay-as-bid” pricing creates incentives for generators to “submit
offers that reflected their best guess at what the cleared price will be for the most expensive needed resource, instead of bidding their actual costs as they do in a uniform
price auction”). Although there was some debate in the United States about the merits
of pay-as-bid after the California electricity crisis, all of the U.S. markets have continued to use the uniform clearing-price design. See ALFRED E. KAHN, PETER C. CRAMTON,
ROBERT H. PORTER & RICHARD D. TABORS, PRICING IN THE CALIFORNIA POWER EXCHANGE
ELECTRICITY MARKET: SHOULD CALIFORNIA SWITCH FROM UNIFORM PRICING TO PAY-AS-BID
PRICING? 1–7 (2001) (concluding that a shift from uniform pricing to pay-as-bid pricing
would be a mistake and would likely do more harm than good to consumers).
232. See Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, No. 14-840, slip
op. at 5 (2016) (the clearing price is “the price an efficient market would produce”).
233. See, e.g., J.M. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM. ECON.
REV. 241, 250 (1940) (“A price which at all times covers only short-run marginal cost
would lead to large operating deficits whenever demand is short of capacity, and
would bankrupt most industries, no matter how shock-proof their capital structures.”); Joskow, supra note 206, at 303 (discussing the “revenue inadequacy” or
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price auction design provides for this (at least in part) because lower
cost generators are able to capture infra-marginal rents (the difference between the clearing price and their offer price), which can then
be used to cover some of the generator’s fixed costs. Whether these
infra-marginal rents are sufficient to cover fixed costs and to encourage new market entrants is a question that all of the electricity markets are struggling with, as discussed in more detail below. Suffice it
to say for now that all of this gets much harder in a world of cheap
natural gas, which reduces the offer prices for natural gas generators
that have typically been the marginal resource setting the clearing
prices in the electricity auctions.234 This is further compounded by the
increasing supply of renewable generation, given that these resources
have no short-run marginal costs (i.e., no fuel costs) and thus offer
their power into the auctions at zero or even negative prices because
of the subsidies they receive (tax credits, etc.).235
The second major design feature shared by the wholesale power
markets is a sequence of day-ahead and real-time markets, both of
which use the uniform-clearing price auction.236 The day-ahead market is a market for the commitment or scheduling of generation units
for every hour of the following day.237 The outcome of the auction in
this market, which is based on a “security constrained unit commitment” algorithm, is the schedule of supply resources (the stack of committed generation units that have cleared the market) needed to meet
demand together with prices for each hour.238 This outcome is financially but not physically binding on the participants.239 The main
“missing money” problem that comes from over-reliance on short-run marginal cost
pricing in the electricity markets).
234. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, STAFF REPORT TO THE SECRETARY ON ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND RELIABILITY 6 (2017) (“With the sustained drop in natural gas prices, . . . natural gas-fired combined-cycle (NGCC) plants are currently a less costly source of baseload generation than coal or nuclear power in many regions of the country.”).
235. Id. at 10 (observing that high penetrations of variable renewable energy resources “with near-zero marginal costs . . . will lower wholesale energy prices independent of effects of the current low natural gas prices”); see also Dieter Helm & Cameron Hepburn, The Age of Electricity, 35 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 183, 189 (2019) (“A
key feature of renewable electricity generating technologies is that they have close to
zero marginal costs. . . . This represents a radical departure from the conventional cost
structure of electricity markets.”).
236. See Cramton, supra note 200, at 594.
237. See id.
238. Id.
239. Id.; see also LIN & MAGNAGO, supra note 222, at 182 (“The day-ahead market
results—energy schedules and associated market prices—are contractually and financially binding to all market participants.”).
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purpose of the day-ahead market is to allow market participants to
coordinate and plan for the next day and to hedge against more volatile real-time prices.
The real-time market, as the name suggests, is a series of auctions
conducted throughout the operating day—at least every five
minutes.240 The outcome of these auctions, which is based on a “security constrained economic dispatch” algorithm, is the least-cost or economic dispatch of generation resources for every five-minute interval
of the day.241 The real-time market thus operates as a balancing market, in which economic dispatch is reconciled with actual system operating conditions (the physical constraints of the grid) and is used to
adjust power sales and purchases to account for deviations from the
amount of electricity traded in the day-ahead market.242 Because the
system must be balanced in every instant, however, generators and
load serving entities literally have no time to find the “correct price.”
Instead, the market operator, using a combination of software and engineering judgment, enforces the power balance in real-time and then
derives the prices for the appropriate intervals.243 In effect, the market-clearing prices that result from the real-time auctions are a mathematical residual of the solution to the optimization problem of dispatching the appropriate amount of electricity in every instant to meet
load.244
As one would expect, the volumes of electricity traded in the dayahead market are much greater than those traded in the real-time
markets, accounting for 85% or more of the total energy traded
through these markets.245 In essence, the day-ahead market allows for
the bulk of the generation resources needed to meet demand during
the next day to be scheduled and committed, while the real-time
240. See id.
241. Id.
242. The actual system operating conditions are provided by a state estimator that
receives a continuous data feed from every node in the system. See id. at 187.
243. Id. (“Power balance is enforced at all times and real-time prices have to be
discovered at fixed intervals of time. Load customers or generators have literally no
time to find the right price, but to follow the determined prices that are determined by
the market operator at fixed intervals.”).
244. Id. at 212 (“The market-clearing process for an electricity market can be described as a process in which an optimization problem is solved.”).
245. Across the different RTO/ISO markets trading in these two markets together
accounts for between 45% and 70% of the total energy supplied during a given day, of
which 85% or more is traded through the day-ahead market. See id. at 188. The remaining 30–55% comes from long-term bilateral contracts and self-scheduled resources (generation that is owned by load serving entities) that are scheduled into
these markets as price-taking resources. See id.
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market determines actual dispatch and balancing. The natural way of
looking at these markets is as nested, complementary markets (what
some refer to as a multi-settlement market) where the day-ahead
market generates forward prices and the real-time market generates
spot prices.
But the algorithms that run these markets are different, given
that the physical system constraints incorporated into the market
clearing algorithms vary depending on whether one is committing and
scheduling generation units for the next day (the day-ahead market)
or dispatching units in real time (the real-time market).246 These differences create additional complexities in the markets and have been
the subject of recent market manipulation cases regarding the use of
so-called virtual bidding to arbitrage between the two markets.247
Virtual bidding (also known as “convergence bidding” in some
markets) allows financial institutions and others to buy or sell “virtual” electricity in the day-ahead market and then close out those
trades with the opposite transaction in the real-time market.248 These
are financial trades, and no physical electricity is ever delivered as a
result of these transactions.249 The theory behind virtual bidding is
that the arbitrage opportunity it represents will improve liquidity in
the markets and facilitate convergence between the prices in the dayahead and real-time markets; that is, the additional trading will “arb
246. See John E. Parsons, Cathleen Colbert, Jeremy Larrieu, Taylor Martin & Erin
Mastrangelo, Financial Arbitrage and Efficient Dispatch in Wholesale Electricity Markets
16 (MIT CEEPR, Working Paper No. 2015-002, 2015).
247. See, e.g., id. (“Because the real problem is so much more complex than intersecting a pair of simple supply and demand curves, and because the Day-Ahead and
Real-Time markets employ algorithms with different approximations, decompositions
and judgments, a [Day-Ahead/Real-Time] spread can arise even when there is no simple deficiency of supply or demand bid into the Day-Ahead market. Since the problem
is not caused by a simple deficiency of supply and demand, virtual bidding may not
help to converge the prices. Worse still, virtual bidding may help converge the prices,
but convergence may not correspond to improved system performance. In these cases,
the profits on virtual bids can be a purely parasitic transfer from electricity customers.”).
248. See, e.g., Black Oak Energy, LLC v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 725 F.3d 230,
239 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“[U]nlike entities that traffic in electricity, the virtual marketers
have a purely financial interest in the markets. They do not participate as producers or
distributers of electricity, but rather as speculators and risk takers. . . . From FERC’s
policy perspective, the virtual marketers serve a useful purpose: they spot and exploit
inefficiencies, driving prices closer to an accurate reflection of fundamental value.” (citation omitted)).
249. Id. at 236 (noting that “the salient factor that distinguishes [virtual marketers]
from all others who participate in the . . . market is that they never actually transmit or
take delivery of electricity”).
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out” the price differences between the two markets.250 But all of that
assumes, of course, that these markets are nested—that they operate
in actual fact as a multi-settlement market. In many cases, this may be
a reasonable assumption, and there is empirical evidence that virtual
bidding has facilitated convergence and improved efficiency.251 In
some cases, however, virtual bidding has been used to exploit differences in the rules, models, and algorithms underlying these markets
resulting in several high-profile manipulation cases.252 As a high-level
RTO executive recently testified in Congress: “Trading this price inefficiency does not eliminate the inefficiency, it merely profits from
it.”253
The third common feature of the RTO/ISO markets in the United
States is nodal pricing.254 The objective here is to create a series of location-specific markets and prices across the network that will reflect
congestion at specific locations (where congestion is understood as
constraints on the capacity of the existing power lines).255 Thus, for
each identified node on the system, the market clearing algorithms
will calculate a “locational marginal price” or LMP that is the clearing
250. See Black Oak Energy, L.L.C. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 125 FERC ¶ 61,042,
at 15 (2008) (stating that the purpose of virtual bidding is to facilitate “transactions
that reduce price divergence between the Day-Ahead and Real-Time markets”).
251. See, e.g., Akshaya Jha & Frank A. Wolak, Can Financial Participants Improve
Price Discovery and Efficiency in Multi-Settlement Markets with Trading Costs? 14–18
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. w25851, 2019), https://web.stanford
.edu/group/fwolak/cgi-bin/sites/default/files/Jha_and_wolak_May_2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8H8Z-ZVPL].
252. See, e.g., Constellation Energy Commodities Grp., Inc., 138 FERC ¶ 61,168
(2012) (approving consent agreement regarding manipulation scheme in New York
ISO market using virtual bidding to force price divergence in day-ahead and real-time
markets in order to benefit various contracts-for-differences positions); ETRACOM
LLC, 155 FERC ¶ 61,284, at 1 (2016) (assessing civil penalties for manipulation scheme
in CAISO market using virtual bidding to increase congestion at certain locations and
thereby increase the value of related congestions revenue rights contracts); see also
Black Oak Energy, LLC v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 725 F.3d 230, 239–40 (D.C. Cir.
2013) (“[T]heir unique position within the marketplace animates FERC’s concern over
whether virtual marketers will have a beneficial effect on the functioning of the markets. Since their business interests are purely speculative, . . . the virtual marketers
pose a threat as potential market manipulators.”).
253. See Powering America: Examining the Role of Financial Trading in the Electricity Markets, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy of the H. Comm. on Energy & Com.,
115th Cong. 95 (2017) (statement of Vincent P. Duane, Senior V.P. Law, Compliance,
and External Relations, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.). As Duane stressed, “the important
takeaway is to appreciate the rules, models, and algorithms that make up ‘market design’ bear significantly on how prices are formed.” Id. at 94.
254. See LIN & MAGNAGO, supra note 222, at 214.
255. See id.

794

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[105:739

price for that node.256 As the name suggests, LMP is calculated as the
marginal cost of supplying an additional increment of load at a specific
location taking account of network congestion.257 For the day-ahead
market, the market clearing algorithms use information on the expected state of the grid (the so-called network topologies) for each
hour of the next day to compute hourly LMPs for each node on the
system.258 The LMP values that result are the prices that would be expected from competition in the presence of congestion as captured by
the simulation of network topologies.259 For the real-time markets,
LMP is the price that would be expected to result from competition at
a specific node, had there actually been a market at that location.260
Thus, the RTO/ISO market operators are really operating a series
of different market simulations for each node on the system over different time intervals.261 The prices that they generate for these different markets are products of the market-clearing algorithms that use
the various offers and bids as inputs based on simulations and models
of the expected and actual physical operation of the grid. In reality,
these prices are artifacts of the software used to model and manage
the grid and the markets themselves are best understood not as physical places where supply and demand meet but as computer programs
that seek to mimic or simulate a market within the physical constraints of the grid.

256. Id.
257. LMP typically includes three components: the marginal price for energy, the
marginal cost of congestion at the specific location, and the marginal loss of energy
associated with transmission constraints at the specific location. See id. at 214–15.
258. Id. at 182–82.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 187–89.
261. See infra Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Price Making in Organized Wholesale Power Markets
This diagram illustrates the sequence of different markets and their respective time frames operated by the RTOs and ISOs.

Because each of the RTOs and ISOs have their own specific rules
and market designs, they each use customized software packages to
manage their markets. Currently, there are a handful of software vendors that provide the tools that run the organized wholesale power
markets (Gurobi, GE/Alstom, and Siemens are the major players).262
Most of them use some version of the core set of linear programming
and mixed integer programming algorithms that have been developed
over the last half century to solve complex optimization problems.263
Notwithstanding their foundational importance to these markets and
the prices that result, these vendors (and the tools they provide) are
262. Founded by Robert Bixby (a developer of the CPLEX optimization algorithm)
and several colleagues, Gurobi provides the basic software that runs the ISO New York
electricity markets. See, e.g., ROBERT E. BIXBY, BUSINESS AND MATHEMATICS: A SAGA OF 25
YEARS OF PROGRESS IN OPTIMIZATION (2014), http://www.math.uwaterloo.ca/~
hwolkowi/henry/teaching/f16/602.f16/602miscfiles/UF_Entrepreneurship_
19November2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/EUR8-5PK2] (discussing Bixby’s work with
CPLEX and Gurobi’s work with electricity markets); N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, 20182022 STRATEGIC PLAN 12, https://www.nyiso.com/documents/20142/2225883/
2018+NYISO+Strategic+Plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/TQ4H-J4NN] (discussing Gurobi’s
work for New York ISO). GE acquired Alstom in 2015 and provides the basic software
that runs the CAISO, ISO New England, MISO, and Southwest Power Pool electricity
markets. See GEN. ELEC., DIGITAL ENERGY MARKET MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (2019), https://
www.ge.com/digital/sites/default/files/download_assets/market-management
-system-from-ge-digital.pdf [https://perma.cc/TE97-CWMB].
263. See, e.g., YONGHONG CHEN, FENGYU WANG, JIE WAN & FENG PAN, DEVELOPING NEXT
GENERATION ELECTRICITY MARKET CLEARING OPTIMIZATION SOFTWARE, 2018 IEEE POWER &
ENERGY SOC’Y GEN. MEETING 1.
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almost entirely insulated from ongoing discussions about oversight
and regulation of the wholesale electricity markets. Like the price reporting agencies that publish the natural gas price indexes, they are
largely invisible, even though their software determines how prices
are made.
Viewed from the outside, the overall complexity of these markets
is staggering, requiring highly specialized support structures and personnel to make them work. To take one example, in PJM, which is the
largest wholesale power market in the United States serving more
than 65 million people across various mid-Atlantic and midwestern
states, market operators must contend on a daily basis with multiple
offers from over 1,300 generators; 20,000 demand bids; 60,000 virtual bids and offers; 9,500 different pricing nodes; 20,000 different
transmission elements; and some 6,000 different transmission contingencies that must be modeled.264 Designing a mechanism that can
manage the physical, economic, and computational complexity of
these markets is a socio-technical achievement of the first order.265
Designing an effective regime for oversight and regulation may well
be beyond the capabilities of any institution.
In the face of such complexity, FERC has delegated much of the
design and oversight of these markets to the RTOs and ISOs, which are
themselves regulated by FERC as public utilities.266 Aside from a series
264. See PJM at a Glance, PJM, https://www.pjm.com/~/media/about-pjm/
newsroom/fact-sheets/pjm-at-a-glance.ashx [https://perma.cc/J8LS-QAHG]; MICHAEL J. WARD, PJM INTERCONNECTION, RESOURCE COMMITMENT AND DISPATCH IN THE PJM
WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKET 4 (2011) (summarizing average daily volumes in PJM
markets); see also Cramton, supra note 236 (“The day-ahead and real-time optimization of resources involves state-of-art optimization techniques and hardware. To get a
sense of the magnitude of the problem, ERCOT has thousands of computer servers to
run its systems. This is very much a smart market. Preferences and constraints are
expressed in sophisticated ways and then optimized to achieve the highest welfare
possible.”).
265. See Helman et al., supra note 200, at 181 (“These vast regional wholesale spot
markets, several consisting of tens of thousands of simultaneously determined prices
at locations on the grid, are one of the signal technological achievements to date of the
regulatory reform of the U.S. electricity industry.”).
266. See Order 888, supra note 15, at 21,540, 21,591–97 (encouraging formation
of ISOs as vehicle for administering open access transmission and elaborating principles for ISO governance and operation); Regional Transmission Organizations, supra
note 66, at 841–911 (identifying key characteristics and functions of RTOs); see also
Michael H. Dworkin & Rachel Aslin Goldwasser, Ensuring Consideration of the Public
Interest in the Governance and Accountability of Regional Transmission Organizations,
28 ENERGY L.J. 543, 554–57 (2007) (discussing various functions of RTOs); Hari M.
Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 7 (describing RTOs as hybrid institutions); Shelley Welton, Rethinking Grid Governance for
the Climate Change Era, 109 CALIF. L. REV (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 8–22) (on
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of technical conferences on software needs in these markets and some
remarks in various rulemakings about software constraints, moreover, the Commission has not directed any detailed regulatory attention to the algorithms and software used to run these markets.267
Thus, most market design choices are made by the RTOs and ISOs
through member-driven stakeholder processes.268 These choices are
then compiled in tariffs that are submitted to FERC, which sometimes
leads to a back-and-forth between the Commission and the RTO/ISO.
At its best, RTO/ISO governance looks like a successful venture in collaborative, multi-stakeholder governance that allows for and even
promotes experimentation.269 In practice, however, critics charge that
it sometimes looks more like a private club dominated by industry incumbents and used to block competition from clean energy resources.270 Although FERC’s commitment to work with market participants through the RTO/ISO process and in various technical
conferences recognizes these market actors not simply as targets of
regulation but as design partners—an approach that has the potential
to deliver meaningful engagement on highly technical questions, it is
critical to recognize that market participants are often self-serving
and cannot be counted upon to look out for the public interest. One
major challenge for FERC, as discussed further below, is to ensure that
the private interests that have such a strong voice in RTO/ISO governance do not marginalize the broader public interest in determining
how prices are made in these different markets.
file with Minnesota Law Review) (discussing growth and development of RTOs and proliferation of different governance structures).
267. See, e.g., Remedying Undue Discrimination Through Open Access Transmission Service and Standard Electricity Market Design, 67 Fed. Reg. 55,452, 55,498 (proposed Aug. 29, 2002) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (discussing market and operations software needs across the RTOs and ISOs); see also FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N,
RECENT ISO SOFTWARE ENHANCEMENTS AND FUTURE SOFTWARE AND MODELING PLANS
(2011). FERC has also convened a series of annual technical conferences on software
in the RTO and ISO markets. See RTOs and ISOs, FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N (July 13,
2020), https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/market-planning.asp
[https://perma.cc/55W2-PK9K]. The most recent conference was in June 2019. See
Notice of Technical Conference: Increasing Real-Time and Day-Ahead Market Efficiency and Enhancing Resilience Through Improved Software, 85 Fed. Reg. 11,068–69
(Feb. 26, 2020).
268. See Benjamin A. Stafford & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Winds of Change in Energy Systems: Policy Implementation, Technology Deployment, and Regional Transmission Organizations, 21 ENERGY RSCH. & SOC. SCI. 222, 230 (2016) (describing RTO stakeholder
governance); Welton, supra note 266, at 17–20.
269. See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 266, at 7–11.
270. See Welton, supra note 266, at 13–14 (describing RTOs as “private, industryled, voluntary clubs”).
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B. MARKET POWER, MARKET MANIPULATION, AND GAMING
FERC’s overriding concern in its initial effort to restructure the
electricity industry was to prevent the exercise of market power. Because of the physical constraints of the grid and the imperative of balancing supply and demand in real time, generators with market power
could withhold some of their generation during times of scarcity (peak
demand) or submit inflated offers in order to drive clearing prices
higher.271 FERC therefore focused on the structure of these markets
and assumed that as long they were structurally competitive, the resulting prices could be deemed just and reasonable.272
The Commission’s basic approach grew out of its experiments
with market-based rates for bi-lateral sales of electricity in the late
1980s and early 1990s.273 Drawing on antitrust conceptions of market
power, the Commission developed ex ante screens to determine
whether the seller possessed market power.274 If the seller passed
these screens, the Commission would grant it market-based rate authority—that is, the authority to go out into the market and sell power
at market-based rates.275 Various appellate decisions held that FERC’s
271. See, e.g., VON MEIER, supra note 204, at 295 (“The extreme inelasticity of demand
and supply as the system nears its limits makes it vulnerable to the withholding of even
small amounts of generation capacity.”); Richard O’Neill & Udi Helman, Regulatory Reform of the U.S. Wholesale Electricity Markets, in CREATING COMPETITIVE MARKETS: THE
POLITICS OF REGULATORY REFORM 141 (Marc K. Landy, Martin A. Levin & Martin Shapiro
eds., 2007) (“There was not much question that in the transition from the era of monopoly regulation, the new electricity markets could be particularly prone to generation market power.”).
272. See Helman et al., supra note 200, at 191–93 (discussing FERC’s approach to
market power in wholesale electricity markets).
273. See G. William Stafford, Electric Wholesale Power Sales at Market-Based Rates,
12 ENERGY L.J. 291, 291–94 (1991) (discussing FERC’s early use of market-based rate
authority).
274. Use of traditional concentration measures for determining market power in
electricity has been criticized on various grounds given the distinctive nature of the
electric grid and the possibility of more localized instances of market power that derive from network topologies. See, e.g., Severin Borenstein, James Bushnell & Christopher R. Knittel, Market Power in Electricity Markets: Beyond Concentration Measures,
20 ENERGY J. 65, 86 (1999) (concluding that concentration measures “suffer from a
number of weaknesses, which are exacerbated when applied to restructured electricity markets”); Staropoli & Jullien, supra note 217, at 564 (“Particularly for electricity,
market power cannot be assessed based on traditional concentration measures alone.
Notably, there is another type of market power, the local market power, which depends essentially on the localization on the network and the temporary topography of
the network.”).
275. See William H. Hieronymus, J. Stephen Henderson & Carolyn A. Berry, Market
Power Analysis of the Electricity Generation Sector, 23 ENERGY L.J. 1, 36–41 (2002) (describing history of FERC’s use of various market power screens for market-based rate
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market-based rate program was consistent with the Federal Power
Act, on the theory that competition would provide the discipline to ensure that rates (prices) would be just and reasonable.276 Notably, the
Supreme Court has never addressed the question of whether marketbased rates are consistent with the Federal Power Act.277
While the system of market-based rates was designed for a world
of bilateral contracts, it took on additional importance with the move
to restructure wholesale markets in the late 1990s and early 2000s.278
Merchant generators and electricity traders such as Enron were all required to secure market-based rate authority before they could participate in the new wholesale markets.279 Needless to say, FERC’s general assumption that this would ensure that markets were
competitive proved to be mistaken.
In addition to these ex ante market screens, the RTOs and ISOs
have also adopted market-mitigation procedures that are set forth in

authority). FERC’s most significant recent effort to refine its approach to market-based
rate authority came in 2015. See Refinements to Policies and Procedures for MarketBased Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy, Capacity and Ancillary Services by
Public Utilities, Order 816, 153 FERC ¶ 61,337 (2015). FERC further refined its horizontal market power analysis in 2019. See Refinements to Horizontal Market Power
Analysis for Sellers in Certain Regional Transmission Organization and Independent
System Operator Markets, Order 861, 168 FERC ¶ 61,040 (2019) (to be codified at 18
C.F.R. pt. 35).
276. To date, the Ninth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit have held that market-based
rates satisfy the just and reasonable standard. See, e.g., California ex rel. Lockyer v. Fed.
Energy Regul. Comm’n, 383 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[I]n a competitive market, where neither buyer nor seller has significant market power, it is rational to assume that the terms of their voluntary exchange are reasonable, and specifically to infer that the price is close to marginal cost, such that the seller makes only a normal
return on its investment.” (quoting Tejas Power Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n,
908 F.2d 998, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1990))).
277. See Morgan Stanley Cap. Grp., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty.,
544 U.S. 527, 538 (2008) (“We have not hitherto approved, and express no opinion
today, on the lawfulness of the market-based-tariff system, which is not one of the issues before us.”); see also Spence & Prentice, supra note 163, at 197–200 (surveying
the doctrinal landscape regarding the question of whether market based rates satisfy
the just and reasonable standard).
278. See Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy, Capacity, and
Ancillary Services by Public Utilities, 72 Fed. Reg. 39,904, 39,904 (July 20, 2007) (codified as amended 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (establishing system of market-based rates for
wholesale sales of electricity).
279. See Enron Power Marketing, Inc., 65 FERC ¶ 61,305 (1993); Enron Energy Services Power, Inc., 81 FERC ¶ 61,267 (1997). In the wake of the California electricity
crisis and evidence of Enron’s efforts to manipulate the market, FERC revoked Enron’s
market-based rate authority in 2003. See Order Revoking Market-Based Rate Authorities and Terminating Blanket Marketing Certificates, 103 FERC ¶ 61,343 (2003).
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their FERC approved tariffs.280 Because prices set in the auctions cannot be mitigated after the fact, mitigation must proceed in real time.
As market operators, the RTOs and ISOs are the only entities capable
of performing these functions. Although the rules differ across the various RTOs and ISOs, each of them employs an independent market
monitor that establishes reference prices for different generators that
are then used to determine if the bids submitted by a generator are in
line with their short-run marginal costs.281 In cases where a submitted
bid departs from the reference price by more than a specified threshold amount, the market operator will replace the submitted bid with
the reference price.282 For some generators, reference prices are determined on a daily basis.283 In all of these markets, moreover, offers
to sell electricity are also capped at an administratively determined
value.284 One would be forgiven for questioning whether this was all
really just cost-of-service regulation by another name.285
During the early years of restructuring, FERC focused its oversight efforts almost exclusively on market structure. The goal was to
280. See Regional Transmission Organizations, supra note 66, at 896 (proposing
that RTOs develop rules and procedures to identify and respond to problems of market
power in real time).
281. FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, STAFF ANALYSIS OF ENERGY OFFER MITIGATION IN RTO
AND ISO MARKETS, PRICE FORMATION IN ORGANIZED WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS,
DOCKET NO. AD14-14-000, at 4–7 (2014) [hereinafter STAFF ANALYSIS] (discussing procedures for setting reference level prices in RTO and ISO markets); see also Suedeen G.
Kelly, Maria F. Vouras & Jennifer S. Amerkhail, The Subdelegation Doctrine and the Application of Reference Prices in Mitigating Market Power, 26 ENERGY L.J. 297, 303–16
(2005) (discussing different approaches of RTO/ISO market monitors in setting reference prices).
282. See STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 281, at 6.
283. Id.
284. See 18 C.F.R. pt. 35 (2016) (establishing caps on energy offers at the higher of
$1000/MWh or a resource’s verified cost-based incremental offer and caps verified
cost-based incremental offers at $2000/MWh). ERCOT has adopted much higher price
caps.
285. This is perhaps most evident in the case of the capacity markets, which are
structured around an administratively determined demand curve and include very
specific rules that determine how various resources can participate. Daniel Breslau has
described the PJM capacity market as a “market-like entity.” See Daniel J. Breslau, Designing a Market-Like Entity: Economics in the Politics of Market Formation, 43 SOC.
STUD. SCI. 829, 846 (2013); see also Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 171
FERC ¶ 61,035, at 49 (2020) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting) (observing that the order “creates a byzantine administrative pricing scheme that bears all the hallmarks of cost-ofservice regulation, without any of the benefits”); see also Joshua C. Macey & Jackson
Salovaara, Rate Regulation Redux, 169 U. PA. L. REV. 1181, 1236–47 (2020) (describing
the ways in which capacity market rules and recent reforms have come to resemble
traditional cost of service regulation).
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ensure structurally competitive markets that would in turn produce
just and reasonable prices.286 The possibility of market manipulation
and gaming, especially in the absence of market power, received very
little attention. But the California crisis changed all of that, demonstrating that traders and other market participants could take advantage of market rules and manipulate the ways of price making irrespective of whether they had market power.287
The most famous (or infamous) of such market manipulation
schemes were those employed by Enron traders.288 Employing names
such as Death Star, Fat Boy, Black Widow, Big Foot, and Get Shorty
(among others), the Enron traders found multiple ways to game the
California electricity markets.289 Some of these strategies were based
on the submission of false energy schedules and bids into the California Power Exchange (the spot market for wholesale electricity) that
sought to take “unfair advantage” of the market rules and affect the
resulting market prices.290 Others were designed to “fool” the software managing the markets, particularly the congestion management
program run by the California Independent System Operator or
CAISO.291 Although most of these strategies were viewed as inconsistent with the anti-gaming provisions of the CAISO and California
Power Exchange tariffs, FERC had few tools at the time to address
them.292
In addition to the Enron manipulation strategies, there was evidence of economic and physical withholding of generation from the
California markets in order to drive the clearing prices in the auctions

286. See, e.g., Remedying Undue Discrimination Through Open Access Transmission Service and Standard Electricity Market Design, 67 Fed. Reg. 55,452, 55,503 (proposed Aug. 29, 2002) (“The development of structurally competitive markets is the
Commission’s long-term goal.”).
287. See supra note 67 (discussing the literature covering the California crisis).
288. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, chs. VI–VIII (discussing various Enron strategies).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at ES-1 (concluding that “many trading strategies employed by Enron and
other companies were undertaken in violation of antigaming provisions of the Commission-approved tariffs for the Cal ISO and Cal PX”); see also Enron Power Marketing,
Inc., 119 FERC ¶ 63,013, at 4 (2007) (concluding that Enron violated its market-based
rate authority starting in 1997 by engaging in “gaming and anomalous market behavior by itself and in concert with others” and ordering disgorgement of more than $1.6
billion in unjust profits).
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higher.293 Although there was sufficient generating capacity “on paper” to supply the California market, ownership of relatively expensive gas-fired thermal units was concentrated in a handful of companies.294 Because these resources typically set the clearing price during
periods of peak demand, the owners had considerable incentives to
engage in strategic bidding and withholding of generation in order to
drive clearing prices higher.295 These withholding strategies, in other
words, were specifically intended to take advantage of the uniform
clearing-price design in the markets.
As a mountain of post-crisis analysis has made clear, the California crisis resulted from a near perfect storm of bad design choices,
software flaws, and a lack of attention to (and limited tools for dealing
with) widespread manipulation and gaming—all taking place in the
context of constrained generation capacity and challenging drought
conditions across the western United States.296 The overall costs to the
California economy stemming from the disruption in both natural gas
electricity markets were substantial—as much as $40 to $45 billion
according to one estimate.297
In the wake of the crisis, FERC adopted new market behavior
rules and Congress added new anti-manipulation provisions to the
Federal Power Act, importing language from federal Securities laws
and mirroring provisions added to the Natural Gas Act.298 Congress
293. During the crisis, multiple factors conspired to drive wholesale prices in the
California Power Exchange far above their pre-restructuring levels. On June 28, 2000,
prices in the day-ahead market peaked at $1,099/MWh—a fifteen-fold increase over
the pre-restructuring average cost of $74/MWh. See Order Proposing Remedies for
California Wholesale Electric Markets, 93 FERC ¶ 61,121, at 12 (2000) (documenting
price increases); Order Directing Remedies for California Wholesale Electric Markets,
93 FERC ¶ 61,294, at 19 (2000) (determining that pre-restructuring rates were around
$74/MWh).
294. See, e.g., STEVE ISSER, ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING IN THE UNITED STATES: MARKETS AND POLICY FROM THE 1978 ENERGY ACT TO THE PRESENT 250 (2015) (discussing evidence of strategic bidding and withholding by gas-fired thermal generation units during the early years of the California wholesale power market).
295. See id.
296. See, e.g., WEARE, supra note 17. Two specific design flaws contributed substantially to the market dysfunction: (1) a prohibition on long-term contracts that forced
the utilities into the spot market for virtually all of their power purchase needs, and
(2) the lack of any demand response as a result of a decision to freeze retail rates. Id.
at 93.
297. Id. at 3–4.
298. FERC’s market behavior rules for electricity are codified at 18 C.F.R. § 35.41.
FERC’s regulations prohibiting electricity market manipulation are at 18 C.F.R. § 1c.2.
EPAct 2005 added virtually identical anti-manipulation provisions to the Federal
Power Act and the Natural Gas Act. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58,
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also gave FERC expansive new civil penalty authority, which FERC has
used vigorously over the last decade.299 Taken together, these new
tools provided an important complement to the Commission’s ongoing efforts to prevent the exercise of market power. In effect, the use
of ex ante market screens and the market power mitigation rules work
to ensure that the markets are structurally competitive, while the conduct-based approaches provide a deterrent against market manipulation and gaming.
All of which has translated into a massive expansion of FERC’s
market analysis and surveillance operations as well as a substantial
increase in the capacity of its enforcement division. On the market surveillance side, to take one example, FERC now receives, on a non-public basis, approximately seven gigabytes of data every day on market
bids, offers, and, outcomes in the six RTO/ISO markets.300 In 2018, the
Commission’s electricity market surveillance screens generated
369,230 alerts, more than a thousand a day on average.301 Needless to
say, keeping track of all of this is no small task and involves a very
different skill set compared to what the Commission did prior to restructuring. Notwithstanding the fact that FERC’s enabling statutes
have changed very little since the 1930s, it is fair to say that the agency
today is almost unrecognizable compared to its previous incarnation.302
And yet, even with the substantial resources it has devoted to analyzing market structure and policing market conduct, FERC continues to struggle with the actual mechanisms of price formation at the
center of these markets. While the gaming and manipulation that were
apparent in California resulted in part from structural problems in the
markets and the lack of specific rules to prevent such behavior, these

§ 1283 119 Stat. 594, 979 (2005) (adding new anti-manipulation provisions to the
Federal Power Act, codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824v).
299. EPAct 2005 gave FERC new civil penalty authority of up to $1 million per day
per violation. See 16 U.S.C. § 825o-1. For a review of FERC’s enforcement efforts after
EPAct 2005, see STAFF WHITE PAPER, supra note 18.
300. See FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, 2019 REPORT ON ENFORCEMENT, DOCKET NO.
AD07-13-013, at 72 (2019).
301. Id. at 74–75. These alerts led to twenty-three additional inquiries and five referrals for investigation. Id. at 8.
302. See Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems 163 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 43–50 (2014) (discussing challenges that FERC has faced in trying to manage
electricity restructuring and regulate electricity markets using tools and authorities
from the Federal Power Act).
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problems also stemmed from efforts to take advantage of the software
and specific rules regarding participation in the electricity auctions.303
Since the California crisis, moreover, a significant number of
FERC’s electricity market manipulation cases have involved trading
strategies that target market design flaws and software errors in the
RTO and ISO markets.304 FERC has taken the position that gaming of
such flaws is manipulative conduct, and the Commission has initiated
enforcement actions based on violations that it characterizes as exploiting known loopholes for “free money.”305 As these markets increase in complexity, such gaming will inevitably continue, forcing the
Commission into a never ending dynamic of cat-and-mouse with sophisticated traders seeking ever more creative ways to profit from the
specific rules and features of the ways of price making in these markets.306
To be sure, the problem of market manipulation is hardly unique
to electricity, and FERC deserves enormous credit for substantially enhancing its ability to monitor market conduct and police against manipulation. But without also focusing directly on the ways of price
303. FERC’s investigation of Enron’s trading strategies found that Enron’s cumulative profits from its electricity trades during the California crisis were around $1.8 billion. See FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, INITIAL REPORT ON COMPANY-SPECIFIC SEPARATE PROCEEDINGS AND GENERIC EVALUATIONS 83 (2002).
304. See, e.g., Make-Whole Payments and Related Bidding Strategies, 144 FERC
¶ 61,068 at 13–14 (2013) (describing how JP Morgan Ventures Energy Corporation
gamed the CAISO and MISO market software with a specific bidding strategy that triggered various above-market payments); see also STAFF WHITE PAPER, supra note 18, at
16–31 (reporting on various manipulation cases since 2005); Robert S. Fleishman &
Paul C. Varnado, Perspectives on FERC’s Enforcement Program as It Relates to Energy
Market Manipulation, in THE GUIDE TO ENERGY MARKET MANIPULATION 15, 22 (Gordon
Kaiser ed., 2018) (“A significant portion of FERC manipulation cases involve trading
that occurred in the context of market design flaws and software errors in RTO and
ISO electricity markets.”).
305. See Houlian Chen, 151 FERC ¶ 61,179, at 2 (2015); JP Morgan Ventures Energy
Corp., 144 FERC ¶ 61,068, at 17 (2013) (stating that “one of [FERC’s] core responsibilities is detecting, preventing, and appropriately sanctioning the gaming of energy markets”).
306. See Make-Whole Payments and Related Bidding Strategies, 144 FERC ¶ 61,068,
at 15 (2013) (“In the wake of Enron’s schemes in the CAISO market, the Energy Policy
Act of 2005 gave the Commission ‘broad authority to prohibit manipulation’ and an
‘intentionally broad proscription against all kinds of deception, manipulation, deceit
and fraud.’ Both the breadth of Congress’s authorization to the Commission and the
breadth of the Anti-Manipulation Rule itself are a response to what courts have long
recognized: the impossibility of foreseeing the ‘myriad means’ of misconduct in which
market participants may engage.” (citing Cargill v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1163 (8th
Cir. 1971) (“The methods and techniques of manipulation are limited only by the ingenuity of man.”))).
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making in these markets, it is difficult for FERC to determine whether
certain conduct should be considered legitimate or not. More importantly, as the markets themselves (and the pricing algorithms that
power them) are further adjusted to accommodate the transition to a
low-carbon electricity system, such challenges are sure to intensify. As
we will see in the next section, moreover, these challenges are, at least
in the first instance, less a matter of manipulation and gaming than
they are about the more fundamental struggle over whether and how
to value certain resources in the RTO/ISO pricing algorithms.
C. PRICE FORMATION AND FERC’S INSIDE/OUTSIDE PROBLEM
The theory behind the uniform clearing-price auction was that
low-cost generators would capture infra-marginal rents (the difference between the clearing price and a generator’s offer price) that
they could use to cover their fixed costs.307 In the early days of restructuring, there was a general view across the industry that natural gas
would continue to be relatively expensive, with higher cost natural gas
peaking plants always on the margin setting the clearing price during
periods of peak demand. With the dramatic decline in natural gas
prices since 2008 as a result of the shale gas boom, natural gas power
plants’ share of total electricity generation in the United States has increased significantly, largely at the expense of coal.308 Over the same
period, renewable energy, primarily wind and solar, has also grown
considerably as a result of rapidly declining costs and government
policy supports.309 Taken together, these two developments—shale
gas and cheap renewables—have led to substantial reductions in the
clearing prices in the organized electricity markets.310
307. See, e.g., PAUL L. JOSKOW, COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND INVESTMENT IN
NEW GENERATING CAPACITY 9 (2006) (“Inframarginal generating units earn net revenues
or quasi-rents that contribute to the recovery of their fixed operating and capital costs
whenever the market clearing price exceeds their own marginal generation costs.”).
308. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 234, at 13 (“The biggest contributor to
coal and nuclear plant retirements has been the advantaged economics of natural gasfired generation.”).
309. See Lincoln L. Davies, Eulogizing Renewable Energy Policy, 33 J. LAND USE &
ENV’T L. 309, 320–21 (2018) (discussing significant declines in costs of renewables and
contribution of various policy supports); Helm & Hepburn, supra note 235, at 189 (“A
key feature of renewable electricity generating technologies is that they have close to
zero marginal costs. Unlike thermal electricity generation, which requires the purchase and combustion of coal, oil, or gas, the incoming energy from the sun and the
wind is free, and the marginal costs are limited. This represents a radical departure
from the conventional cost structure of electricity markets.”).
310. Prices declined significantly in PJM from 2014 to 2018. See generally MONITORING ANALYTICS, L.L.C., 2018 STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT FOR PJM (2019).
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Declining prices have in turn led to early retirements of baseload
generation, mainly coal and nuclear power, but also (increasingly)
more expensive natural gas units.311 This has led to a proliferation of
efforts inside and outside of the markets to create new revenues for
particular types of generators. Over the last decade, multiple states
have adopted various subsidy programs for certain types of resources.312 Some of these subsidy programs have focused on encouraging investment in new generation within states while others have
focused on providing additional revenues to existing generators at
risk of early retirement.313 In both cases, questions have emerged regarding how these state programs interact with FERC-regulated markets for capacity and energy.
Not surprisingly, litigation has ensued. In 2016, the Supreme
Court struck down a Maryland program that required load serving entities in the state to sign long-term contracts for new natural gas generation that conditioned compensation on the ability of the generator
to clear the PJM capacity market.314 More recently, two appellate decisions upheld zero emission credit programs seeking to provide additional revenues to nuclear power plants in Illinois and New York315
Although the Supreme Court recently denied cert in these cases, more
litigation is brewing as other states such as Ohio and Indiana move
forward with new subsidy programs.316 We are back, it seems, to a
311. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 234.
312. See, e.g., Five States Have Implemented Programs to Assist Nuclear Power
Plants, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail
.php?id=41534 [https://perma.cc/HEF4-PPPM] (discussing state programs in Connecticut, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, and Ohio to support nuclear power plants).
313. Id.; see also Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg. LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016) (addressing Maryland program to support new natural gas fired generation in the state).
314. The Court held that this requirement impermissibly interfered with FERC’s
jurisdiction over wholesale electricity markets because it explicitly tied compensation
to the clearing prices in the PJM capacity market. See Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1292.
315. See Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. Star, 904 F.3d 518, 523 (7th Cir. 2018) (upholding Illinois’s zero emission credit (ZEC) program on grounds that it did not require
recipients to participate in FERC regulated auctions); Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Zilberman, 906 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 2018) (concluding that New York’s ZEC program was
not preempted under the FPA because there was no “impermissible tether” to the
FERC regulated auctions as in Hughes).
316. See, e.g., John Funk, Ohio Gov DeWine Signs Controversial Nuke Subsidy Bill,
UTIL. DIVE (July 23, 2019) [hereinafter Funk, Dewine], https://www.utilitydive.com/
news/breaking-ohio-passes-controversial-nuke-subsidy-bill-by-one-vote [https://
perma.cc/7DCT-8D6Z]; Darren Sweeny, Ind. Governor Signs Bill Pausing Coal Plant Retirements, S&P GLOB. MKT. INTEL. (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.spglobal.com/
marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/ind-governor-signs
-bill-pausing-coal-plant-retirements-57738848 [https://perma.cc/8T8V-BEHF]. The
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high-stakes version of what Walton Hamilton once called “price-by
way of litigation.”317
Meanwhile, there are vigorous ongoing debates within the RTOs
and ISOs (and at FERC and the Department of Energy) over proposals
to create new in-market products and rules to “enhance” price formation in a manner that monetizes certain attributes associated with
certain types of resources.318 The recent controversy over the Department of Energy’s proposed rule on grid resiliency, which seeks to find
additional ways to compensate baseload resources (i.e., coal and nuclear) for their contribution to grid reliability or resiliency is one example of this.319 RTOs and ISOs have also created new market

Ohio legislation came under scrutiny in July 2020, when the state’s Speaker of the
House was charged in a $61 million bribery scheme associated with the legislation.
John Funk, Top Ohio Lawmaker Charged with Accepting $61M Bribe in Scheme To Pass
Nuclear Bailout, UTIL. DIVE (July 21, 2020), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/top
-ohio-lawmaker-charged-with-accepting-61m-bribe-in-scheme-to-pass-nucle
[https://perma.cc/L5FD-R5UM].
317. Hamilton was referring to the practice of utility ratemaking and its tendency
to devolve into an elaborate process of adjudication. See Walton H. Hamilton, Price—
By Way of Litigation, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 1008, 1034 (1938) (“The invocation of the
courts is an extravagant expense to all concerned. It brings into the process of pricemaking the devices of litigation, contrived for another purpose, alien to the task, and
set to a far slower tempo. The introduction of juristic procedures into the process of
price-making is an invitation to frustration.”).
318. See PJM INTERCONNECTION, PROPOSED ENHANCEMENTS TO ENERGY PRICE FORMATION 1–2 (2017) (“Today, the continuing penetration of zero marginal cost resources, declining natural gas prices, greater generator efficiency, and reduced generator margins resulting from low energy prices have resulted in a generation mix that
is differentiated less by cost and more by physical operational attributes. As a result,
enhancing energy price formation so the market sends better price signals has become
more prominent and worthy of attention.”). A critical view of the current situation in
these markets might concur with Philip Mirowski and Edward Nik-Kah’s observation
that “[f]ixing markets with more markets is just another way that neoliberals have of
never having to say they’re sorry.” See MIROWSKI & NIK-KHAH, supra note 37, at 236. A
more earnest view sees these efforts as an ongoing set of pragmatic experiments aimed
at shaping these markets during a time of enormous change. Cf. Fed. Power Comm’n v.
La. Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621, 642 (1972) (observing that “agencies created to
protect the public interest must be free, within the ambit of their statutory authority,
to make the pragmatic adjustments which may be called for by particular circumstances”).
319. See U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,940, 46,942–44 (Oct. 10, 2017) (observing that “regulated
wholesale markets are not adequately pricing resiliency attributes of fuel-secure generation” and directing FERC to consider new pricing rule that would require RTO and
ISO markets to provide additional compensation to these generators). FERC terminated the proceeding shortly after the DOE issued its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
But the Commission simultaneously initiated its own proceeding on the issue. See Grid

808

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[105:739

products that would provide additional compensation for so-called
fast ramping capacity—that is, the capacity of certain generation (primarily natural gas plants) to quickly come on line in order to balance
the intermittency associated with variable renewable resources.320
These recent in-market efforts are part of a broader, longstanding effort to modify the wholesale electricity markets to accommodate
various types of resources—from new ancillary services to demand
response, storage, and distributed generation. In examining these efforts, it is important to distinguish between those directed at relaxing
or removing barriers to entry for new resources such as storage and
demand response and those intended to correct or compensate for
various “out-of-market” supports. As the electric generation mix continues to shift under the influence of cheap natural gas and higher penetration of renewables, there will inevitably be additional efforts to
create new in-market products and rules to deal with various problems and “fix” the markets.321
What is important to recognize in the current moment is that
these two problems are connected: as out-of-market payments further depress clearing prices, market participants push that much
harder for additional compensation and favorable rules inside the
markets. This inside/outside problem has consumed an enormous
amount of attention in the RTOs and ISOs as well as at FERC, and some
believe that it threatens the long-term viability of these markets.322
To take the most pertinent current example, some RTOs are now
using minimum offer pricing rules as “in-market” tools in the capacity
markets (the markets for future generating capacity) to mitigate the

Reliability and Resiliency Pricing, 162 FERC ¶ 61,012 (2018) (terminating DOE proceeding and initiating new proceeding).
320. See, e.g., California Independent System Operator Corporation, 156 FERC
¶ 61,226 para. 36 (2016); Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc., 149 FERC
¶ 61,095 (2014); see also Fast-Start Pricing in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators, 157 FERC ¶ 61,213 (2016).
321. PJM’s recent proposal to “enhance” energy price formation is a good example,
and points to the obvious challenge of deciding what should be the “correct” approach
to pricing in these markets. See PJM INTERCONNECTION, supra note 318, at 5. (“Generally,
low prices are desirable and beneficial for consumers—provided they continue to reflect the fundamentals of supply and demand in the market. However, to the extent
that prices are suppressed by the analytical methods of the price calculation itself, an
opportunity exists to enhance price formation by revising those methods.”).
322. See, e.g., RAYMOND L. GIFFORD & MATTHEW S. LARSON, ‘AROUND MARKET,’ ‘IN MARKET,’ AND FERC AT A CROSSROADS 20 (2018) (arguing that no “in-market” or “around
market” solutions will be able to fix the problems in the RTO/ISO markets).
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price suppression effects of state subsidies.323 These rules were originally designed to control for buyer-side power—that is, the ability of
load serving entities to suppress prices for future generation in the
capacity market.324 But as concerns over “out-of-market” payments to
various generators have intensified, several RTOs have looked to the
minimum offer pricing rule as a tool to provide a floor price for capacity that would mitigate the price suppression effects of these out-ofmarket payments.325 By forcing all resources, including those receiving subsidies, to offer capacity at the minimum price, these rules seek
to control for the situation where a generator receiving a subsidy
would be willing to offer its capacity at a lower price because of the
subsidy it receives.326
In contrast to its more typical posture of deference to RTO market
design proposals, FERC has become quite involved in some of these
efforts over the last several years. The Commission’s recent actions
with respect to PJM’s proposed capacity market reforms reveal much
about the current Commission’s thinking on these issues. In June
2018, FERC took the unusual step of denying a market reform proposal developed by PJM based on several years of an intense multistakeholder process on the grounds that it did not go far enough in
mitigating the “price suppressive” effects of out-of-market policy supports.327 After an elaborate discussion regarding which subsidies
were considered “material” and a deep dive into the details of PJM’s
two-stage auction design, the Commission, in a split 3-2 decision, rejected the proposal, concluding that it would “allow[] resources receiving out-of-market support to significantly affect capacity prices in
a manner that will cause unjust and unreasonable and unduly

323. These issues are currently before the Commission in the context of efforts to
reform the PJM capacity market to mitigate the “price-suppression” effects of state
subsidies. See, e.g., Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, LLC, 163 FERC ¶ 61,236 para.
1 (2018) (“[T]he integrity and effectiveness of the capacity market administered by
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM) have become untenably threatened by out-of-market
payments provided or required by certain states for the purpose of supporting the entry or continued operation of preferred generation resources that may not otherwise
be able to succeed in a competitive wholesale capacity market.”).
324. See N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 158 FERC
¶ 61,137 para. 1 (2017) (Bay, Comm’r, concurring).
325. Id.
326. See id. at paras. 1–2 (“[T]he Commission’s theory of the [minimum offer pricing rule] has changed, morphing from an examination of monopsony power to an examination of whether states have provided support or a subsidy to a resource that is
selling into the capacity market.”).
327. Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, LLC, 163 FERC ¶ 61,236 (2018).
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discriminatory rates in PJM.”328 The majority continued, “[w]e cannot
rely on such a construct to harness competitive market forces and produce just and reasonable rates.”329 In December 2019, FERC followed
up with yet another Order on the matter, establishing its own revised
capacity market design for PJM.330 And in April 2020, the Commission
denied various requests for rehearing and affirmed the basic elements
of the December order, provoking yet another barrage of criticism and
a vigorous dissent from Commissioner Richard Glick.331
The stated rationale for FERC’s recent efforts to reform these
markets is that they can somehow be made pure—isolated from the
“distortionary” effects of background entitlements.332 A moment’s reflection, however, makes clear that these markets can never be made
pure. Indeed, as former FERC Chairman Norman Bay observed in an
earlier proceeding on minimum offer pricing rules:
The pervasiveness of public policies that provide subsidies or impose costs
on resources makes it futile to attempt to unwind them all. Assuming that it
is even possible to determine a “subsidy-free offer,” any attempt to unwind
completely all subsidies and added costs necessarily assumes that some regulatory entity is capable of calculating the correct offer that resources must
submit to the market. The clearing price from such a process could not
328. Id. at para. 156.
329. Id.
330. See Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, LLC, Order Establishing Just and
Reasonable Rate, 169 FERC ¶ 61,239 (2019). This was the seventh time since 2006
that the Commission had intervened in the design of the PJM capacity market. In its
December 2019 order, the Commission determined that any new or existing generation resource that receives a “State Subsidy” as defined by the Commission and that
does not qualify for one of four exemptions would be subject to the MOPR. See id. at
para. 9. The four exemptions include (1) existing “self-supply” or self-scheduled resources; (2) existing demand-response, energy efficiency, and storage resources; (3)
existing renewable resources participating in state RPS programs; and (4) “new and
existing resources that are not subsidized and thus do not generally require a review
to protect ‘the integrity and effectiveness of the capacity market’.” Id. at para. 2.
331. See Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, LLC, Order on Rehearing and Clarification, 171 FERC ¶ 61,035 (2020); see also id. at para. 3 (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting)
(referring to the Commission’s December 2019 MOPR rule as turning “the ‘market’ into
a system of bureaucratic pricing so pervasive that it would have made the Kremlin
economists in the old Soviet Union blush”).
332. See Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, LLC, 163 FERC ¶ 61,236 para. 2
(2018) (“With each such subsidy, the market becomes less grounded in fundamental
principles of supply and demand.”); see also id. at para. 150 (finding that PJM’s proposed capacity market reform “fails to protect the integrity of competition in the
wholesale capacity market against unreasonable price distortions and cost shifts
caused by out-of-market support to keep existing uneconomic resources in operation,
or to support the uneconomic entry of new resources, regardless of the generation
type or quantity of the resources supported by such out-of-market support. The resulting price distortions compromise the capacity market’s integrity.”).
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credibly be called a market-based outcome. If a wholesale market operator
tried to create an ex ante market free from the influence of public policy and
the myriad of state and federal actions that impact supply and demand, this
would create the most administrative construct of all. In short, the cure
would be worse than the alleged disease.333

Simply put, there is no way to insulate these markets from the price
“distorting” effects of public policy.334 All generating resources are
subsidized or penalized in one way or another and the proliferation of
out-of-market payments and new in-market products and rule
changes inevitably devolves into a line-drawing exercise that requires
hard choices.335 This is hardly a new problem. Nor is it one that is exclusive to electricity. In fact, it provides yet another illustration of the
core legal realist insight that all market transactions (and all prices)
are conditioned by background entitlements.336
Recognizing this, of course, does not provide an obvious solution
to the challenges facing electricity markets. But it does help us see the
incoherence of ongoing appeals to free markets and a level playing
field in the current debates.337 Whatever one thinks of his politics,
333. N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. N. Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 158 FERC
¶ 61,137, at 6 (Bay, Comm’r, concurring); see also id. at 5 (noting that efforts to correct
for state “intrusions” into the markets “assumes that a market can and should be free
from out-of-market influences. . . . In point of fact, out-of-market influences are everywhere.”).
334. See Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection LLC, 163 FERC ¶ 61,236, at 8–9
(Glick, Comm’r, dissenting) (“If the Commission really wants to protect what it calls
the ‘integrity’ of the capacity market, it would need to mitigate each and every federal,
state, and local subsidy that allows a resource to lower its capacity market offer as well
as the offers of vertically integrated utilities with guaranteed cost recovery. I suspect
that we would soon find that there are few, if any, resources that would qualify to participate in PJM’s capacity market without being subject to an offer floor.”).
335. See Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 906 F.3d 41, 57 (2d Cir. 2018)
(“FERC uses auctions to set wholesale prices and to promote efficiency with the background assumption that the FPA establishes a dual regulatory system between the
states and federal government and that the states engage in public policies that affect
the wholesale markets.”); Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. Star, 904 F.3d 518, 524 (7th Cir.
2018) (“Instead of deeming state systems such as Illinois’ [ZEC program] to be forbidden, the Commission has taken them as givens and set out to make the best of the situation they produce. . . . [T]he need to make adjustments [to the PJM capacity auction]
in light of states’ exercise of their lawful power does not diminish the scope of those
powers.”).
336. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM.
L. REV. 603, 625–26 (1943) (“The market value of a property or a service is merely a
measure of the strength of the bargaining power of the person who owns the one or
renders the other, under the particular legal rights with which the law endows him,
and the legal restrictions which it places on others.”).
337. And these appeals are coming from all sides. Compare Rich Glick & Matthew
Christiansen, FERC and Climate Change, 40 ENERGY L.J. 1, 6 (2019) (“[I]t is critical that
all resources be able to compete on a level playing field in the wholesale electricity
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former Secretary of Energy Rick Perry was surely correct when he
stated that “there is no free market in the energy industry.”338 Indeed,
once we acknowledge that there is no pre-political set of criteria for
choosing among resources, it becomes impossible to avoid the push
and pull of politics in deciding which resources, under which circumstances, will participate in the markets.
Seen in this light, it should not be a surprise that certain merchant
generators and other market participants in the RTOs and ISOs are
seeking to create new rules and products that will advantage them relative to other resources. While such activities might be viewed as detrimental to well-functioning markets, this simply begs the prior questions of whether, and on what terms, certain resources should be
allowed to participate in the markets and who gets to decide.339 Indeed, when one pulls back the curtain on price making within these
markets, there is no lack of rent-seeking behavior to go around. Recent
calls to reform RTO/ISO governance to increase participation and improve deliberation are surely worthy exercises, but this does not absolve FERC of its obligation to police these markets in a manner that
protects the broader public interest.340

sector and that rules designed for conventional technologies are not barriers to entry
of new ones.”), with John S. Moot, Subsidies, Climate Change, Electric Markets and the
FERC, 35 ENERGY L.J. 345, 346 (2014) (“Subsidies are creating a toxic mix of imperfect
competition and imperfect regulation working directly at cross-purposes with each
other.”).
338. Timothy Cama, Perry: ‘There Is No Free Market in the Energy Industry,’ HILL
(Oct. 6, 2017, 1:52 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/354270
-perry-there-is-no-free-market-in-the-energy-industry [https://perma.cc/4NR2
-7KHC]. But see Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760,
768 (2016) (“In this new world [of competitive wholesale power markets], FERC . . .
undertakes to ensure ‘just and reasonable’ wholesale rates by enhancing competition—attempting, as we recently explained, ‘to break down regulatory and economic
barriers that hinder a free market in wholesale electricity.’” (quoting Morgan Stanley,
554 U.S. at 536)).
339. Cf. Danny Cullenward & Shelley Welton, The Quiet Undoing: How Regional
Electricity Market Reforms Threaten State Clean Energy Goals, YALE J. ON REGUL. BULL.
(Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.yalejreg.com/bulletin/the-quiet-undoing-how-regional
-electricity-market-reforms-threaten-state-clean-energy-goals [https://perma.cc/
56W8-RSQD] (suggesting that there is a quiet effort underway seeking to undo “decades of progress” that FERC has made “in crafting robust, well-functioning regional
energy markets”).
340. See, e.g., CHRISTINA SIMEONE, UNIV. OF PA. KLEINMAN CTR. FOR ENERGY POL’Y, PJM
GOVERNANCE: CAN REFORMS IMPROVE OUTCOMES? 3–4 (2017) (outlining various proposed
governance reforms for PJM and other RTOs); Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 266,
at 593 (discussing FERC’s responsibility to ensure that RTO governance advances the
long-term public interest); Welton, supra note 266, at 58 (expressing “limited
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Doing that effectively will require FERC to make some clear
choices. For starters, the Commission should abandon its uneven and
unsuccessful appeals to a vision of these markets as things that can
somehow be kept pure.341 Several former and current Commissioners
have already embraced a version of this argument.342 It is past time
for the rest of the Commission to recognize the incoherence and confusion that results from efforts to promote an unrealistic view of these
markets. Second, FERC should clarify once and for all that it will respect the structure of federalism in the Federal Power Act and allow
state policy supports (of whatever kind) to flow through these markets without trying to develop offsetting in-market fixes. Here, the
Commission will need to send a strong signal to the RTOs and ISOs, as
well as to market participants, that it will be vigorous in policing their
efforts to use rule changes and/or new in-market products to correct
for out-of-market subsidies. Third, the Commission should continue
working to find ways to allow new resources and technologies to access these markets, as it has already done with demand response, storage, and distributed generation.343 In doing so, it will need to differentiate carefully between rules and products that promote entry and
those that are directed at offsetting out-of-market supports by enhancing prices. This will not always be an easy line to draw, but FERC
is in a better position to draw it than any other entity. Taken together,
these three proposals offer a pragmatic approach to the organized
confidence that reforms focused on RTO’s internal governance processes alone could
adequately recalibrate sectoral responsibility”).
341. The early vision of these markets promoted by some of the pioneers in mechanism design suggested that they could somehow be kept pure. See, e.g., Vernon L.
Smith, Regulatory Reform in the Electric Power Industry, 19 REGULATION 33, 44 (1996)
(“[Central dispatch] is simply rule-governed, nerve-center coordination, based entirely
on bids to buy power, and the offers to sell power or transmission services, by decentralized competing owners. Attempts to use the ‘pool’ or exchange to impose rules that
are a disguised attempt to perpetuate regulation, or forms of political bias favoring
particular interests, must be vigorously resisted. In electric power we are, and should
be, talking about the development of a property-rights system—rights to inject or
withdraw power, rights of transmission access, rights to invest and to claim the benefits (and incur the losses) that accrue to such investment.”).
342. See, e.g., Glick & Christiansen, supra note 337, at 14 (discussing the importance of ensuring current market rules do not become barriers to innovation); TONY
CLARK, REGULATION AND MARKETS: IDEAS FOR SOLVING THE IDENTITY CRISIS 16 (2017).
343. See, e.g., Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, Order No. 745, 134 FERC ¶ 61,187 (2011); Electric Storage Participation in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators, Order No. 841, 162 FERC ¶ 61,127 (2018); Participation of Distributed Energy
Resource Aggregations in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations
and Independent System Operators, 172 FERC ¶ 61,247 (2020).
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electricity markets, while still recognizing the delicate and contested
ways of price making at their core as key pieces of infrastructure that
require careful and ongoing regulation.
As noted, FERC has ample legal authority to regulate along these
lines.344 Even in a world where the Commission is relying upon competition and market forces to fix prices, it clearly has authority under
its long-standing (and recently elaborated) jurisprudence regarding
“practices” affecting rates to engage in any number of ways with the
mechanics of price making in these markets.345 Indeed, it would be difficult to think of a “practice” that more directly affects rates than the
pricing algorithms, and the broader market rules that shape them, at
the center of these markets. There are also good reasons why FERC
should take a more proactive approach to regulating these pricing
structures rather than delegating crucial questions of their design to
the RTOs and ISOs. It is not obvious, in this respect, that the current
version of multistakeholder governance operating in the RTOs and
ISOs is the best way to design a market or that the outcomes of such
processes are necessarily consistent with the public interest.346
The key takeaway here is that once we view these ways of price
making as tools for harnessing the power of competition and directing
it toward public ends, a more expansive set of choices opens up.347
Thus, while decisions to value demand response, storage, distributed
resources, resiliency, or flexibility in the markets (along with proposals to price carbon in various ways) will never get us any closer to
the mythical level playing field, they can still rather easily be viewed
as choices that fit within FERC’s authority to regulate price formation
in a manner that advances the public interest.
Some might argue in response that both FERC and the courts have
already settled the question by embracing the view that ratemaking
(and the just and reasonable standard that governs it) should never
344. See supra Part I.
345. See Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760
(2016); Eisen, supra note 27.
346. See, e.g., Shelley Welton, Electricity Markets and the Social Project of Decarbonization, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1067, 1073 (2018) (characterizing RTO governance as
“quasi-private, immensely technocratic, and largely opaque”).
347. Cf. Jonas J. Monast, Electricity Competition and the Public Good: Rethinking
Markets and Monopolies, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 667, 706 (2019) (“Competition will continue to steer the evolution of the electricity sector in both restructured and traditionally regulated markets. The questions going forward are what form competition takes
and what constraints public policy places on the scope of competition. Maximizing societal benefits in both restructured and traditionally regulated states depends on recognizing, and mitigating, instances when regulatory and market-design choices interfere with public goals.” (footnotes omitted)).
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try to accommodate extra-economic concerns, environmental or otherwise, that go beyond the traditional balancing of interests between
ratepayers and investors.348 As a doctrinal matter, such a view rests
on a slender reed.349 As a policy matter, it defies common sense given
the unprecedented changes taking place in the electricity sector. Even
for those on the fence about how to decarbonize the electricity sector,
it does not take much of a leap to recognize that the public interest is
expansive enough to encompass an approach to pricing that would encourage competition from new resources and products in order to facilitate a clean energy transition that is well underway.350
While climate policy is not the focus of this Article, it is indicative
of the confusion that can result when we reify markets and assume
that there is a correct way to design them. In the end, we need to recognize market design for what it is—a political exercise. Those in favor of aggressive climate action (including this author) should not be
shy about arguing that electricity markets should not only accommodate state policies to support clean energy, but that they should be revised and redirected as needed to allow new resources and technologies to participate in order to facilitate the ongoing transition.
Although a majority of the current FERC Commissioners seem to have
limited interest in leading such an effort, there is nothing in the

348. See, e.g., Grand Council of the Crees v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 198 F.3d
950, 958 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (following Hope Natural Gas to conclude that ratemaking under § 205(a) of the Federal Power Act is “an effort to balance the interest of power
consumers and producers” and that “[e]nvironmental interests appear orthogonal to
both”); see also NAACP v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 425 U.S. 662, 669 (1976) (“This Court’s
cases have consistently held that the use of the words ‘public interest’ in a regulatory
statute is not a broad license to promote the general public welfare. Rather, the words
take meaning from the purposes of the regulatory legislation.”).
349. Grand Council of the Crees, 198 F.3d at 957 (invoking Chevron deference to
find that FERC’s exclusion of environmental interests was a “reasonable” interpretation of the Federal Power Act in the face of congressional silence).
350. Several commentators and at least one FERC Commissioner have made versions of this argument. See, e.g., Glick & Christiansen, supra note 337, at 45 (“The Commission’s ultimate responsibility is to protect the ‘public interest.’ There is perhaps no
greater concern to the public interest than the existential threat posed by anthropogenic climate change.”); Christopher J. Bateman & James T.B. Tripp, Toward Greener
FERC Regulation of the Power Industry, 38 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 275 (2014) (arguing for
a revised understanding of the public interest by FERC to accommodate a more proactive approach to climate change); see also Eisen, supra note 27 (arguing that FERC
should ground carbon pricing in the RTO/ISO markets on its expansive authority to
regulate “practices” affecting rates).
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jurisprudence of the Federal Power Act that would necessarily preclude a future FERC from moving in this direction.351
In making such an argument, however, clean energy advocates
should be careful to recognize that the shoe could end up on the other
foot. While the structure of federalism that animates the Federal
Power Act provides a solid legal justification for accommodating state
policy supports in FERC regulated markets without trying to mitigate
them with “fixes” inside those markets, there is no justification for deploying this sort of accommodation selectively to apply only to those
policies that support one’s preferred set of resources.352 Likewise, for
those promoting a more aggressive posture by FERC favoring carbon
pricing in the RTO/ISO markets, such as the use of a carbon adder for
all emitting resources,353 those same arguments could be turned
around to support a decision to impose a resiliency adder or some
other market product that enhances the value of certain fossil fuel
351. There is always the question, of course, of how the federal courts and the current Supreme Court would react to such a move.
352. Some states, such as Ohio, have already adopted out-of-market payments for
coal-fired generators, in addition to large nuclear plants. See Funk, Dewine, supra note
316. Others such as Indiana appear to be moving in this direction. See, e.g., Catherine
Morehouse, Indiana Passes Coal Plant Support Bill as Democrats Removed from Conference Committee Deliberations, UTIL. DIVE (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.utilitydive
.com/news/indiana-passes-coal-plant-support-bill-as-democrats-removed-from
-conference [https://perma.cc/C4PV-HG9F].
353. See, e.g., Eisen, supra note 27; Ari Peskoe, Easing Jurisdictional Tensions by Integrating Public Policy in Wholesale Electricity Markets, 38 ENERGY L.J. 1, 30–37 (2017)
(discussing various legal arguments in favor of including a carbon adder in RTO/ISO
markets); STEVEN WEISSMAN & ROMANY WEBB, U.C. BERKELEY CTR. FOR L., ENERGY, & ENV’T,
ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE WITHOUT LEGISLATION: HOW THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION CAN USE ITS EXISTING LEGAL AUTHORITY TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND INCREASE CLEAN ENERGY USE 10–11 (2014) (arguing that FERC does have legal
authority to impose a carbon adder on wholesale sales of electricity). These proposals
are often premised on the argument that carbon adders correct (at least in part) for
the implicit subsidies that fossil fuel power plants enjoy as a result of the inability of
current pricing structures to account for the environmental externalities associated
with fossil fuel combustion. Although some market operators, such as CAISO, already
have provisions in place to accommodate California’s carbon pricing regime, the idea
of using carbon pricing in the broader RTO/ISO markets appears to be gaining ground,
especially as controversies over state policy supports intensify. In September 2020,
FERC convened a technical conference to explore carbon pricing in the RTO/ISO markets. See Technical Conference Regarding Carbon Pricing in Organized Wholesale Electricity Markets, FERC (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.ferc.gov/news-events/events/
technical-conference-regarding-carbon-pricing-organized-wholesale-electricity
[https://perma.cc/T8ZT-Y8BU]. And in October 2020, FERC issued a proposed policy
statement on the issue. See Carbon Pricing in Organized Wholesale Electricity Markets,
Proposed Policy Statement, Docket No. AD-20-14-000, 173 FERC ¶ 61,062 (Oct. 15,
2020).

2020]

PRICE MAKING

817

generators. In the end, it is critical to recognize that the organized
electricity markets will always be, at best, limited and imperfect vehicles for pursuing climate policy goals.
IV. WAYS OF PRICE MAKING AND THE CHALLENGE OF MARKET
GOVERNANCE
In his dissenting opinion in the Hope Natural Gas case, Justice
Jackson recognized the political nature of prices and the need to balance competing interests in any determination of rates.354 “We should
recognize ‘price’ for what it is,” he wrote,
a tool, a means, an expedient. In public hands, it has much the same economic
effects as in private hands. . . . The fact is that in natural gas regulation price
must be used to reconcile the private property right society has permitted to
vest in an important natural resource with the claims of society upon it—
price must draw a balance between wealth and welfare.355

For Jackson, striking the right balance was a task that required deep
knowledge of the natural gas industry.356 To that end, he warned
against making “a fetish” of the formalisms of public utility accounting
and the distortions that these created for the process of ratemaking.357
Like Walton Hamilton and Louis Brandeis before him, Jackson knew
that ratemaking could, and often did, devolve into a series of accounting rituals and bookkeeping exercises that obscured the deep play of
economic interests.358
Hope, of course, is most famous because it finally put to rest the
“fair value rule” of Smyth v. Ames, freeing ratemaking from the impossible task of determining the proper, constitutionally mandated value
of utility assets.359 Going forward, commissions were free to adopt
354. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 653 (1944) (Jackson,
J., dissenting).
355. Id.
356. Id. (“To carry this into techniques of inquiry is the task of the Commissioner
rather than of the judge, and it certainly is no task to be solved by mere bookkeeping
but requires the best economic talent available.”).
357. Jackson appended a long footnote elaborating on this point: “To make a fetish
of mere accounting is to shield from examination the deeper causes, forces, movements, and conditions which should govern rates.” Id. at 643–44 n.40.
358. Id. (citing Walton Hamilton, Cost as a Standard of Price, 4 L. CONTEMP. PROBS.
321, 323–25); see also GERALD BERK, LOUIS BRANDEIS AND THE MAKING OF REGULATED COMPETITION, 1900-1932, at 23–25 (2009) (discussing Brandeis’s view of the social construction of costs and the role of accounting).
359. See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546 (1898) (holding that “the basis of all
calculations as to the reasonableness of the rates to be charged by a corporation maintaining a highway under legislative sanction must be the fair value of the property being used by it for the convenience of the public”). For a discussion of the controversy
over the “fair value rule,” see Boyd, supra note 6, at 761–69.
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different methods of setting rates as long as the “end result” was just
and reasonable.360 Not surprisingly, the decision was widely (and
rightly) hailed as a watershed not only in public utility regulation but
also in the strong deference to regulatory agencies that marked the
administrative law of the time.361 For these reasons, Hope can make a
strong claim to being the most important case in U.S. energy law.
But it is worth going back to Hope to consider the arguments
made by the dissenting Justices and their implications for how we
have thought about pricing and the public interest since the decision.
Along with Jackson, Justice Frankfurter also dissented. In his view, the
majority decision diminished the role of the courts in ensuring that
regulation would proceed according to a broad understanding of the
public interest.362 “[T]he public interest,” he wrote, “is a texture of
multiple strands. It includes more than contemporary investors and
contemporary consumers. The needs to be served are not restricted
to immediacy, and social as well as economic costs must be
counted.”363 Such a view had important implications for the Court’s
deference to the expertise of the Commission:
It will not do to say that it must all be left to the skill of experts. Expertise is a
rational process and a rational process implies expressed reasons for judgment. It will little advance the public interest to substitute for the hodgepodge of the rule in Smyth v. Ames, an encouragement of conscious obscurity
or confusion in reaching a result, on the assumption that so long as the result
appears harmless its basis is irrelevant.364

Implicit in Frankfurter’s dissent was a concern with the details of price
making. By focusing only on the “end result,” the majority opinion
worked to black box these details, thereby abandoning any
360. Hope, 320 U.S. at 602 (“Under the statutory standard of ‘just and reasonable’
it is the result reached not the method employed which is controlling. It is not theory
but the impact of the rate order which counts. If the total effect of the rate order cannot
be said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry under the Act is at an end. The
fact that the method employed to reach that result may contain infirmities is not then
important.” (citations omitted)).
361. See James C. Bonbright, Utility Rate Control Reconsidered in the Light of the
Hope Natural Gas Case, 38 AM. ECON. REV. 465, 465 (1948) (describing the Hope decision as “one of the most important economic pronouncements in the history of American law”); see also Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the
Emergence of New Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399, 441 (2007) (discussing Hope as an example of the “profound deference of New Deal-era administrative
law”).
362. Hope, 320 U.S. at 627 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“But [the Natural Gas Act’s]
very foundation is the ‘public interest,’ and the public interest is a texture of multiple
strands.”).
363. Id.
364. Id. (citations omitted).
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commitment to substantive review of the techniques of ratemaking.365
This posture of deference, according to Frankfurter, ran counter to the
foundational commitment to the public interest that animated the
Natural Gas Act. The problem in the Hope case was thus not that the
Federal Power Commission had fixed the rates too low, but rather
“that the range of its vision was too narrow.”366
Frankfurter was no stranger to public utility law. Along with
many of his contemporaries, he wrote extensively about public utility
regulation and its role in testing new approaches to the social control
of business.367 For him, the primary task of public utility regulation
was to ensure that key systems of provisioning in a modern industrial
economy—the “essential services” provided by public utilities—
would always serve the broader public interest.368 Although Smyth v.
Ames had been a disaster, it was a mistake, Frankfurter seemed to be
saying, to throw out the judiciary’s duty to safeguard the broad public
interest in its review of ratemaking by expert agencies. Simply put,
one could dispense with the misguided effort to constitutionalize ratemaking that marked Smyth v. Ames while still holding on to an expansive view of the public interest.
There is some irony here. Frankfurter has been celebrated for his
commitment to judicial deference to expert agencies during the New
Deal era,369 and Hope is often held out as the apotheosis of judicial deference to expertise in the field of ratemaking.370 And yet, Frankfurter
dissented in Hope and defended the role of the courts in protecting the
365. Id. at 603.
366. Id. at 627.
367. See, e.g., FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 81 (1930); see
also DANIEL ERNST, TOQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES IN
AMERICA, 1900-1940, at 24 (2014) (“No economic issue was of greater concern to
Frankfurter and other legal progressives in the 1920s than the regulation of public
utilities.” (footnote omitted)); William J. Novak, Law and the Social Control of American
Capitalism, 60 EMORY L.J. 377, 399–404 (2010) (discussing importance of public utility
to the broader Progressive agenda aimed at social control of business).
368. FRANKFURTER, supra note 367, at 81 (“No task more profoundly tests the capacity of our government, both in nation and state, than its share in securing for society
those essential services which are furnished by public utilities. . . . The needs thus met
are today as truly public services as the traditional government functions of police and
justice.”).
369. See Schiller, supra note 361, at 431 (noting that it was Frankfurter “who essentially stripped courts of their power to review ratemakings”); see also id. at 432
(quoting Frankfurter in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310
U.S. 573, 584 (1940): “It is not for the federal courts to supplant the Commission’s
judgment even in the face of convincing proof that a different result would have been
better.”).
370. Id. at 440–41.
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public interest from the more narrow, technocratic approach to ratemaking being developed by the Federal Power Commission.371
While Justices Frankfurter and Jackson obviously could not have
foreseen the era of restructuring, the concerns they voiced in Hope are
relevant to how we think about prices and the public interest in the
current environment. By laying the groundwork for a narrow, economistic understanding of ratemaking and the prices that result, Hope
worked to marginalize the broader notion of public interest that originally motivated public utility regulation and with it the notion that
prices were tools to advance the public interest. This has carried
through into the era of markets, reinforcing a certain invisibility that
works to depoliticize the ways of price making at the center of these
markets. Simply put, Hope’s command that we need not worry about
the ways of price making as long as the result is just and reasonable
has deflected attention from the question of how prices are actually
made—a question that is no less relevant in the case of markets, than
under cost-of-service ratemaking. As long as we stop short of asking
that question and investigating the details of how these markets actually work, we will never be able understand the real politics at work
in the economy.
A. KNOWLEDGE PROBLEMS
The price mechanism, Justice Douglas famously wrote in the Socony-Vacuum case, is the “central nervous system of the economy.”372
In that case, which involved an elaborate plan to control the supply of
distressed gasoline so as to stabilize published price indices, the Court
recognized that the “pricing structure” of a particular market could itself be the object of a price-fixing conspiracy.373 The Socony-Vacuum
case is known for its articulation of the rule that all price-fixing, no
matter the origin or the effect, is per se illegal.374 The rationale is simple and direct: distorted prices send bad signals which lead to coordination failures and inefficient allocation of resources. Only by protecting pricing structures from manipulation and collusion will the price
system be able to perform its proper role.
371. Hope, 320 U.S. at 627.
372. United States v. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
373. Id. at 221 (“Any combination which tampers with price structures is engaged
in unlawful activity. Even though the members of the price-fixing group were in no
position to control the market, to the extent that they raised, lowered, or stabilized
prices they would be directly interfering with the free play of market forces.”); see also
Daniel A. Crane, The Story of United States v. Socony-Vacuum: Hot Oil and Antitrust in
the Two New Deals, in ANTITRUST STORIES (Daniel A. Crane & Eleanor Fox eds., 2007).
374. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 221.
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Consciously or not, Douglas’s description echoed a Hayekian conception of the price system—one that viewed the price mechanism,
when functioning in the context of competitive markets, as the best
solution to the knowledge problem at the heart of modern economies.375 For Hayek, the key to a well-functioning price system was robust competition, which he viewed as a means of discovery rather
than an end-state.376 Competition, Hayek argued, must be allowed to
operate unfettered in order for the price system to work: “the price
system will fulfill this function only if competition prevails, that is, if
the individual producer has to adapt himself to price changes and cannot control them.”377 Government regulation, in turn, should operate
solely in the background—defining property rights, promoting competition, and protecting the price system from the corrupting influences of politics and special interests.378
By emphasizing the superior epistemic performance of the price
system and the limited knowledge of individual market participants,
Hayek offered a powerful alternative to (and critique of) his life-long
adversary, central planning, as well as the neoclassical model of
375. See Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, supra note 3, at 526–27 (“We must
look at the price system as such a mechanism for communicating information if we
want to understand its real function. . . . The most significant fact about this system is
the economy of knowledge with which it operates, or how little the individual participants need to know in order to be able to take the right action. . . . It is more than a
metaphor to describe the price system as a kind of machinery for registering change,
or a system of telecommunications which enables individual producers to watch
merely the movement of a few pointers, as an engineer might watch the hands of a few
dials, in order to adjust their activities to changes of which they may never know more
than is reflected in the price movement.”); see also Lynne Kiesling, The Knowledge
Problem, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS (Christopher J. Coyne & Peter Boettke eds., 2015) (discussing Hayek’s conception of the knowledge problem and
the role of prices and market processes in providing a partial solution).
376. See Hayek, Competition as a Discovery Procedure, supra note 3.
377. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 49 (1944).
378. See F.A. Hayek, The Economy, Science and Politics, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
F. A. HAYEK VOL. 15: THE MARKET AND OTHER ORDERS 213, 225 (Bruce Caldwell ed., 2014)
(“We know the general character of the self-regulating forces of the economy and the
general conditions in which these forces will function or not function, but we do not
know all the particular circumstances to which they bring about an adaptation. This is
impossible because of the general interdependence of all parts of the economic process, that is because, in order to interfere successfully on any point, we would have to
know all the details of the whole economy, not only of our own country but of the whole
world. In so far as we want to avail ourselves of the forces of the market—and there
can probably be no doubt that we must do so if we want even approximately to preserve our standard of life—it would seem that a rational economic policy should confine itself to creating the conditions in which the market will function as well as possible, but should not regard it as its task deliberately to influence or guide individual
activities.”).
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perfect competition, with its assumptions of complete knowledge on
the part of market actors.379 And although Hayek clearly recognized
that the price system did not always work as intended—that we are
still “very far from having learned to make the best use of it”380—he
implicitly rejected the idea that anyone could understand, much less
intervene effectively in the process of price formation in different
markets.381
And yet, Hayek’s emphasis on the relative success of different institutional arrangements in working to solve the knowledge problem,
together with his insights regarding the superior performance of competitive markets in aggregating knowledge and communicating that
knowledge via prices, profoundly influenced subsequent developments in the economics of information and mechanism design that
have in turn led to all manner of interventions in markets.382 In
379. See, e.g., Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, supra note 3, at 527 (“But I
fear that our theoretical habits of approaching the problem with the assumption of
more or less perfect knowledge on the part of almost everyone has made us somewhat
blind to the true function of the price mechanism and led us to apply rather misleading
standards in judging its efficiency. The marvel is that in a case like that of a scarcity of
one raw material, without an order being issued, without more than perhaps a handful
of people knowing the cause, tens of thousands of people whose identity could not be
ascertained by months of investigation, are made to use the material or its products
more sparingly; i.e., they move in the right direction.”).
380. Id. at 528.
381. See Hayek, supra note 378, at 226 (“Not because he knows so much, but because he knows how much he would have to know in order to interfere successfully,
and because he knows that he will never know all the relevant circumstances, it would
seem that the economists should refrain from recommending isolated acts of interference even in conditions in which the theory tells him that they may sometimes be beneficial. The recognition of this limitation of our knowledge is important if we do not
want to become responsible for measures which will do more harm than good.”).
382. See, e.g., Maskin, supra note 218, at 247 (“Friedrich von Hayek’s work was an
important precursor to the modern theory of mechanism design.”); Robert Wilson,
John Harsanyi and the Economics of Information, 14 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 296, 296
(1996) (“A half-century ago, Friedrich von Hayek (a 1974 Nobelist) offered a new perspective on markets, prices, and the invisible hand. In his view, the fundamental process of a market economy is price formation. He interprets prices resulting from competing bids and offers as summaries of information dispersed among traders. It is
essential, but nonetheless amazing, that markets distill the welter of disparate information into terms of trade relevant for productive and allocative efficiency.”). As discussed in Part III, supra notes 217–18, Wilson was deeply involved in electricity restructuring and the design of California’s electricity market. Vernon Smith, another
early proponent of the application of mechanism design and experimental economics
to electricity restructuring, was also deeply influenced by Hayek. See, e.g., Smith, supra
note 217, at 242 (“[E]xperiments have long demonstrated Hayek’s proposition [regarding competition as a discovery procedure]. People discover a price that they didn’t
know existed. They didn’t know there would be some price that they would agree on,
but they find it.”).
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particular, the idea that specific market arrangements could be constructed to harness the power of competition to generate prices that
would solve coordination problems previously committed to regulation opened up a whole world of possibilities by providing a new set
of tools to give effect to the broader goals of deregulation. At the heart
of this work was a commitment to creating new rules and institutions—new “market architectures” to use Robert Wilson’s phrase—
that would establish a basis for competition and allow the Hayekian
process of learning and discovery to proceed.383
In all of this, however, very little attention was given to the question of how politics and power relations influenced the process and
substance of market design. The idea that newly constructed markets
could be kept pure—encased in a set of rules and institutions that
would keep politics at bay—was fundamental to the success of the effort. Actors were viewed as responding to, learning from, and acting
strategically within the constraints of the particular arrangement (a
specific auction structure for example), while almost no attention was
given to the question of how those same actors might work strategically to shape the arrangement itself and thus to determine how competition would proceed. Put crudely, Hayek’s epistemic conception of
the price system, as activated in various applications of mechanism
design, contains within it a deeply conservative posture of anti-politics that stops short of any serious investigation into the political economy of market design.
But once we recognize that price making cannot be understood
in neutral, functionalist terms, efforts to design institutions to solve
the knowledge problem become impossible to separate from politics.
Viewed in this way, prices are not simply pieces of information, but
are also objects of struggle—an insight that one can find in Max Weber’s understanding of markets and prices as well as in the work of
the institutional economists and legal realists, many of whom were
writing at roughly the same time that Hayek was working out some of
his early concepts of the price system.384 By looking at the larger institutional and political environment in which decisions about market
design are made, it becomes clear that there can never be any pre-political set of criteria for determining how to design markets and, in the
process, how to shape and format competition.
383. See Wilson, supra note 217, at 160 (“The basic design choice is the architecture of the market.”); id. at 161 (“The principle . . . is to treat the market design as establishing a mode of competition among the traders. The key is to select a mode of
competition that is most effective in realizing the potential gains from trade.”).
384. See, e.g., WEBER, supra note 12, at 183; Hamilton, supra note 46, at 311.
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Thus, to go back to the Socony-Vacuum case, the Court’s focus on
the manipulation of pricing structures in the oil industry, like the focus
on manipulation of pricing structures in the contemporary natural gas
and electricity markets, leaves unanswered the prior question of how
the pricing structures themselves are constructed and whether they
should be considered objects of investigation or regulation. Indeed, as
the cases of natural gas and electricity make clear, the price mechanisms operating in particular markets are all to some degree contrived
and, as a result, inevitably subject to politics. In each case, the specific
ways of price making have provided partial solutions to the
knowledge and coordination problems in these markets by opening
up new spaces for the forces of competition to operate. But in both
cases the specific ways of price making that emerged were the result
of numerous design choices that, even though framed in the technical,
seemingly neutral language of economics, have determined the nature
and quality of competition and the distribution of opportunities
among market participants. In both cases, moreover, the resulting
prices—the index prices in natural gas and the clearing prices in the
organized electricity markets—take on additional salience compared
to other, more ordinary prices. Like other benchmark prices they are
“systemically significant” in that they determine the value of other
transactions and investments.385 As a result, the ways of price making
that determine these prices are the focus of great interest and ongoing
struggle on the part of market participants.
B. THE HIDDEN ABODE OF PRICE MAKING
The critique of traditional public utility regulation (and much of
the rationale for deregulation) depended fundamentally on the possibility that markets could be designed and overseen in a manner that
would allow prices to form under competitive conditions. In the context of natural gas and electricity markets, FERC assumed that market
forces and the discipline of competition would work to keep prices at
their normal levels—that the market price was, in effect, the just and
reasonable price. FERC learned the hard way that market forces cannot always be trusted to operate in a free and open manner. The California energy crisis demonstrated that it must be vigilant to protect
against gaming and manipulation—that markets are fragile, that market design matters, and that the ways of price making at the heart of
these markets can be objects of manipulation.386
385. See Hockett & Omarova, supra note 120.
386. See supra Parts II & III.
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But the Commission has struggled to understand and surveil the
ways of price making at the heart of these markets. While FERC has
devoted significant attention to market structure and the conduct of
market participants, it has so far not taken on the instrumentalities of
price making themselves—leaving their regulation and oversight
largely to third parties. This is a problem, not least because it calls into
question the supposed advantage of transparency that has often been
used to justify the replacement of regulation with markets.387 As this
Article has demonstrated, the ways of price making at the heart of
both restructured natural gas and electricity markets are in many
ways less transparent than the traditional cost-of-service approach
they replaced. And while FERC has ample legal authority to engage in
more direct oversight and regulation of these ways of price making
should it choose to do so (and there are good reasons why it should),
making these markets more transparent is easier said than done—a
fact that is increasingly apparent as these markets (like others across
the economy) become more sophisticated, more complex, and more
automated.
The challenges that FERC faces in overseeing and regulating natural gas and electricity markets are thus similar in some ways to challenges facing other regulatory agencies in the so-called information
age.388 Understanding market-clearing algorithms and the ways in
which they can be gamed is a very different (and much more difficult)
task than ensuring a proper accounting has been made to determine
cost-of-service and set rates. There are hard questions here about accountability that derive in part from deeper questions about epistemic
competence. Can FERC really claim to understand how these markets
function and can it in turn claim to be discharging its responsibilities
if it continues to treat these indices and algorithms as black boxes?
Should these ways of price making and, by extension, the governance
of these markets be left largely to third parties?
Because the ways of price making at the heart of these markets
are products of active design, they are inevitably subject to politics
and contestation. In effect, the Weberian struggle over prices in the
context of what he called the “market situation” has moved upstream

387. See, e.g., MIROWSKI & NIK-KHAH, supra note 37, at 217–21 (noting the long history of arguments stressing the transparency of markets relative to regulation and
showing how this is undermined in a world of market design where only the designers
“truly understand [these markets’] setup and operation”).
388. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State in the Information Age, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 369 (2016).
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to become, primarily, a struggle over the ways of price making.389
Once this is recognized, it is not hard to see how the often hidden and
highly technical arena of price making is where the politics of markets
are at their most intense—an observation that extends well beyond
the cases discussed in this Article to the large and growing number of
boutique markets and platforms that are based on new, often algorithmic, approaches to price making.390
Such a view has important normative implications. If we approach the indices and algorithms at the heart of restructured natural
gas and electricity markets as part of the common infrastructure supporting these markets, it is relatively easy to conclude that there is a
strong public interest in ensuring that they have integrity and are able
to perform their services as intended.391 More generally, once we recognize that market devices and the various ways of price making in
different markets are objects of conscious design and struggle, it is relatively easy to see how questions of market power and anti-competitive conduct are intimately connected with the microstructures of
price formation.392 By determining the manner in which competition
389. WEBER, supra note 12, at 168–72.
390. See MATTLI, supra note 13; see also Samuel Bowles, Alan Kirman & Rajiv Sethi,
Friedrich Hayek and the Market Algorithm, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 215, 217 (2017) (“Many
markets now involve algorithmic price-setting and order placement alongside direct
human action, raising interesting new questions about the processes by which information is absorbed and transmitted by prices.”).
391. There is some precedent for this in the line of cases following Munn v. Illinois,
94 U.S. 113 (1876). See, e.g., Kinsey Co. v. Bd. of Trade, 198 U.S. 236, 249 (1905) (“[T]he
quotations of prices from the market are of the utmost importance to the business
world, and not least to the farmers; so important, indeed, that it is argued here and has
been held in Illinois that the quotations are clothed with a public use.”). The case was
on appeal from an Illinois Supreme Court case, New York & Chicago Grain & Stock Exchange v. Board of Trade of Chicago, 127 Ill. 153 (1889), which characterized the market statistics and the rules and regulations of the Board of Trade in disseminating those
statistics as clothed with a public interest as understood in Munn and thus subject to
regulation. See also German All. Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 416–17 (1914) (“We
may venture to observe that the price of insurance is not fixed over the counters of the
companies by what Adam Smith calls the higgling of the market, but formed in the
councils of the underwriters, promulgated in schedules of practically controlling constancy which the applicant for insurance is powerless to oppose and which, therefore,
has led to the assertion that the business of insurance is of monopolistic character and
that ‘it is illusory to speak of a liberty of contract.’”).
392. I am indebted to Josh Macey for helping me see this point. Carl Pechman made
a somewhat analogous point in his 1993 book on the electricity industry, in which he
argues that the ability of firms to specify and manipulate access to the computer models used for electric power systems operation and control provided a source of market
power that was inhibiting the transition to a more competitive generation market. See
CARL PECHMAN, REGULATING POWER: THE ECONOMICS OF ELECTRICITY IN THE INFORMATION
AGE 3 (1993).
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will proceed, the different ways of price making operating at the heart
of various markets and platforms across the economy—from natural
gas and electricity to Uber and Amazon—are, to use the old words,
“clothed with a public interest.”393 To be sure, all of this begs the question of what integrity means and who gets to determine the public interest—questions that cannot be answered without getting into matters of politics and institutional competence. But these are the
questions that have animated economic regulation since its inception,
and it is a mistake to view the move to markets as somehow dispensing with them.
C. PUBLIC UTILITY AND MARKET GOVERNANCE
Public utility law has always lived in the shadow of the market.
The standard view of rate regulation sees it as a way of carving off or
ring-fencing certain sectors of the economy from the typical approach
of using the antitrust laws to protect competition. Implicit in this view
is the idea that competitive markets are a more natural way to organize economic activity, and that regulation should be used only when
absolutely necessary.394
This view has been widely endorsed by judges, lawyers, and
scholars from across the political spectrum, reflecting a quintessential
American commitment to free enterprise and the power of markets.395
But one can still embrace the wisdom implicit in such a view while also
recognizing that markets can be quite fragile and difficult to manage.
Like regulation, markets are means not ends. As such, they need to be

393. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877) (“Property does become clothed
with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and
affect the community at large.”).
394. Cf. Stephen G. Breyer, Antitrust, Deregulation, and the Newly Liberated Marketplace, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1005, 1007 (1987) (“Regulation is viewed as a substitute for
competition, to be used only as a weapon of last resort—as a heroic cure reserved for
a serious disease.”); JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, ALBERT L. DANIELSEN & DAVID R. KAMERSCHEN,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 141 (2d ed. 1988) (“Regulation, it is said, is a substitute for competition. Hence its objective should be to compel a regulated enterprise,
despite its possession of complete or partial monopoly, to charge rates approximating
those which it would charge if free from regulation, but subject to the market forces of
competition.”).
395. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951) (“The heart of our
national economic policy long has been faith in the value of competition.”); Thomas K.
McCraw, What Economists Have Thought About Competition and What Difference It
Makes, 101 PROC. MASS. HIST. SOC’Y 24 (1989) (reviewing American thinking on market
competition).
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actively managed, adjusted, and redirected on occasion.396 From this
perspective, markets are fragile not because they are vulnerable to
politics, but because we have failed to recognize that they are inherently political.397
To say this is not simply to recognize (again) that our standard
conception of markets is incomplete and overly abstract. Nor is it just
another way of repackaging the legal realist insight that all markets
are in fact legal entities—that there is no such thing as a “free market.”398 Recent work traveling under the label of law and political
economy, the resurgence of interest in Brandeis, and growing concerns about economic concentration in the platform economy have all
brought the question of markets back into a broader conversation
among legal scholars.399 All of this is a welcome and important development, but we make a mistake if we allow that conversation to operate at the same level of abstraction and generality that has framed the
debate about regulation and markets for much of the last half century.
When we talk about “the market” or “the price system,” as we all do,
we need to be careful to recognize how much discursive work these
concepts do and how they often obscure the actual concrete practices,
techniques, and devices that constitute markets.400
396. See MACKENZIE, supra note 9, at 275 (“Markets, like technologies, are surely
means—to be tinkered with, modified, redesigned, improved, and on occasion delimited—not ends that can only be embraced or rejected.”).
397. Breslau, supra note 285, at 830 (“Markets are products of a political process.
Of the elements that comprise markets—property rights, rules of exchange, unwritten
norms, and a cultural context—all are potential objects of political contention, and
their configuration at any moment is the product of previous rounds of struggle.”).
398. Cf. HARCOURT, supra note 41, at 242 (“At the end of the day, the notion of a ‘free
market’ is a fiction. There simply is no such thing as a nonregulated market—a market
that operates without legal, social, and professional regulation. . . . The question is thus
not whether to regulate. Instead the only question is how the existing and prospective
kinds of regulation distribute wealth. That is the only important question and it is, tragically, masked by our faith in natural order and efficient markets.”).
399. See, e.g., Jedediah Britton-Purdy, David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski & K.
Sabeel Rahman, Building a Law-and-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond the Twentieth-Century Synthesis, 129 YALE L.J. 1784 (2020) (arguing for a new “law-and-politicaleconomy” approach to legal scholarship built upon a reorientation from twentieth century concerns with efficiency, neutrality, and anti-politics toward power, equality, and
democracy); Lina Khan, The Separation of Platforms and Commerce, 119 COLUM. L. REV.
973, 976–79 (2019) (discussing ways in which dominant online platforms stifle competition and distort markets); TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW
GILDED AGE (2018) (arguing for a recovery of the concerns of Brandeis and other Progressives with economic concentration and the need for a revitalized approach to antitrust).
400. See DANIEL T. RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE 47 (2011) (“By the end of the 1970s,
a new idea of the market, cut free from the institutional and sociological relationships
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This Article has embraced the notion that we need to investigate
these techniques and practices directly. In doing so, we need to recognize that market actors and market participants are intimately bound
up with these techniques. And we need to acknowledge that regulation ignores these techniques (or assumes them away) at its peril. Put
another way, the varied and variable ways of price making within particular markets need to be taken seriously as objects of investigation.
We need more concrete histories of how actual markets work to complement our already well-developed intellectual histories of how they
should work in the abstract.401
By focusing on the actual mechanics and relative merits of different techniques of price making, we can perhaps start to move past the
stale and unproductive opposition of regulation and markets that has
structured so much of energy law and the broader field of economic
regulation for the last fifty years and that has left policymakers,
judges, and scholars (among others) struggling to find a vocabulary
with which to engage these questions. Viewed from this perspective,
it may be more productive to think of public utility less as an antiquated form of governmental price fixing that operates as a substitute
for markets than as a political rationality of price making for key systems of provisioning—one that is manifest in an ongoing set of experiments with different institutional forms and practices (including
markets), all of which are (or should be) grounded in a commitment
to fair prices and a broad conception of the public interest. Taking
such a view, this Article contends, brings into relief an older set of
questions about politics and markets, reminding us that markets and
the price mechanisms that power them have always been political instruments, even and especially when they are represented as natural
or efficient solutions to the problem of economic coordination.
CONCLUSION
“Preoccupation with the ethics of pricing,” Joseph Schumpeter
observed, “is precisely one of the strongest motives a man can

constitutive of earlier economic analysis . . . was being called on to do unprecedented
amounts of thinking.”).
401. Cf. Callon & Muniesa, supra note 62, at 1240 (observing that abstract conceptions of “the market” have made concrete markets invisible and seldom studied); Philip
Mirowski, Markets Come to Bits: Evolution, Computation, and Markomata in Economic
Science, 63 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 209, 220 (2007) (criticizing the “habit of regarding
all markets as minor variations on homogeneous auctions, rather than keeping in view
the variegated motley of species that is revealed in a proper natural history of markets”).
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possibly have for analyzing actual market mechanisms.”402 Although
Schumpeter was discussing the economic theories of the Scholastics,
his observation holds for our own time, reminding us that a concern
with the normative dimensions of prices leads one almost inevitably
into an investigation of how prices are formed or made in particular
circumstances.
This Article has taken this commitment to heart in a wide-ranging
investigation of the ways of price making in restructured natural gas
and electricity markets. In doing so, it has drawn upon a diverse array
of sources (old and new) to develop a novel perspective on these markets, training attention to the techniques and practices that generate
prices and determine the ways in which competition proceeds.
Such a perspective, it is argued, leads to a more realistic understanding of what these markets can and cannot do as well as a more
robust set of considerations for reform. But it is also generative beyond the specific cases addressed here and increasingly relevant in
the face of growing enthusiasm for designer markets and the adoption
of new, often algorithmic, approaches to pricing across the economy.
In all of these cases, careful attention to the techniques and practices
of price making helps to surface important questions about politics,
fairness, and the public interest that have lain dormant for too long.

402. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 60 (1954).

